REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, FLORENTINO CENIZA, SANTIAGO CENIZA, ESTANISLAO CENIZA, ROMEO SIMBAJON, PABLO RAMOS, ATILANO BONGO, EDGAR ADOLFO, E…

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision^[1]
dated September 28, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31728,
affirming the decision^[2] in
LRC Case No. N-46 of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaue City, Branch XXVIII,
which declared private respondents as the owners entitled to the registration
of the lots in question.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Apolinar Ceniza was the declared owner in 1948 of Lot No. 1104,
located at Cabancalan, Mandaue City, under Tax Declaration No. 01686. When he
died, his heirs took possession of the property and in 1960 partitioned the
same through a deed of extrajudicial partition. Apolinar’s children, namely, Santiago, Estanislao, Florencia,
Manuela, Mercedes and Florentino, all surnamed Ceniza, each got 1/8 share of
the property. His grandchildren, namely, the siblings Remedios Adolfo, Melecio
Ceniza, and Constancia Zanoria, each got 1/24 share, while Apolinar’s other
grandchildren, namely, the siblings Concepcion Suico, Benjamin Ceniza, Lilia
Ceniza and Delfin Ceniza, each got 1/32 share.

Private respondent Florentino Ceniza purchased the shares of his
sisters Manuela and Mercedes and the share pertaining to the siblings Jesusa,^[3]
Benjamin and Delfin. Together with his share, Florentino became the owner of
Lot Nos. 1104-A&C and had them tax declared in his name.

Florencia’s share, a portion of Lot No. 1104-B, was purchased by
Mercedes who in turn bartered the same with the share acquired by Santiago,
another private respondent in this case.

A portion of Santiago’s property was bought by his daughter,
Asuncion Ceniza, married to private respondent Atillano Bongo and who
successfully obtained a tax declaration therefor.

From the portion purchased by Asuncion Ceniza, another private
respondent, Romeo Simbajon, purchased an area of 270 square meters. Romeo also
acquired a tax declaration in his name. He was the husband of Felicitas Ceniza,
another daughter of Santiago.

The share acquired by Estanislao, another child of Apolinar, was
also a portion of Lot No. 1104-B. He also caused the tax declaration pertaining
to the said lot transferred in his name.

The siblings Remedios Adolfo and Constancia Zanoria, married to
private respondent Pablo Ramos, bought the share of their brother, Melecio
Ceniza. Remedios’ share, in turn, was transferred to her heirs, private
respondents Edgar, Emma, Jerry, Glenn, Gina, Lorna, Chona, Evelyn, Hubert,
Amiel, all surnamed Adolfo, and the heirs of their brother Leoncio Adolfo,
namely, his wife Elenita Adolfo, and children David and Prestine May Adolfo.

On November 4, 1986, private respondents applied for registration
of their respective titles over the property they inherited from Apolinar
Ceniza, with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28. Petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
opposed the application on the following grounds:

1.       That neither the
applicant/s nor their precedessors-in-interest have been in open continuous exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).

2.       That the muniment/s
or title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payment/s receipt/s of applicant/s
if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do/es not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands
applied for or of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior
thereto. Said muniment/s of title do/es
not appear to be genuine and the tax declaration/s and/or tax payment receipts
indicate pretended possession of applicants to be of recent vintage.

3.       That the claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be
availed of by the applicants who have failed to file an appropriate application
for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as
required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on
October 25, 1996.

4.       That the parcel/s
applied for is/are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

In a decision dated February 28, 1990, the Regional Trial Court
of Mandaue City granted the application.^[4] It
held that since the applicants’ possession of the land for more than thirty
(30) years was continuous, peaceful, adverse, public and to the exclusion of
everybody, the same was “in the concept of owners.” Since the land was neither encumbered nor subject to any other
application for registration, the trial court ordered that, upon the finality
of its decision, the decrees of registration should be issued in favor of the
applicants.

The Solicitor General interposed an appeal for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines before the Court of Appeals.

