THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CARLOS VILLA ABRILLE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Does a private individual who, claiming to be the owner of a parcel of land,
with companions comes upon this property under cultivation by another and there
by the use of a revolver to intimidate drives the tenant away and cuts six
cavans of palay, claimed as payment for rent, commit the crime of coercion as
charged in the complaint and as found by the trial court, or the crime of
robbery as recommended by the Attorney-General? This question contains the
salient points necessary for resolution, putting others as to which there is
doubt to one side.

The Attorney-General supports his contention that the crime of robbery has
been committed with the citation of the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of January 18, 1887, and the case of U. S. vs. Albao ([1914], 29 Phil.
Rep., 86). We believe, however, that the facts herein follow rather other
decisions of this court, of which U. S. vs. Vega ([1903], 2 Phil. Rep.,
167); U. S. vs. Tupular ([1906], 7 Phil. Rep., 8); U. S. vs.
Tremoya ([1908], 10 Phil. Rep., 89) ; and U. S. vs. Mena ([1908], 11
Phil. Rep., 543) are the most prominent. Thus, in the first case of United
States vs. Vega, the crime charged was robbery. The facts as set forth
in the decision were as follows:

“One morning in March, 1898, the four accused, provided with bolos and
firearms, went to a granary belonging to Ponciano Alba, situated at the place
called Tansa Norte, within the limits of the town of Capiz, Panay, and, under
threats of death, compelled Basilio Difon, the person left in charge by the
owner, to leave the house and to deliver the palay which was stored there under
lock and key. This Difon did and made delivery of the palay by measure, this
operation lasting two days. It appeared that there were 447 cavanes of palay,
which were taken out and carried away on sleds, in the presence of witnesses, to
the house of Fernando. They also carried away agricultural instruments, a
caldron, 2 barotos, 43 boards, 5 beams, a milk cow, and 10 carabaos
which were in the field.”

Note the similarity of the facts in the Vega case and in the present
instance—use of firearms, intimidation, palay unlawfully taken. Note further
that Mr. Justice Torres, speaking for the court, states: “Notwithstanding the
fact that Fernando Vega, who was the principal offender in this case, alleges
that he was the owner of the property of which he took possession by means of
this coercion of the person left in charge of it, it is not permissible to take
the law into one’s own hands, and to seize the property of a third person
without being authorized to do so, and entirely disregarding the authorities
whose duty it is to settle disagreements between private individuals and to give
each one that which is his due, in accordance with the law.” Note, finally, that
the court held that the facts proven constituted the offense of coercion and not
robbery.

The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to
robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused.
Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another by the use
of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was the purpose, without
authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor, to
compel another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then,
conviction for coercion under article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the
accused are the prime criterion. (5 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 716.) And there
was no common robber in the present case, but a man who had fought bitterly for
title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands and attempting
to collect what he thought was due him. (See Villa Abrille vs.
Banuelos, [1911], 20 Phil. Rep., 1, involving title to land occupied by
complainant.) Animus furandi was lacking.

Finding no error in the judgment of the lower court, sentencing the accused
to two months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory
penalties of article 61 of the Penal Code, to pay a fine of three hundred pesos,
or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs, the same is affirmed with the costs of this instance. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo, and Street, JJ.,
concur.