ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSE ROBLES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an appeal by plaintiff Zambales Chromite Mining Co. from the
order of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, dated April 23, 1957,
dismissing plaintiff’s first third, fourth and fifth causes of action,
and from the order of July 23, 1957, denying plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration.

On March 17, 1953, Jose Robles, later referred to as the operator,
and the Zambales Chromite Mining Co., later mentioned as the Mining
company, executed a contract later supplemented by a “supplementary
agreement”, ratified on August 14, 1953. According to these two
documents, the mining company which owned or had possession of several
mineral claims containing mineral deposits, principally chrome ore,
delivered them to Robles who undertook to operate them, extract chrome
ore in a minimum amount of 2,000 tons a month and to pay the company a
royalty of P3.00 per ton net. The other terms of the agreements were
that Robles “was to repair and rehabilitate at his own expense within a
certain period, the roads and bridges of the mining camp and points of
mining operations to the provincial road in Sta. Cruz, Zambales, for
the purpose of transporting the chrome ore to the Acoje pier or to
shipping points of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, and to spend for said repair
and rehabilitation at least P30,000; that as operator, Robles
guaranteed the prompt payment of the wages and salaries, at the minimum
wage rate, of all laborers and employees; that any violation of any of
the terms and conditions of the agreements was sufficient ground for
the cancellation of the same by the aggrieved party; and that at the
termination or cancellation of the agreements, all improvements placed
on or undertaken by the operator at his expenses on the premises, such
as, buildings, development work, roads, bridges and the like, which are
not movable machinery or equipment, shall become the property of the
mining company, without obligation to pay for the same.

Appellant claiming that Robles had violated the terms and conditions
of the agreement and that notwithstanding demands made by it on him to
comply therewith, he refused to do so, advised him in writing on
October 10, 1956 that it had cancelled and resolved the contract and
demanded that he vacate the mining properties. On November 28, 1956, it
filed an action for unlawful detainer against him in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. Robles moved for dismissal of the
case on the ground that the Justice of the Peace Court had no
jurisdiction over the same, involving as it did mineral land. His
motion was denied by the Justice of the Peace Court as well as the
Court of First Instance of Zambales before which he raised the question
of jurisdiction. Not satisfied, Robles brought the case to this
Tribunal in a petition for certiorari (Robles vs. Zambales
Chromite Mining Co., et al., 104 Phil., 688; 55 Off. Gaz. [31] 6012).
In our decision promulgated on September 30, 1958, we ruled that the
Justice of the Peace Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
unlawful detainer case, although it involved mineral land.

In the meantime, on January 7, 1957, plaintiff-appellant filed the
present action. Its complaint contained six causes of action. Under the
first cause of action, plaintiff claims that defendant Robles failed to
extract at least 2,000 tons of chrome ore a month, beginning August 15,
1953, he having produced only the total of about 3,158 tons of chrome
ore, instead of a total of 76,000 tons up to October 15, 1956; that
defendant failed to pay plaintiff, at least the sum of P12,000 per
month beginning August 15, 1953, or the total sum of P456,000 from
August 15, 1953, computed at 12% of the total value of said 76,000 tons
computed at the selling price of P48.00 per ton, defendant having paid
the plaintiff as of October 11, 1956, only the total sum of P3,426.25;
that defendant Robles did not spend at least P30,000, Philippine
currency, as agreed upon for the rehabilitation and repair of
plaintiff’s roads and bridges; that he also failed to promptly pay the
wages and salaries of his laborers and employees working at the said
mines, causing many of said laborers to quit their jobs, thereby
contributing largely to defendant’s failure to comply with the other
terms of the agreements; and that despite the cancellation and
dissolution of the contract by plaintiff, defendant continued to
operate the mining mineral claims and had removed a total of at least
1,258.22 tons of chrome ore between October 11 and 31, 1956, of which
858.22 tons defendant shipped on board a steamer and sold at a total
price of P43,280.44, and the remaining 400 tons were deposited by him
along the bank of the Nayum River in Sta. Cruz, Zambales, preparatory
to their being shipped out and removed from the municipality of Sta.
Cruz, Zambales. For the protection of the rights and interest of the
plaintiff, it later asked the court to perpetually restrain Robles and
his co-defendants from further mining, extracting and removing chrome
ore from the aforementioned mineral claims.

Under the second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that contrary to
the stipulations of the contract, plaintiff had been reliably informed
that Robles and his co-defendants, representatives and employees, were
contemplating or threatening to remove and destroy or tear down the
buildings, roads, and bridges and other permanent improvements and
installations belonging to the plaintiff and within its mining
properties. Plaintiff asked that defendants be restrained from’
removing and destroying or tearing down said improvements.

