PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AVA MA. VICTORIA CARIQUEZ Y CRUZ, AND LEEZEL FRANCO Y SAMSON, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

People versus Cariquez

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Ava Ma. Victoria Cariquez y Cruz, the mother of a two and a half year old girl named Mariel Cariquez y Cruz, and Leezel Franco y Samson, the mother's live in partner, for the death of the child. The mother was charged with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act Number 7659, and her partner was charged in the same information as a co-conspirator. The case matters because the Supreme Court here explains how circumstantial evidence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, the defense of accident, and conspiracy operate together in a child abuse prosecution that ends in death.

Procedural History

The two accused were originally charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, with serious physical injuries under Section 10, Article VI of Republic Act Number 7610. After the child died on 31 May 1996, the information was amended to charge parricide. On 19 March 1997, the trial court convicted Ava of parricide and sentenced her to reclusion perpetua, and convicted Leezel of homicide and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, with costs. Both accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning a single error: that the trial court gravely erred in convicting them without sufficient evidence.

Facts

In January 1996, Ava and her daughter Ethel moved into a townhouse at Royal Townhomes in Mandaluyong City, together with Ava's sister Lilia Gojul and Ava's live in partner Leezel Franco. The household was violent. Ava and Leezel quarreled almost every day, and both were using drugs. Neighbors heard the little girl crying every day, even at one or two o'clock in the morning.

On 14 April 1996, Lilia visited and was shocked to see Ethel with a shaven head, a face full of contusions, faded cigarette burns on her neck, marks of pinching and maltreatment on her arms and legs, black eyes, and contused knees from prolonged kneeling. When asked who hurt her, Ethel tearfully pointed to Ava and Leezel. A neighbor, Michelle Torrente, saw the burns and bruises, and Ethel told her, "pinaso po ako," naming Leezel as the one who burned her. Another neighbor, Theresa Castillo, asked the yaya why the child's hair was shaved, and the yaya answered, "parusa." When Lilia visited again on 12 May 1996, the child was sickly and had even more contusions.

On 27 May 1996, Ethel was rushed unconscious to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. Ava first told the doctor that the child's uncle had mauled her, then changed her story and said the child fell from the stairs. The doctors found a combination of chronic and acute bleeding on the brain, a skull fracture, and soft tissue injuries, and noted that the head injury was confluent, meaning it was sustained on different dates. Ethel died on 31 May 1996 from severe traumatic head injury. In her affidavit and reply-affidavit, Ava pointed to Leezel as the one who beat the child with a belt buckle; on the witness stand, she claimed the death was an accident.

Issues

• Whether or not the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the child's statements identifying her tormentors were hearsay, or admissible as part of the res gestae.
• Whether or not the defense of accident exempted Ava from criminal liability.
• Whether or not conspiracy was established between Ava and Leezel.

Applicable Provisions

Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on part of the res gestae, provides:

Section 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequently thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

This provision allowed the child's spontaneous answers naming her abusers to be received in evidence despite her death.

Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, invoked by the defense, exempts from criminal liability one who acts under circumstances stated therein; the Court applied its requisites to the claim of accident.

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability: x x x

The Court held that the requisites of accident were not proven, so this exemption did not apply.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that circumstantial evidence may convict, provided there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are drawn are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The prior acts of torture were inseparable from the fatal act of 27 May 1996, which the Court called the coup de grace.

On the second issue, the Court held that the declarations of the neighbors as to what they personally observed were not hearsay. As to the child's answers identifying her abusers, the Court held they formed part of the res gestae, the startling occurrences being the tortures inflicted on her. The Court explained that there is no fixed interval of time between the startling event and the declaration; what is required is that the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive.

On the third issue, the Court held that accident did not exempt Ava, because the requisites were not shown: that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care, that the injury was caused by mere accident, and that there was no fault or intent to cause the injury. The defense of accident shifted to the accused the burden of proving the exemption, and the totality of Ava's story proved instead that the child was maltreated and pushed hard, driving her head to the cemented stairs.

On the fourth issue, the Court agreed that conspiracy was established, applying the settled rule that in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, and each conspirator is liable for the crimes committed by the other.

Doctrine

Circumstantial evidence suffices for conviction when there is more than one circumstance, the underlying facts are proven, and their combination produces moral certainty of guilt. A child's spontaneous statement identifying her abuser, made in the wake of a startling occurrence, is admissible as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130, and no fixed interval of time defeats it. The defense of accident under Article 12 requires a lawful act done with due care, injury by mere accident, and absence of fault or intent, and it shifts the burden of proof to the accused. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Ava for parricide and of Leezel for homicide, with the penalties and costs imposed by the trial court.

Remember This

Remember the line that a child's spontaneous outcry naming her abuser is part of the res gestae, and that accident never excuses one whose own unlawful act caused the injury. Examiners use this case on circumstantial evidence, the res gestae exception, and the requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance.