G.R. No. 128067. June 05, 1998

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA FILSYSTEMS (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU), PETITIONER, VS. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND FILSYSTEMS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions June 5, 1998 SECOND DIVISION PUNO, J.:
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PUNO, J.:


Assailed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Resolution and Order[1]
of the public respondent, dated June 28, 1996 and November 18, 1996,
respectively, dismissing petitioner’s petition for certification
election.

It appears that petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Filsystems (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU) is a registered labor union
with Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-10-1575-95 issued by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on October 25, 1995. On
November 6, 1995, petitioner union filed a Petition for Certification
Election among the rank-and-file employees of private respondent
FILSYSTEMS, Inc. before the DOLE – National Capital Region (NCR).[2]
Attached as annexes to the petition are the Certificate of Registration
issued by the DOLE, copies of union membership signed by thirty three
(33) rank-and-file employees of respondent company, the Charter
Certificate showing its affiliation with the National Federation of
Labor Unions (NAFLU-KMU), the list of union officers, the certification
of the union secretary of the minutes of the general membership meeting,
the Books of Accounts and its Constitution and By-Laws.[3]

Private respondent opposed the petition. It questioned the status
of petitioner as a legitimate labor organization on the ground of lack
of proof that its contract of affiliation with the NAFLU-KMU has been
submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days
from its execution.[4]

In reply, petitioner averred that as a duly registered labor
union, it has “all the rights and privileges x x x to act as
representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining
with employers.”[5]

On January 12, 1996, Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap dismissed the
petition for certification election. He ruled that petitioner, as an
affiliate of NAFLU-KMU, has no legal personality on account of its
failure to comply with paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) of Section 3, Rule II
of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,[6] viz:

“x x x

“In matters of affiliation of an independently registered union,
the rules provide that the latter shall be considered an affiliate of a
labor federation after submission of the contract or agreement of
affiliation to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30)
days after its execution.

“Likewise, it mandates the federation or national union concerned
to issue a charter certificate indicating the creation or establishment
of a local or chapter, copy of which shall be submitted to the Bureau of
Labor Relations within thirty (30) days from issuance of such
certificate.

“A close examination of the records of the case does not reveal
that the federation and the independent union have executed a contract
or agreement of affiliation, nor had it shown that it has submitted its
charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor Relations, within thirty (30)
days from issuance of such charter certificate as amended by the rules.

“Petitioner argued that it has complied with all the requirements
for certification election pursuant to the mandate of Sec. 2, Rule V of
Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code; that the rule cited
by respondent is not included in the Rule citing the requirements for
certification election.

“We disagree with petitioner’s contention. The rule cited by the
petitioner, Sec. 2, Rule V, Book V, sub-paragraphs A, B, C, D, E, F and
G, refers to an independently registered labor organization which has
filed a petition for certification election.

“In the case at bar, an independently registered union has
affiliated with a federation, hence, strict compliance with the
requirements embodied in Sec. 3, paragraphs A, B and E of Rule II, Book V
of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code should be
complied with.

“Record discloses that petitioner has not shown to have executed a
contract or agreement of affiliation nor has it established that is has
submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
within thirty (30) days from its execution.

“Thus, petitioner in this case having failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement, there was no valid affiliation. Consequently,
petitioner has no legal personality because the union failed to attain
the status of legitimacy for failure to comply with the requirements of
law.”

Petitioner appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. It reiterated its contention that as an independently
registered union, it has the right to file a petition for certification
election regardless of its failure to prove its affiliation with
NAFLU-KMU.[7]

On February 26, 1996, private respondent opposed the appeal. It
argued that petitioner should have filed its petition for certification
election as an independently registered union and not as a union
affiliated with NAFLU-KMU.[8]

Meanwhile or on February 7, 1996, another union, the Filsystem
Workers Union (FWU), filed a Petition for Certification Election in the
same bargaining unit. On March 22, 1996, the Med-Arbitration – NCR
Branch granted the petition. The certification election held on April
19, 1996, was won by FWU which garnered twenty six (26) votes out of the
forty six (46) eligible voters. The FWU was certified on April 29,
1996, as the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees
of private respondent. Eventually, FWU and the private respondent
negotiated a CBA.[9]

On June 11, 1996, the private respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal of petitioner as it has become moot and academic. It also
invoked Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the
Labor Code stating that “once a union has been certified, no
certification election may be held within one (1) year from the date of
issuance of a final certification election [result].”[10]

In opposing the Motion to Dismiss Appeal, petitioner contended
that its appeal is not moot as the certification election held on April
19, 1996, was void for violating Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing
Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,[11] viz:

“SEC. 10. Decision of the Secretary final and inappealable.
– The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) calendar days within which to
decide the appeal from receipt of the records of the case. The filing of
the appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of
any certification election. The decision of the Secretary shall be final
and inappealable.”

Petitioner further argued that the CBA executed between the FWU and
the private respondent could not affect its pending representation case
following Section 4, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the
Labor Code[12] which states:

“SEC. 4. Effects of early agreements. – The
representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a
collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the last 60
days of the subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the
representation case.”

On June 28, 1996, respondent Secretary dismissed the appeal
interposed by petitioner on the ground that it has been rendered moot by
the certification of FWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file workers of respondent company. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in an Order dated November 18, 1996.[13]

Before this Court, petitioner contends:

I

Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in holding that the pending
appeal in the representation case was rendered moot and academic by a
subsequently enacted collective bargaining agreement in the company.

II

Public respondent committed a serious legal error and gravely
abused its discretion in failing to hold that the legal personality of
petitioner as a union having been established by its Certificate of
Registration, the same could not be subjected to collateral attack.