Under the third cause of action, plaintiff alleges that although
under the conditions of the contract, plaintiff had the right to send
and station its representatives at the mines to verify the status of
the same and to take the necessary precautions to protect its
properties, Domingo Sison and Juan Francisco, acting for themselves
and/or representatives of defendant Robles, with the aid of the
Philippine Constabulary, ejected the representatives sent by the
plaintiff on or about January 2, 1957; that inasmuch as Robles had lost
any right to occupy the mineral claims and extract chrome ore therefrom
because of the cancellation of the contract, he had no right to prevent
plaintiff or its authorized representatives from entering the mines and
from using its buildings, roads, and bridges and other permanent
improvements; consequently, defendant should be restrained from
preventing plaintiff or any of its representatives from entering the
mining premises and using the buildings, roads, bridges, etc.

Under the fourth cause of action, plaintiff asks that defendants be
required jointly and severally to pay the sum of P43,280.44, which
represents the value of 858.22 tons of chrome ore referred to in the
first cause of action.

Under the fifth cause of action, plaintiff claims delivery by or
payment from defendants of the balance of 400 tons of chrome ore
removed from the mines after the cancellation of the contract and
deposited along the bank of the Nayum River, mentioned in the first
cause of action.

Under the sixth cause of action, plaintiff claims the sum of P10,000 attorney’s fees plus expenses of litigation.

Robles filed his answer to the complaint with a motion to dismiss
the first, fourth and fifth causes of action and that after trial on
the merits, the second, third and sixth causes of action be likewise
dismissed.

On April 23, 1957, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s first,
third, fourth and fifth causes of, action and at the same time ordered
that the second and sixth causes of action be set for hearing. For
purposes of reference, we reproduce said order:

“Acting on the defendant’s petition to dismiss
plaintiff’s instant complaint and it appearing that there is pending
before tile Justice of the Peace Court of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, Civil
Case No. 127 entitled ‘Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Jose
Robles, for ejectment; that this Court has found in Civil Case No. 1878
of this court, which is a certiorari case filed by Jose Robles against
the Justice of the Peace of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, in connection with
said Case No. 127, that said Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction to
try said Civil Case No. 127; that between said Case No. 127 and the
instant case there is identity of parties and rights asserted, as well
as substantial identity in the relief prayed for, so that any judgment
which may be rendered in said Case No. 127 will undoubtedly amount to res adjudicata
with respect to plaintiff’s First, Third, Fourth and Fifth causes of
action in this case; that the proper remedy for these causes of action
is an action for recovery of possession and rents; that it has been
held that an injunction should not be a substitute for an ordinary
action of forcible entry and detainer (Sofia Devera vs.
Crispin Arbes, 13 Phil, pp. 273, 277). the Court finds the dismissal of
plaintiff’s first, third, fourth and fifth causes of action to be in
order.

“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the plaintiff’s first, third,
fourth and fifth causes of action in this case, are hereby dismissed,
and the case is set for hearing on June 12, 1957 at 9:00 o’clock in the
morning with respect to plaintiff’s Second and Sixth causes of action.”
(Record pp. 84-85).

In asking for the dismissal of the first cause of action, Robles
claimed that there was another action pending between the same parties
and for the same causes before the Justice of the Peace Court of Sta.
Cruz, Zambales, Case No. 127, referring to the illegal detainer case
already mentioned. In answer, plaintiff contends that the pendency of
another action may not be invoked in the instant case because although
the basis of the complaint for ejectment and the present action arose
from the same cause, namely, violation by the defendant of the terms
and conditions of the contract, nevertheless, the relief prayed for and
the rights asserted are different. In the ejectment case, plaintiff
seeks to obtain possession of the mining premises, while in the present
action, in its first cause of action, plaintiff merely asks that
defendant be restrained from operating the mining properties without
necessarily being ejected therefrom. Moreover, other causes of action
set forth in plaintiff’s complaint, such as the recovery of P43,280.44
(fourth cause of action) and the recovery of 400 tons of chrome ore or
its value (fifth cause of action) are well beyond the jurisdiction of
the Justice of the Peace Court, and what is more, the same do not
represent back rentals or damages on account of the unlawful detainer.

Defendant, however, asserts that the first cause of action is in
the guise of a separate action of injunction and is in effect a
petition for preliminary injunction in aid of its action for illegal
detainer, a remedy where the Justice of the Peace Court may not grant;
naturally, plaintiff may not obtain such relief by filing a separate
action for injunction in the Court of First Instance based on the same
set of facts. As to the distinction sought to be made by plaintiff
between the right to possess the mining properties and the right to
operate them, such distinction according to defendant is untenable for
the reason that both rights are co-existent on the question of whether
the contract between the parties still exists. And as regards the
fourth and fifth causes of action, defendant urges that an action for
injunction is not the proper remedy, but rather the filing of an
ordinary action for the recovery of a sum of money and for replevin,
respectively.

