PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BONIFACIO BALTAZAR, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

BONIFACIO BALTAZAR was grazing his carabao outside the cemetery
of Bgy. Kaingin, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, around seven o’clock in the morning of
Christmas Day 1992. When it started to rain he went inside the cemetery to seek
shelter. As he entered, he smelled a foul odor which he thought was coming from
one of the mausoleums. He immediately went to the house of Bgy. Capt. Anastacio
Rigdaus to report the matter; however the barangay captain was not there.
Baltazar was able to see him only the following day. Bgy. Capt. Rigdaus then
summoned two (2) of his tanods and told them to proceed to the cemetery
to investigate the report. The tanods eventually found the body of a
young girl already in a state of decomposition, later identified to be that of
seven (7)-year old Gladys Joy Marcos who had been missing since 11 December
1992.

On 1 August 1994, or two (2) years later, Bonifacio Baltazar
was charged with murder for the killing of seven (7)-year old Gladys Joy Marcos
in an Information which alleged that about 11 December 1992, at around five
o’clock in the afternoon, he willfully and feloniously, with intent to kill,
cruelty, use of superior strength, employing means to weaken the defense or to
insure impunity, hit her head with a hard object resulting in her instantaneous
death.^[1]

Roberto Marcos, father of Gladys Joy, testified that his
daughter had been missing since 11 December 1992 and was found dead on 26
December 1992 inside the cemetery in Bgy. Kaingin, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija.
Subsequently, the accused Bonifacio Baltazar, a neighbor living some five (5)
houses away, became a suspect in the killing of Roberto’s daughter.

Alejandro Briones, whose house was just fifty (50) meters away
from that of the accused, testified that in the afternoon of 11 December 1992
while he was on his way home from his onion plantation he passed by the accused
Bonifacio Baltazar and Gladys Joy Marcos walking hand in hand near the cemetery.

That much, unfortunately, was the evidence for the
prosecution.

The accused denied participation in the perpetration of the
crime. He claimed that he never left his house on 11 December 1992 and was in
fact playing tong-its^[2] with his
neighbors.

Bgy. Capt. Anastacio Rigdaus testified that it was the accused
who reported to him the stench supposed to be coming from one of the tombs in
the cemetery. He also said that he saw the accused attend the wake of the
victim.

Rodrigo Lucero, a public school teacher, testified that on 11
December 1992 he and his companions were at the cemetery constructing a tomb for
one of his relatives, and that on that day he saw a person enter the cemetery
but could not identify him as the person of the accused.

Mercy Mercado whose house was near the cemetery testified that
between 4:00 o’clock and 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 11 December 1992
Gladys Joy bought some snack items from her store. She was riding on a bicycle
with a male companion in his 20’s.

On the basis of the very scanty evidence herein narrated, the
court a quo on 28 March 1997 found the accused guilty of murder and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Gladys
Joy Marcos P50,000.00 for her death, P50,000.00 for moral damages, and to pay
the costs.^[3]

Quite obviously, the trial court convicted the accused of
murder based on circumstantial evidence. It thus ratiocinated –

It is true that no witness testified that it was the accused
who had in fact killed the victim. However, Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: a)
There is more than one circumstance; b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and c) The combination of all the circumstances are such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution brought to fore the following circumstances
which purportedly prove that the accused is the culprit, to wit: 1. That the
accused was seen with the victim in the town cemetery at around 5:00 o’clock of
December 11, 1992 and immediately before she disappeared x x x x 2. That the
victim was missing thereafter x x x x 3. That the victim was found dead in the
very town cemetery and near the place where she and the accused were seen x x x
x 4. That the accused left and was never seen anymore in the town after the
discovery of the body of the victim on December 26, 1992 x x x x 5. That the
accused has not visited nor condoled with the family during the wake of his
neighbor x x x x

There are other circumstances which the Court notes (in)
proving the guilt of the accused. For one, while the accused claims he was at
the wake of the victim for three (3) hours x x x there was no witness to
corroborate his presence. On the other hand, Roberto Marcos, the victim’s
father, as well as witness Francisco Flores, testified that they never saw the
accused at the wake x x x x This casts serious doubt as to the credibility of
the accused’s alibi, especially when considered in the light of the fact that he
should have readily been noticed at the wake, being the person who first
reported the existence of a dead body to the authorities. It is likewise strange
that the accused, as he himself admitted, never attempted to talk to the
victim’s relatives.

Clearly, for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence to
prosper, the prosecution must establish more than one circumstance indubitably
linking the accused to the commission of the crime. Likewise, the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proved and that the combination of all
these circumstances must produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. This is
not so in the instant case.

Strictly speaking, the prosecution presented in evidence only
one (1) circumstance linking, albeit indirectly, accused-appellant to the crime,
i.e., that he was seen walking hand in hand with the victim outside the cemetery
in the afternoon of 11 December 1992 immediately before the latter’s
disappearance. As to the fact that accused-appellant left Bongabon immediately
after knowing that he was being suspected of having killed Gladys Joy, it only
remained a mere supposition on the part of the prosecution. Other than the
testimonies of Alejandro Briones and Roberto Marcos to the effect that they had
not seen the accused-appellant after 26 December 1992, no other evidence was
presented to prove their claim that indeed he had already left Bongabon.