In a decision dated September 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. It held that the ruling in Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals,^[5] that
before public land could be registered in the name of a private individual, it
must first be established that the land had been classified alienable and
disposable, “refers to public lands and not to those which have acquired the
nature of a private property in view of the continuous possession thereof by
its claimants.” The Court of Appeals
held:

In this case, it was sufficiently established by appellees that
they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject lots even before the year 1927, or fifty nine (59) years before the
application was filed (TSN, April 13, 1989, pp. 3-4; February 6, 1989, p. 7-11;
June 2, 1988, pp. 3, 8-9). This period
more than sufficiently satisfies the 30 years requirement of the Public Land
Act for property to be considered as private land. Significantly, Section 4,
Presidential Decree No. 1073 provides:

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 4(c), Chapter
VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bonafide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.

Appellant was thus no longer required to prove that the property in
question is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Clearly, the property no longer forms part
of the public domain. The long and continuous possession thereof by appellees
converted said property to a private one. This finds support in the ruling in
Director of Lands vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, to wit:

“x x x alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30) years under the Public Land Act, as
amended is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure.” The
above is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases of
Cariño v. Insular Government, Suzi v. Razon, and Herico v. Dar, that open
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion
of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. x x x In interpreting the provisions of Section
48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, this Court said in Herico v. Dar, “x x x
when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of the patent.”

The Court of Appeals then cited Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court.^[6]
In that case, this Court ruled that “alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land
Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure.”
Moreover, appellant Republic’s claim that the property in question remains to
be “public land” under the Constitution, is “refuted” by this Court’s
pronouncement in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court that “the Constitution cannot impair vested
rights.”

The Court of Appeals concluded its decision with the following
observations:

Finally, we note that no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of
Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that
the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing
that the lots in question are forestal land, unlike the case of Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701, wherein the Director of Lands
questioned the petition for registration filed by the applicant therein on the
claim that the property applied for registration in his favor was classified
and proven to be forestal land.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied
in a resolution dated October 29, 1996. Traversing petitioner’s argument that under Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution, all lands of the public domain are owned by the State, the
Court of Appeals stated that said provision “further states that agricultural
lands are excluded from those lands that may not be alienated.” It further ruled:

In the instant case, among the documents presented by appellees are
Real Estate tax receipts that sufficiently show that the subject land is mainly
utilized for agricultural purposes devoted to the planting of coconut, corn x x
x and sugar cane x x x aside from using the same for residential purposes x x
x.

It is noticeable that appellant failed to present any proof to
establish its claim that the land in question is not alienable. Although on
July 10, 1989, the court a quo issued
an order “directing the Bureau of Forest Development [BFD] to submit xx within
thirty (30) days from its receipt of [said order] a report on the status of the
land xx to determine whether said land or any portion thereof is within the
forest zone xxx” (Record, p. 63), the BFD failed to comply. Moreover, appellant
never contested appellees’ application nor did it may (sic) any manifestation
that the land in question is not alienable. Likewise, the prosecutor representing the Republic of the Philippines
during the trial did not even contest the classification of the land as stated
in the evidence of appellees. Their
belated objection should therefore not prejudice appellees who openly and in
good faith presented all the documents pertinent to their claims.

Presidential Decree No. 1073 extended the period within which a
qualified person may apply for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title
by judicial legalization to December 31, 1987. The filing of this case in
October, 1986 was therefore seasonable. Under the decree, this right is
available to a person who has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945. We reiterate that appellees have
proven themselves to have been in possession of the subject land even prior to
June 12, 1945.

Hence, this petition for review, alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred in: (1) holding that private respondents have registerable title
to the lots in question, and (2) ordering the registration thereof in their
names.^[7]

The issues raised before us are: (a) whether there is a need for
private respondents to establish that the land subject of their application was
alienable and disposable despite proofs showing their possession thereof for
more than 30 years; and (b) whether private respondents were able to meet the
period required by the Public Land Act, as amended.

Petitioner contends that before a public land can be registered
in the name of a private individual, it must be shown first that (a) the land
has been classified alienable and disposable, and (b) the applicant, by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.

