FELINO QUIAMBAO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN FEDERICO S. COMANDANTE AND MEMBERS, ATTYS. ROBERTO T. AGAGON AND ADE…

Quiambao versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition filed by Felino Quiambao, a police officer of the Western Police District Command in Manila, against the Court of Appeals, the National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission, and its officers. Quiambao was dismissed from the police service for grave misconduct arising from a robbery and mauling incident, and he asks the Supreme Court to reverse the dismissal and order his reinstatement. The case matters because it settles two things every reviewee must know: first, that the power to dismiss erring police officers is shared concurrently between the People's Law Enforcement Board and the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and second, that procedural rules on petitions for review are to be liberally construed in favor of substantial justice.

Procedural History

The administrative complaint was investigated by the Office of the Hearing Officer of the National Police Commission, and the case was later forwarded to the People's Law Enforcement Board of the City of Manila for adjudication. Separately, the Philippine National Police Inspectorate Division investigated the charges, and its Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer recommended dismissal, which the Acting PNP Chief approved. Quiambao appealed to the National Appellate Board, which affirmed the dismissal and later denied his motion for reconsideration. He then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it for lack of merit, holding that he failed to state the material date of receipt of the resolution denying reconsideration, and that the jurisdictional issue was raised too late. His motion for reconsideration was merely noted because the appellate resolution had already become final. He then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

On the evening of 22 December 1990, Espie Catolico was walking along Capulong Street in Tondo, Manila, looking for her housemaid who had left the day before. An old woman told her that a policeman was looking for her because the housemaid was in his custody. When Catolico went to the place indicated, she was allegedly accosted by Quiambao and five other persons, who forcibly took her handbag and its contents, consisting of merchandise, jewelry, and personal items worth approximately nine thousand pesos. Quiambao then allegedly herded her into his owner-type jeep, brought her to a dimly lit portion of North Harbor, slapped her several times, and warned her not to look for her housemaid anymore.

Catolico filed a sworn statement with the PNP Inspectorate Division accusing Quiambao and six others of robbery-holdup and mauling, corroborated by a witness, Grace Commendador. On 22 August 1991, she filed a separate administrative complaint for grave misconduct with the Office of the Hearing Officer at the National Police Commission, Western Police District.

The Inspectorate Division investigated, and on 31 October 1992 its Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer recommended dismissal, approved by the Acting PNP Chief. Quiambao appealed to the National Appellate Board, which affirmed the dismissal on 25 October 1993 and denied reconsideration on 27 December 1993. He received a certified copy of that denial only on 23 September 1996, and filed his petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 7 October 1996.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review for failure to state the material date of receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
• Whether or not the Acting PNP Chief and the National Appellate Board had jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case, given the concurrent jurisdiction of the People's Law Enforcement Board.
• Whether or not the summary dismissal of Quiambao was supported by substantial evidence and rendered with due process.

Applicable Provisions

Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975, the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, provides:

Section 41. (a) Citizen's Complaints. – Any complaint by an individual person against any member of the PNP shall be brought before the following: (1) Chiefs of police, where the offense is punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days; (2) Mayors of cities or municipalities, where the offense is punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for a period of not less than sixteen (16) days but not exceeding thirty (30) days; (3) People's Law Enforcement Board, as created under Section 43 hereof, where the offense is punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for a period exceeding thirty (30) days; or by dismissal.

This provision appears to lodge dismissal cases in the People's Law Enforcement Board, but it must be read with the summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief.

Section 42 of the same law provides:

Sec. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors. - The Chief of the PNP and regional directors, after due notice and summary hearings, may immediately remove or dismiss any respondent PNP member in any of the following cases: (a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty of the charges; and (c) When the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer.

This is the source of the concurrent power of the PNP Chief to dismiss, which the Court upheld in this case.

Paragraph (c) of Section 41 provides:

(c) Exclusive Jurisdiction – A complaint or a charge filed against a PNP member shall be heard and decided exclusively by the disciplining authority who has acquired original jurisdiction over the case and notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction as regards the offense; Provided, That offenses which carry higher penalties referred to a disciplinary authority shall be referred to the appropriate authority which has jurisdiction over the offense.

This rule of exclusive original jurisdiction defeated Quiambao's claim that only the People's Law Enforcement Board could hear the case.

Section 6 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 provides:

SECTION 6. Contents of the petition. – The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in Revised Circular No. 28-91. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein.

This governs the contents of a petition for review and supplied the standard for deciding whether Quiambao substantially complied.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition substantially complied with Section 6. Paragraph 18 of the petition stated that the resolution denying reconsideration was received by Quiambao on 23 September 1996, supported by a certified copy. The appellate court's belief that he had been served earlier had no evidentiary basis. The Court stressed that procedural rules must be liberally interpreted so as not to frustrate substantial justice.

On the second issue, the Court held that the PNP Chief and the regional directors share the power to dismiss with the People's Law Enforcement Board. Reading Section 41 with Section 42, the Court found that the power to dismiss is concurrently exercised. Under paragraph (c) of Section 41, the disciplining authority that first acquires original jurisdiction keeps it exclusively, so the Inspectorate Division's earlier acquisition of jurisdiction excluded the later complaint before the National Police Commission hearing officer. The Court added that even if jurisdiction were lacking, Quiambao was estopped from raising it because he actively participated in the proceedings and objected only when the outcome turned against him.

On the third issue, the Court held that the summary dismissal was valid. Summary proceedings require notice of the charges, copies of supporting affidavits, and the filing of an answer, and sworn statements may take the place of oral testimony. Quiambao filed position papers and motions for reconsideration, so he was given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The concurring findings of the Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer, the Acting PNP Chief, the National Appellate Board, and the Court of Appeals were conclusive on the Court.

Doctrine

The power to dismiss erring members of the Philippine National Police is not lodged exclusively in the People's Law Enforcement Board. Under Section 42 of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP Chief and regional directors may summarily dismiss a member when the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong, when the respondent is a recidivist, or when he is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer. This power is concurrent with that of the People's Law Enforcement Board.

Under paragraph (c) of Section 41, the disciplining authority that first acquires original jurisdiction over a complaint retains it exclusively, to the exclusion of other bodies with concurrent jurisdiction. A party who actively participates in proceedings and raises the issue of jurisdiction only after an adverse ruling may be estopped from questioning that jurisdiction.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, and the submission of position papers may suffice; a full adversarial trial is not indispensable. Finally, procedural rules on petitions for review are liberally construed to serve substantial justice.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the dismissal of Quiambao from the police service.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the PNP Chief's summary dismissal power under Section 42 is concurrent with the People's Law Enforcement Board's jurisdiction, and the body that first acquires jurisdiction keeps it exclusively. Examiners use this case to test concurrent jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 6975, estoppel to raise jurisdiction, and the liberal construction of procedural rules in petitions for review.