The test by which to determine whether or not the pendency of
another action is a bar to a second action, is whether or not “the
judgment to be rendered in the action first instituted will be such
that, regardless of which party is successful, it will amount to res
adjudicata against the second action,” (Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation vs. Aldecoa & Co., 30 Phil., 255). In said case, it was held that to sustain the plea of another action—

“* * * there must be the same parties, or at least
such as represent the same interests. There must be the same rights
asserted and the same relief prayed for. This relief must be founded on
the same facts, and the title or essential basis of the relief sought
must be the same. The identity of these particulars should be such that
if the pending case had already been disposed of, it could be pleaded
in bar as a former adjudication of the same matter between the parties.”

In that case, it was held that an action to annul the mortgage was
not a bar to an action for foreclosure of the same, for the reason that
although a final judgment in the first case declaring the mortgage null
and void, would preclude the bank from foreclosing the mortgage, and
therefore dismiss its foreclosure suit, still a decision holding such
mortgage valid would pave the way for the foreclosure of the same. So,
in the present case, the action for ejectment in the Justice of the
Peace Court may not bar plaintiff’s suit in the Court of First
Instance, or rather some of his causes of action because if it is
finally decided that defendant should be ejected from the mining
premises in the illegal detainer case, plaintiff could still prosecute
his causes of action against defendant in the Court of First Instance.
It is argued that injunction should not be a substitute for an ordinary
action for forcible entry and detainer (Sofia Devesa vs.
Crispin Arbes, 13 Phil., 277, cited in the appealed order). However, in
the four causes of action dismissed by the trial court, plaintiff does
not seek to deprive defendant of the possession of the property. In the
first cause of action, plaintiff merely asks that defendant be
restrained from further operating the mines or otherwise extracting ore
from the same; in the third cause of action, the relief sought was to
restrain defendant from preventing plaintiff’s representatives from
entering the premises, and from using the buildings, roads, bridges,
etc. on the premises. The fourth and fifth causes of action only ask
for the recovery of sums of money or the possession of chrome ore,
other than damages due to illegal detainer. Incidentally, it will be
observed that although defendant Robles in his answer did not ask for
the dismissal of the third cause of action, nevertheless, the trial
court motu proprio dismissed the same.

There is another and practical reason for holding that the unlawful
detainer case in the Justice of the Peace Court of Sta. Cruz, Zambales,
does not bar the causes of action of plaintiff company in the Court of
First Instance, dismissed by the latter, and it is this. Said unlawful
detainer case may for all practical purposes now be considered
abandoned and if it has not yet been tried and decided by the Justice
of the Peace Court, plaintiff company may well ask for its dismissal.

It is highly possible that plaintiff company, seeing that the final
determination of the unlawful detainer case would be unduly delayed, as
in fact it was, and consequently, it could not obtain the possession of
the property in question in the immediate future, it filed the present
case in the Court of First Instance in 1957, in order to obtain
appropriate relief and minimize damages and losses. But then it could
not well ask for the dismissal of said unlawful detainer case, for the
reason that the Justice of the Peace Court had temporarily lost
jurisdiction over the same, the case having been finally taken to this
Tribunal on appeal, and said appeal was not decided by us until
September 30, 1958.

The abandonment or dismissal of the unlawful detainer case would not
substantially affect the rights of the mining company over the property
in litigation, particularly, possession thereof, for the reason that
such possession may well be included in the relief prayed for in the
Court of First Instance under the prayer at the end of its complaint
that “plaintiff further respectfully prays the Honorable Court to such other relief
as to it may seem just and equitable under the premises”. Besides, the
Court of First Instance in the present action would be in a much better
position to determine the relative rights of the parties over the
property in question, and from the standpoint of the plaintiff company,
grant it all the relief it is entitled to. Ordinarily, the relief that
a plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case is entitled to is the
possession of the property under litigation, and damages in the form of
accrued rentals or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the premises. In the present case, however, the rentals and property
were to be in the form of royalties based on the production of chrome
ore as a result of the operation of the mineral claims by the
defendant. However, there looms an incompatibility, namely, that in
order to pay said royalties, the defendant must operate the mines and
produce chrome ore, but according to the relief prayed for by
plaintiff’s complaint, it does not want defendant to continue operating
the mines. Besides, there are other reliefs demanded by plaintiff
company which are not available in an unlawful detainer case, such as,
the payment of royalties, preventing defendant from removing, burning,
or otherwise destroying any of the buildings, roads, bridges and other
permanent improvement and installations on the premises; preventing
defendant from impeding plaintiff’s representatives from entering and
staying on the properties as agreed upon in the contract; the payment
by defendant to the plaintiff of about P43,000 for chrome ore said to
have been sold by him, and for the delivery of chrome ore deposited by
defendant along the bank of the river, preparatory to the shipment
thereof abroad, or value of said ore.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is set aside and
the case is ordered remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings, with costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur in the result.
Padilla, J., took no part.