Petitioner claims that private respondents failed to meet the
said requirements. They did not cite any official proclamation or presented the
land classification map covering the subject parcels of land to prove that they
are alienable and disposable public lands. Neither did private respondents
adduce evidence to show that they had been in possession of the land since June
12, 1945. Although they were able to show possession by Apolinar, their
predecessor-in-interest, since 1948, and private respondents’ actual possession
beginning in 1960, no proof was presented to show possession prior to 1948.
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to have the subject parcels
of land registered in their names.

In their comment, private respondents cite Section 48(b),^[8]
before it was amended by PD No. 1073, and Section (50)^[9] of
the Public Land Act as the applicable law in this case. They maintain that the
land subject of their application is an agricultural land devoted to corn and
other root crops. Further, they have been in possession of the land since 1927.
Estanislao Ceniza, one of the children of Apolinar and who was already ten
years old at that time, testified that his father was the one in possession of
the land, appropriating its fruits and paying its realty taxes. When their father died in 1947, Apolinar’s
chidren took possession of the land. They also appropriated the fruits and paid
realty taxes therefor. In 1960, Apolinar’s heirs partitioned the property,
declared their respective shares in their names for tax purposes and paid the
realty taxes.

Apart from this, private respondents claim that the land in
question has long been a private one, it being a part of Hacienda de Mandaue de
Cebu, which in turn was recognized as a private land by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu in several decisions dated February 27, 1934, March 27, 1935,
May 6, 1937 and August 6, 1937.

Indeed, before one can be granted a confirmation of title to
lands of the public domain, the Public Land Act “requires that the applicant
must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must
either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land
Act.” Only when these conditions are met may the possessor of the land acquire,
by operation of law, “a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.”^[10]

Conclusively, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that mere
adverse possession in accordance with law for a period likewise provided for by
law would automatically entitle the possessor to the right to register public
land in his name. The applicant has to establish first the disposable and
alienable character of the public land. Otherwise, all public lands, regardless
of their classification, can be subject of registration of private titles, as
long as the applicant shows that he meets the required years of possession.
Worth noting is the case of Bracewell v.
Court of Appeals,^[11] where the applicant had been in
possession of the property since 1908 but it was conclusively shown by the
government that the land was classified as alienable or disposable only on 27
March 1972. The Court said:

x x x. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot
claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of
land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private
appropriation. The adverse possession
which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect
title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.^[12]
(Italics supplied)

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;^[13]
an administrative action;^[14]
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;^[15]
and a legislative act or a statute.^[16]

In this case, private respondents presented a certification
dated November 25, 1994, issued by
Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City,
stating that the lots involved were “found to be within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962
4-I555 dated December 9, 1980.”^[17] This
is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of
private respondents’ application.^[18]
Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence,^[19]
which is true in this case. Worth
noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:

…no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to
contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property still
forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in
question are forestal land….^[20]

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere
possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle its
occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in
favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden
of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents
were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals.^[21]
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.^[22]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED
and the decision, as well as the resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 31728 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 49-54,

^[2]
RTC Records, pp. 132-137.

^[3]
Referred as Concepcion Suico in the deed of extrajudicial partition (RTC
Records, p. 77).

