TINING RESUENA, ALEJANDRA GARAY, LORNA RESUENA, ELEUTERIO RESUENA, EUTIQUIA ROSARIO AND UNISIMA RESUENA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, 11TH DIVISION AND JUANITO BORROM…

Resuena versus Borromeo

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, Eutiquia Rosario, and Unisima Resuena against the Court of Appeals and Juanito Borromeo, Sr., the co-owner and overseer of two parcels of land in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu. Borromeo sued the Resuena group for ejectment so that he could expand his beach resort, and the case matters because it settles two questions every Bar candidate must know: whether a single co-owner may bring an ejectment suit over common property, and whether occupants who stay by mere tolerance may claim reimbursement for the houses they built.

Procedural History

Borromeo filed a complaint for ejectment with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu. After a summary proceeding, the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the lots were owned in common and had not been partitioned, so Borromeo had no preferential right of possession over the portions occupied by the petitioners. Borromeo appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, which reversed the Metropolitan Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court held that a co-owner may bring an ejectment action under Article 487 of the Civil Code, and directed the petitioners to vacate the premises, without prejudice to their returning after partition to the portions adjudicated to those who had authorized them to occupy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Facts

Juanito Borromeo, Sr. co-owned two parcels of land in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu, known as Lot No. 2587 and Lot No. 2592. He owned six-eighths of Lot No. 2587, while the late spouses Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja owned two-eighths. Lot No. 2592 was owned in common by Borromeo and the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, although their shares were not determined. Borromeo developed the portions he occupied into the Borromeo Beach Resort.

Before the suit, five of the petitioners resided on the upper portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly with the acquiescence of the Bascon spouses and their heir, Andres Bascon. The sixth petitioner, Eutiquia Rosario, occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592, allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja. Borromeo claimed that all the petitioners occupied the property by virtue of his own liberality. When he sought to expand the resort, he demanded that they vacate, and they refused.

On 16 February 1994, Borromeo filed the complaint for ejectment. The petitioners anchored their defense on Borromeo's testimony in an earlier civil case, where he admitted that the land was not yet partitioned but that he and Basilisa Maneja had verbally agreed on which portions each would occupy. The petitioners argued that this agreement estopped Borromeo, that their occupation had brought it beyond the statute of frauds, and that they were assignees of the Bascon shares. Borromeo died during the pendency of the case, and his heirs were substituted for him.

Issues

• Whether or not a single co-owner may bring an action for ejectment over property owned in common, without joining the other co-owners.
• Whether or not the co-owner's testimony in the earlier civil case estopped him from filing the ejectment suit against the petitioners.
• Whether or not the verbal agreement between the co-owners, allegedly consummated by the petitioners' occupation, removed the case from the statute of frauds and gave the petitioners a right to remain.
• Whether or not the petitioners, as occupants by mere tolerance, are possessors in good faith entitled to reimbursement of necessary expenses under Article 546 of the Civil Code.

Applicable Provisions

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides:

Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This is the categorical and unqualified authority the Court relied on to uphold Borromeo's right to eject the petitioners from Lot No. 2587.

Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides:

Acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument.

The Court invoked this to note that no writing established any right of occupancy in the petitioners, and that the parties could reciprocally compel the documentation of any agreement.

Article 546 of the Civil Code provides:

Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

The Court used this to deny reimbursement, because the petitioners were not possessors in good faith.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Borromeo had the right to eject the petitioners from Lot No. 2587. Article 487 grants every co-owner the authority to bring an ejectment action, and the Court treated the suit as instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. A favorable decision would benefit them, but an adverse decision could not prejudice their rights. Since the petitioners failed to prove any authority to occupy, the co-owner's prerogative to eject was clear. Persons who occupy the land of another by tolerance, without any contract, are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, and a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy.

On the second issue, the Court held that Borromeo was not estopped. His testimony merely suggested a possible agreement on which portions each co-owner would occupy; it established no definitive partition and no right of the petitioners to dwell on the land. Estoppel binds only the parties to it or their successors in interest, and a stranger to a transaction may neither be bound by nor take advantage of it.

On the third issue, the Court held that the alleged verbal agreement did not help the petitioners. Common ownership over Lot No. 2587 remained inchoate and undivided, so any claim that the Bascon spouses could assign determinate portions to the petitioners was speculative. Tolerance bears no legal fruit and may be withdrawn at the owner's change of heart. Absent any document creating a right of occupancy, the petitioners had none.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to reimbursement. Article 546 applies only to a possessor in good faith, one who builds on land believing he is the owner. Persons who occupy by sheer tolerance are not possessors in good faith. As to Eutiquia Rosario, who occupied Lot No. 2592, no argument was raised, so the Court maintained the ruling that Borromeo could eject her as well.

Doctrine

Under Article 487 of the Civil Code, any one co-owner may bring an action in ejectment over common property, and the suit is deemed instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. Occupants who stay on land by mere tolerance, without any contract, hold under an implied promise to vacate upon demand, and ejectment is the proper remedy. Estoppel is effective only between the parties to the transaction or their successors in interest, and a stranger may not invoke it. A verbal agreement among co-owners on the portions they will occupy does not amount to partition and confers no assignable right over determinate portions while common ownership remains undivided. Finally, only a possessor in good faith, one who builds believing he is the owner, may claim reimbursement and retention under Article 546; occupants by tolerance are not possessors in good faith.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with costs against the petitioners.

Remember This

Memorize the line that any one co-owner may bring an action in ejectment, and that tolerance creates no right and no possessor in good faith. Examiners use this case to test Article 487 on co-owner ejectment and Article 546 on reimbursement for improvements built by mere tolerance.