THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DIONISIO SANTOS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Dionisio Santos, a policeman of Pateros, Province of Rizal, acting under the
orders of his chief who desired to put a stop to pilfering in a certain
locality, patrolled this district, and about midnight, seeing two persons in
front of an uninhabited house and then entering an uninhabited camarin,
arrested them without warrant, although no crime had been committed, and took
them to the municipal presidencia where they were detained in the jail
for six or seven hours when they were released. Was the accused guilty of
coercion as found by the trial court? Or was he guilty of the lesser offense of
arbitrary detention as suggested by the Attorney-General? Or was he innocent as
argued by his counsel?

The powers of peace officers in the Philippines, generally stated, are the
same as those conferred upon constables under the Anglo-American Common Law. The
extent of their authority to make arrests without warrant and the limitations
thereon, as held by the Supreme Court, are. as stated in the language of the
Legislature in the Charter of the city of Manila. (U. S. vs. Fortaleza
[1909], 12 Phil. Rep., 472.) The Administrative Code (sec. 2204, edition of
1916; sec. 2258, edition of 1917) enjoins municipal policemen to “exercise
vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.”

The accused herein cannot justify the arrest by reason of acting in obedience
to legal process which it was his duty to obey. He must justify, if at all,
under the rule that peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant any
person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably
tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime
or. breach of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty.
Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another
protective bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even if the suspected
person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable.

One should however not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not
presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Often he has no
opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief
to prevent the escape of the criminal. To err is human. Even the most
conscientious officer must at times be mislead. If, therefore, under trying
circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer
and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he
should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will
terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law. (See
generally Voorhees on Arrest; 5 Corpus Juris, pp. 399, 416; 2 R. C. L., p.
450.)

The Common Law rule as to the arrest without warrant of suspicious
night-walkers is of particular interest. Blackstone says, “Watchmen, either
those appointed by the statute of Winchester (13 Edw. I, c. 4) to keep watch and
ward in all towns from sun-setting to sun-rising, or such as are mere assistants
to the constable, may virtute officii (by virtue of their office)
arrest all offenders, and particularly night-walkers, and commit them to custody
till the morning.” (II Cooley’s Blackstone, p. 1445.) The cases hold that a
peace officer might arrest and detain in prison for examination persons walking
in the street at night whom there is reasonable ground to suspect of felony,
although there is no proof of a felony having been committed; but the arrest
would be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent and there were no
reasonable grounds of suspicion to mislead the officer. (Miles vs.
Weston [1871], 60 111., 361, citing English decisions.) The reason of the rule
is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about streets and uninhabited
premises at midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime.
Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surely
the officer must not be forced to await the commission of robbery or other
felony. The rule is supported by the necessities of life.

The foregoing are the applicable principles of the American and English
Common Law as to the powers of peace officers. The principles of the Spanish law
are not essentially different. (See U. S. vs. Sanchez [1914],
27 Phil. Rep., 442.) Both rest upon the same foundation of reason and common
sense.

Judgment is reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with the
costs de officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo, and Street, JJ.,
concur.