^[4]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby
issued declaring: Florentino Perez Ceniza, married to Remedios Mangubat,
Filipino, of legal age and a resident of Pilit, Cabancalan, Mandaue City, as
owner of Lot 1104-A and Lot 1104-C; Atilano Bongo, married to Asuncion Ceniza
Bongo, Filipino, of legal age, and resident of Pilit, Cabancalan, Mandaue City
as owner of a portion of Lot 1104-B with an area of 541 square meters; Santiago
Ceniza, married to Librada Patigayon, Filipino, of legal age and resident of
Pilit, Cabancalan, Mandaue City, as owner of a portion of Lot 1104-B with an
area of 811 square meters; Estanislao Ceniza, married to Maxima Bukiron,
Filipino, of legal age and resident of Cabancalan, Mandaue City, as owner of a
portion of Lot 1104-B with an area of 810 square meters; Romeo Simbajon,
married to Felicidad Ceniza, Filipino, of legal age and resident of Pilit,
Cabancalan, Mandaue City as owner of a portion of Lot 1104-B with an area of
270 square meters; Evelyn Adolfo, married to Victor Zenoria, Filipino, of legal
age and resident of Pilit, Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Edgar Adolfo, married to
Elizabeth Trara, Filipino, of legal age and resident of Madrid, Spain, Emma
Adolfo married to Danny Tan, Filipino, of legal age and resident of Madrid,
Spain; Jerry Adolfo, married to Helen Henilla, Filipino, of legal age and
resident of Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Glenn Adolfo, married to Rosemarie
Tudtud, Filipino, of legal age and resident of Pilit, Cabancalan, Mandaue City,
Gina Adolfo, married to Danny Planas, Filipino, of legal age and resident of
Pilit, Canbancalan, Mandaue City, Lorna Adolfo, single, Filipino, of legal age
and resident of Pilit, Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Hubert Adolfo, single,
Filipino, of legal age, and resident of Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Elenita
Adolfo, widow, Filipino, of legal age, David Adolfo and Prestin May Adolfo,
both single, Filipinos, minors (represented herein by their mother) and
residents of Cabancalan, Mandaue City, as owners of a portion of Lot No. 1104-B
with an area of 405 square meters; Pablo Ramos, married to Constancia Zanoria,
Filipino, of legal age and resident of Pilit, Cabancalan, Mandaue City, as
owner of a portion of Lot 1104-B with an area of 405 square meters, which lots
are particularly described in their subdivision plan and technical
descriptions, now marked as Exhibits “M”, “M-1”, “M-2”, “JJ”, “JJ-1” and
“JJ-2”, respectively, situated at Cabancalan, Mandaue City, conferring and
registering the titles to the same in pursuance to Proper Registration Decree,
consdiering that they have titles proper for registration since the applicants
by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and notorious possession of these parcels of land, which parcels of
land are alienable and disposable lands of public domain under a bonafide claim
of ownership for more than thirty (30) years (Section 14, Nos. 1 and 4, PD
1529) and have complied with all the requirements of law.

Upon the finality of this Decision, let the corresponding
decree of registration be issued in favor of Florentino Ceniza, married to
Remedios Mangubat; Atilano Bongo married to Asuncion Ceniza Bongo; Santiago
Ceniza, married to Librada Patigayon; Estanislao Ceniza, married to Maxima
Bukiron; Romeo Simbajon, married to Felicidad Ceniza; Evelyn Adolfo, married to
Victor Zanoria; Edgar Adolfo, married to Elizabeth Trara; Emma Adolfo, married
to Danny Tan; Jerry Adolfo, married to Helen Henilla; Glenn Adolfo, married to
Rosemarie Tudtud; Gina Adolfo, married to Danny Planas, Lorna Adolfo, single;
Huberto Adolfo, single; Elenita vda. de Adolfo, widow, David Adolfo, single and
Prestine May Adolfo, in accordance with Section 39 of PD 1529.

SO ORDERED.

^[5]
218 Phil. 666 (1984).

^[6]
230 Phil. 590 (1986).

^[7]
Rollo, p. 26.

^[8]
Section 48, Public Land Act. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

a)         x x x

b)         Those who be
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been, in continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure.
Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

^[9]
Section 50, Public Land Act: Any person or persons, or their legal
representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands
under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application
to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged
title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to
them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. x x x.

^[10]
Republic v. Doldol, 295 SCRA 359, 364 (1998).

^[11]
Supra.

^[12]
Ibid., p. 198.

^[13]
Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, 178 SCRA 708, 711 (1989).

^[14]
Republic v. Bacus, 176 SCRA 376, 384
(1989).

^[15]
Republic v. De Porkan, 151 SCRA 88,
105 (1987).

^[16]
International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines v. University of the Philippines, 200 SCRA 554, 572 (1991).

^[17]
CA Records, p. 95.

^[18]
Supra, note 6 at 364.

^[19]
Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court: Disputable presumptions. – The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:

x x x                             x
x x                             x x x

(m)       That official
duty has been regularly performed.

^[20]
Rollo, p. 54.

^[21]
Zaragoza v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 309, 316 (2000).

^[22]
Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, 336 SCRA 97, 110
(2000).