The petition is meritorious.

I

We shall first resolve whether the public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion when he effectively affirmed the Resolution
dated January 12, 1996 of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner’s
petition for certification election for failure to prove its affiliation
with NAFLU-KMU.

The reasoning of the public respondent and the Med- Arbiter is
flawed, proceeding as it does from a wrong premise. Firstly, it must be
underscored that petitioner is an independently registered labor union
as evidenced by a Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE. As a
legitimate labor organization, petitioner’s right to file a petition for
certification election on its own is beyond question.[14]
Secondly, the failure of petitioner to prove its affiliation with
NAFLU-KMU cannot affect its right to file said petition for
certification election as an independent union. At the most,
petitioner’s failure will result in an ineffective affiliation with
NAFLU-KMU. Still, however, it can pursue its petition for certification
election as an independent union. In our rulings, we have stressed that
despite affiliation, the local union remains the basic unit free to
serve the common interest of all its members and pursue its own
interests independently of the federation.[15]

In fine, the Med-Arbiter erred in dismissing petitioner’s
petition for certification election on account of its non-submission of
the charter certificate and the contract of affiliation with the
NAFLU-KMU with the BLR. The public respondent gravely abused his
discretion in sustaining the Med-Arbiter’s Resolution.

II

We shall now resolve the issue of whether the appeal filed by the
petitioner was rendered moot and academic by the subsequent
certification election ordered by the Med-Arbiter, won by the FWU and
which culminated in a CBA with private respondent.

Public respondent’s ruling is anchored on his finding that there
exists no pending representation case since the petition for
certification election filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the
Med-Arbiter. According to the public respondent, the legal effect of the
dismissal of the petition was to leave the playing field open without
any legal barrier or prohibition to any petitioner; thus, other
legitimate labor organizations may file an entirely new petition for
certification election.

We reject public respondent’s ruling. The order of the
Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner’s petition for certification election
was seasonably appealed. The appeal stopped the holding of any
certification election. Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of
Book V of the Labor Code is crystal clear and hardly needs any
interpretation.

Accordingly, there was an unresolved representation case at the
time the CBA was entered between FWU and private respondent. Following
Section 4, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,
such CBA cannot and will not prejudice petitioner’s pending
representation case or render the same moot.[16] This rule was applied in the case of Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano[17]
where we held that “[t]here should be no obstacle to the right of the
employees to petition for a certification election at the proper time,
that is, within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the life of a
certified collective bargaining agreement x x x, not even by a
collective agreement submitted during the pendency of the representation
case.” Likewise, in Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja,[18] we held that a prematurely renewed CBA is not a bar to the holding of a certification election.

Finally, we bewail private respondent’s tenacious opposition to
petitioner’s certification election petition. Such a stance is not
conducive to industrial peace. Time and again, we have emphasized that
when a petition for certification election is filed by a legitimate
labor organization, it is good policy for the employer not to have any
participation or partisan interest in the choice of the bargaining
representative. While employers may rightfully be notified or informed
of petitions of such nature, they should not, however, be considered
parties thereto with an inalienable right to oppose it. An employer that
involves itself in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact
that it wants to create a company union. Thus, in Consolidated Farms, Inc. II v. Noriel,[19]
we declared that “[o]n a matter that should be the exclusive concern of
labor, the choice of a collective bargaining representative, the
employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the least,
deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend
support to such an attempt at interference with a purely internal
affair of labor. x x x [While] it is true that there may be
circumstances where the interest of the employer calls for its being
heard on the matter, x x x sound policy dictates that as much as
possible, management is to maintain a strictly hands-off policy. For if
it does not, it may lend itself to the legitimate suspicion that it is
partial to one of the contending unions. That is repugnant to the
concept of collective bargaining. That is against the letter and spirit
of welfare legislation intended to protect labor and promote social
justice. The judiciary then should be the last to look with tolerance at
such efforts of an employer to take part in the process leading to the
free and untrammeled choice of the exclusive bargaining representative
of the workers.”

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the public respondent are
set aside. The Bureau of Labor Relations is ORDERED to hold a
certification election in respondent company with petitioner as a
contending union. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., on leave.


[1] In OS-A-4-100-96.

[2] Rollo, pp. 5 and 72.

[3] Records, pp. 1-30.

[4] Rollo, pp. 6 and 72-73.

[5] Rollo, p. 6.

[6] Resolution, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 36-37.

[7] Rollo, pp. 38-44.

[8] Rollo, pp. 77-78.

[9] Rollo, pp. 7 and 78.

[10] Rollo, pp. 46-48.

[11] Rollo, pp. 57-61.

[12] Id.

[13] Order, p. 1; Rollo, p. 24.

[14] See Articles 212
(h) and 257 of the Labor Code; Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Secretary of
Labor and Employment, 247 SCRA 1 [1995]; San Miguel Foods, Inc. – Cebu
B-Meg Feed Plant v. Laguesma, 263 SCRA 68 [1996].

[15] Adamson &
Adamson, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 127 SCRA 268 [1984]; St.
Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. v. Torres, 223 SCRA 779 [1993]; Pambansang
Kapatiran ng mga Anak Pawis sa Formey Plastic National Workers
Brotherhood v. Secretary of Labor, 253 SCRA 96 [1996].

[16] Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, 267 SCRA 303 [1997].

[17] 172 SCRA 49, 58 [1989].

[18] 179 SCRA 127 [1989].

[19] 84 SCRA 469,
473-475 [1978]; see also Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v.
Laguesma, 223 SCRA 452 [1993]; Barbizon Philippines, Inc. v.
Nagkakaisang Supervisor ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. – NAFLU, 261 SCRA
738 [1996].