THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. POTENCIANO MATONDO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On March 11, 1955, Potenciano Matondo and twenty nine (29) others were
charged, upon complaint of the Philippine Women’s Educational
Association, before the Court of First Instance of Davao, with an
alleged violation of Republic Act No. 947, in an information which
reads:

“That during the period commencing
January, 1955, up to the present, in the municipality of Panabo,
Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the abovementioned accused, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, with deliberate intent and without
proper permit from any competent authority, in violation of said Act
No. 947, did then and there willfully, maliciously and unlawfuly enter
and occupy, through force, strategy and stealth, several portions of
public agricultural land situated in the Municipality of Panabo,
Province of Davao, and comprise within the area covered by Sales
application No. 19010 of the Philippine Women’s Educational
Association, a corporation duly registered under the laws of the
Philippines, and which has been granted an entry permit thereto by the
Bureau of Lands.”

On March 14, 1955, the
defendants therein filed a Motion to Suspend the Issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest against them on the ground that they have been in
possession of the land, subject matter of the above information, before
June 20, 1953, the effectivity date of Act 947. The motion was set for
hearing in the course of which, the defense, thru the testimony of
Potenciano Matonda and by the documentary evidence presented,
established the following facts:

That the defendants were members of the Magsilang Magsasaka Ng Davao at Cooperativa,
which have caused the filing of at least three (3) petitions with the
Office of the President of the Philippines, urging the segregation of
some 282 hectares of land, part of the Davao Penal Colony Reservation,
situated in the municipality of Panabo, Davao (Exhibits B, Q.). From
the time of the original petition, which was May 10, 1953, they have
been in possession of the property and out of the 282 hectares, 51
hectares have been cultivated to coffee, corn, palay, abaca, beans and
coconuts. The said petitions were coursed to different offices,
firstly, to the Department of Justice for comment and recommendation
(Exhibit C) then to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(Exh. J), who was instructed by the Office of the President to draft
the necessary proclamation for the exclusion of the parcel of land in
question from the operation of Proclamation No. 414, series of 1931,
and from the Davao Penal Colony Reservation and to declare it open for
disposition under the Public Land law. The members of the association,
by the request of its President Potenciano Matondo, were given passes
by the officers concerned of the Davao Penal Colony, to enter the land
(Exhibit L, dated Oct. 17, 1953).

In compliance with the
instructions of the President, the corresponding proclamation was
drafted and on June 30, 1954, Proclamation No. 39, excluding 282
hectares from the Davao Penal Colony Reservation was promulgated. In
said Proclamation, however, the land was referred to and described as
“S1-V-19010-D” (Philippine Women’s Educational Association). It appears
that while the petitions filed by the defendants with the office of the
President were being coursed to the different offices, the Philippine
Women’s Educational Association learned of the impending proclamation
and applied for the same land. The permit of the Educational
Association to enter the land was issued on August 21, 1954, long after
the defendants had taken possession of the premises and had introduced
improvements thereon.

After the hearing on the motion, the lower court rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder:

“A
la vista do los hechos expuestos, es evideate que antes del 20 de junio
de 1953, fecha en que entro en vigor la ley No. 947, los acusados
entraron y ocuparon 50 hectareas, poco mas o menos, del terreno
solicitado por la ofendida, quienes hasta la fecha continuan en
posesion de la porcion indicada, introduciendo algunas mejoras en ella,
contraria a las alegaciones de la querella de autos, que los acusados
en enero de 1955, ilegalmente y mediante fuerza entraron y ocuparon una
porcion del terreno solicitado por la referida ofendida.

En su virtud, el Juzgado considerando que la ley No. 947, que entro en
vigor el 20 de junio de 1953, on tiene efecto retroactive, y
considerando que los acusados entraron y ocuparon la porcion de terreno
indicado antes de que la ofendida solicitase el terreno en concepto de
compra, por insuficiencia de pruebas, ordena el sobreseimiento de esta
causa, con las costas de oficio.”

The State
appealed and the Solicitor General, in his brief, assigned four (4)
errors supposedly committed by the lower court in dismissing the
information, all of which converage on the singular proposition, to
wit: the propriety and legality of the dismissal, in spite of the fact
that the hearing had, was only on the motion to suspend the issuance of
the warrant of arrest against the defendants. No brief was submitted by
the appellees.

The appeal taken by the State refers
principally to the procedural aspect of the case. It is argued that the
procedure followed by the lower court is not that which the Rules
prescribed. We agree with the Solicitor General that the regular
procedure was not followed. This notwithstanding, the motion filed by
the defendants, could be considered as a Motion to Quash the
information. For one thing, it is not the caption of a pleading, but
the allegations contained therein, that should prevail. In the Motion
to suspend the issuance of warrant of arrest, the defendants claimed
that “their possession of the land, subject matter of the information,
dates back before the effectivity of the law punishing the acts”. The
motion, objectively considered, therefore, was virtually a motion to
quash on the ground that the information does not charge an offense or
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, as in fact, with
respect to the accused, the offense did not then exist.

The
fact that no evidence was presented by the prosecution to substantiate
the allegations of the information, does not warrant the conclusion
that the State was deprived of its day in court. The prosecution did
not object to any of the documentary evidence submitted, which were
official communications from the proper authorities. It cross-examined
the sole witness for the defense. Having reached the conclusion that
the entry to and occupation of the land, by the accused, took place
before the, effectivity of the law, under which they were charged,
because the evidence on record showed it, proving the lack of authority
to enter would not alter the fact that the acts complained of occurred
when said acts were not yet punishable. As far as the criminal aspect
of the case is concerned, it did not matter whether it was the
complainant educational association or the defendants that entered the
land first. It is enough that the entry and occupation of the
defendants was shown to have taken place before the law became
effective.
The decision appealed from should, therefore be, as it
is hereby affirmed, and the appeal of the State is dismissed. Without
costs.

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, and Dizon, JJ., concur.