On the contrary, their testimonies were belied by the fact that
when the warrant of arrest was issued against accused-appellant, it was stated
therein that the latter could be found at his residence in Bgy. Kaingin,
Bongabon, Nueva Ecija. In fact, after the warrant of arrest was served,
accused-appellant was found and apprehended in no time at all at his stated
address. If indeed he was in hiding as intimated by the prosecution, then the
apprehending officers would have encountered difficulty in finding him. Also, it
is not true that accused-appellant was not at the wake of the victim. On this
fact, Bgy. Capt. Rigdaus corroborated the testimony of accused-appellant that he
was at the wake of the victim.

For a conviction based on circumstantial evidence to stand, it
is imperative that there be a confluence of circumstances. These circumstances
which are proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person.^[4] We find that the
web of circumstances adverted to above does not constitute an unbroken chain
that would fairly lead to the conclusion that it was accused-appellant who
killed the victim. In short, the circumstances laid by the prosecution failed to
establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. There were
lapses in the ruling of the court below.

First, it declared that “Briones clearly and
categorically identified the accused as the one who took the victim to the
cemetery immediately before the latter was killed or reported missing.”
This is misleading. Nowhere in the testimonies of Briones could be found that it
was accused-appellant who brought the victim into the cemetery. He only
testified that he passed by the victim and accused-appellant who were walking
towards the cemetery. In fact, upon further clarification, Briones
did not even know where accused-appellant and the victim went after he passed
them by.

Second, it was error on the part of the court below to
state that “while the accused claims he was at the wake of the victim for three
hours x x x there was no witness to corroborate his presence. On the other hand,
Roberto Marcos x x x as well as witness Francisco Flores, testified that they
never saw the accused at the wake.” As culled from the records, Bgy. Capt.
Rigdaus corroborated the testimony of accused-appellant that he attended the
wake of the victim. Likewise, the records revealed that Flores did not testify
that he did not see accused-appellant at the wake of the victim.
In fact, he never mentioned the wake of the victim at all. All he said was that
accused-appellant did not attend the burial of Gladys Joy.
Plainly, wake and burial are two different things. Besides, Flores would have
been incompetent to conclude that accused-appellant did not attend the wake as
Flores himself was not present at the wake all of the time. It was possible then
that accused-appellant was there during the time when Flores was absent.
Moreover, it was understandable and not unusual for accused-appellant not to
talk to or approach the parents of Gladys Joy during the vigil. As explained by
accused-appellant, he was not personally acquainted with the Marcoses but, just
the same, he went to the wake as was customary for a neighbor in their place.

Third, the trial court convicted
accused-appellant based mainly on the testimony of Briones. The court a
quo stated thus: “A perusal of the records shows that perhaps the most
important evidence in the prosecution’s favor is the testimony of Alejandro
Briones x x x x The fact that witness Rodrigo Lucero saw a person (enter the
cemetery) who was not the accused does not prove that the categorical
identification of Alejandro Briones pointing to the accused as the person seen
with the victim is false. In the first place, the Court noted the demeanor of
Alejandro Briones at the witness stand who testified in all candor.” But a
closer scrutiny of the records would reveal that Briones was not really
straightforward in his testimony. In fact, at one instance, the hearing of the
case was reset due to the confusion manifested by Briones. The minutes of the
hearing held on 7 November 1994 is quite revealing. It stated –

When the case was called for hearing, the Public Prosecutor
conducted his direct examination of prosecution witness Alejandro Briones.
However, due to an apparent state of confusion manifested by the witness as
noticed by the Court and Cross-Examining Counsel, the continuation of the cross
examination of the witness Alejandro Briones is hereby reset x x x x^[5]

In criminal prosecutions, the identity of the offender must be
established.^[6] In the instant case, the
prosecution endeavored to demonstrate that accused-appellant was the assailant
by showing that he was the last person seen in the company of the victim
immediately before she disappeared. Nonetheless, based on the quantum of
evidence required in criminal cases, the evidence presented by the prosecution
would not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
accused-appellant. It cannot be made to rest on mere speculations or even
probabilities.^[7] It is not sufficient
for conviction that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or even a
probability of guilt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed
the crime is required.

At all times an accused is presumed innocent unless proved
otherwise. The onus is on the State to dispose of this presumption. In
the case before us, we find that the prosecution miserably failed to discharge
its burden. Although accused-appellant proferred only denial and alibi as
defenses, still, the evidence presented by the prosecution was weaker, and could
not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 40, of Palayan City in Crim. Case No. 0534 – P is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Bonifacio Baltazar is
ACQUITTED on insufficiency of evidence or on reasonable
doubt.

The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to
forthwith cause the release of Bonifacio Baltazar unless the latter is held for
another lawful cause and to inform this Court accordingly within ten (10) days
on the action taken hereon.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

^[2] A card game.

^[3] Decision penned by Judge
Erlinda Pestaño Buted, RTC-Br. 40, Palayan City, p. 18; Rollo, p. 126.

^[4] People v. Ragundiaz, G.R. No.
124977, 22 June 2000.

^[5] Original Records, p. 59.

^[6] People v. Castillo, G.R. No.
130188, 27 April 2000.

^[7] People v. De Los Santos, G.R.
No. 126998, 14 September 1999, 314 SCRA 303.