THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MORO JAMAD, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The death penalty having been imposed upon Moro Jamad, the defendant in the
above entitled cause, the record of the proceedings in the court below is before
us en consulta

(for review).

The information on which the accused was brought to trial is as follows:

“That, on or about the evening of September 30, 1916, at Fort Pikit,
Pagalunga, of the Province of Cotabato, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, P. I.,
said accused, being a duly enlisted private of the Insular Police Force or
Philippine Constabulary, and being on guard duty as a sentinel, did, willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally, and with treachery and premeditation, pursue,
attack, assault, and, with the gun which he was then carrying, shoot at his wife
the Mora Aring, Juan Labonete, and the soldiers Isidro Torres and Taclid,
inflicting several mortal wounds upon each of them, as a result of which the
said Mora Aring, Juan Labonete, and the soldier Isidro Torres then and there
died; and that, after having killed said persons, he fired at his officers with
intent to kill them—acts committed in violation of the law.”

Upon arraignment, and after the information had been read to him in his
native dialect, the accused, under advice of counsel, pleaded “guilty.”

Notwithstanding the plea of “guilty,” several witnesses were examined, under
the well-settled practice in this jurisdiction which contemplates the taking of
additional evidence in cases wherein pleas of “guilty” are entered to complaints
or information charging grave crimes, and more especially crimes for which the
prescribed penalty is death.

The substance of the testimony of these witnesses is set forth in the brief
of the Attorney-General as follows:

“Roberto Munar, a constabulary soldier, testified free, p. 17) that as a
practicante he examined the bodies of Mora Aring, Juan Labonete, and Isidro
Torres and discovered that they had all died as a result of having been shot;
that Mora Aring had a wound showing that a bullet had entered the upper part of
the arm back of the right shoulder and had come out through the breast, and
another wound caused by a bullet which entered below one of the ribs on the
right side and came out of the right side of the back; that Juan Labonete had a
wound caused by a bullet which entered the chest and came out of the back, and
another wound made by a bullet which entered beside the navel and came out of
the left side of the back; that Isidro Torres had a wound caused by a bullet
which entered near the left eye and came out of the rear of the head; that Aring
died probably about one or two hours after having been wounded, and Juan
Labonete and Isidro Torres died about four hours after they were wounded; that
he saw the wound of Taclid which was caused by a bullet which entered the right
shoulder and came out of the upper part of the same side; and that the dead body
of the woman was near the Pikit barracks, and the bodies of the men were in the
barracks when he examined their wounds.”

“Taclid testified (rec, p. 20) that on September 30, 1916, he was unarmed and
seated at the guard post just outside the barracks, and had listened for about
five minutes to a conversation between the defendant and the Mora Aring who were
less than one braza distant from him; that defendant was the sentinel then on
guard; that he (Taclid) was sitting with his head inclined and could not
understand the conversation which was carried on in the Samar dialect; that
after about five minutes Jamad shot him (Taclid) with a gun, knocking him down;
that he did not see the accused point his gun at him as at that moment he was
sitting with his face turned away from him; that he (Taclid) then ran and
notified Lieutenant Killan, and then gave the alarm call with a cornet; that
while he was running he heard several other shots fired. The witness then showed
where a bullet had entered his shoulder and had come out through his back (rec.,
p. 27). He at first testified that defendant and his wife were talking in a loud
tone, but during cross-examination testified that they were not talking in a
loud quarrelsome tone but with a low voice. He also testified that he had no
quarrel or trouble with defendant and knew no reason why he was thus attacked,
that no one was present at the time he was shot except Jamad, Aring and himself;
and that he heard no shooting prior to the shot which struck him.”

“Tranquilino Balicaco testified (rec, p. 24) that he saw this defendant come
from the guard post at about 7 p. m. on September 30, 1916, and shoot Juan
Labonete, a cook, twice with a constabulary gun; that he also saw defendant
shoot three times at Lieutenant Killan; that Juan Labonete was not armed; that
he (witness) had heard shooting before defendant came up into the lieutenant’s
kitchen, and that he (witness) became afraid and had secreted himself but could
see defendant; that the lieutenant was on the balcony; and that he (witness) did
not see the lieutenant do any shooting.”

“Lieut. N. C. Killan testified (rec, p. 29) that on September 30, 1916, he
was a lieutenant of the constabulary; that this defendant was a soldier of the
constabulary; that at about 7 p. m. he (witness) heard several shots and was
informed by Taclid that Jamad had gone juramentado; that Jamad came to
the lieutenant’s house and shot at him (lieutenant) and also shot and killed the
cook Labonete; that he (lieutenant) shot at defendant with a revolver, but the
latter escaped carrying off the ‘Crag’ rifle with him and hid in the grass until
October 3, 1916, when he was captured by the soldiers after exchanging several
shots and that defendant stated that he shot his wife because she insulted
him.”

The evidence thus adduced at the trial, read together with the plea of
“guilty” entered on the arraignment, leaves no room for reasonable doubt that
the accused took the lives, unlawfully, of his wife, Mora Aring; of Juan
Labonete; and of Isidro Torres; and that at or about the same time he shot and
wounded, with intent to kill, the witness Taclid. It appears, furthermore, that
he acted con alevosia (treacherously), that is to say, that he “employed means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tended directly and specially to
insure the commission of those crimes without risk to himself arising from the
defense which his victims might make,” in that he shot them suddenly and without
warning with a rifle, at close range (subsection 2, art. 10, Penal Code).

We are of opinion, however, that notwithstanding his plea of “guilty” to the
commission of these offenses with premeditacion conocida (deliberate
premeditation), it does not appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the commission
of these offenses was marked with premeditacion conocida (deliberate
premeditation) in the sense in which that word is used in subsection 7 of
article 10 of the Penal Code, wherein it is provided that premeditacion
conocida (deliberate premeditation) shall be taken into consideration as an
aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the penalties prescribed in the
code. (U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. Rep., 530.)

The commission of these crimes does not appear to have been marked with any
extenuating circumstances; and having in mind the fact that the accused was a
Constabulary officer, who may be presumed to have had some of the benefit of the
discipline and training afforded its members by that organization and
necessarily incident to their contact with their fellow soldiers and officers,
we are of opinion, in view of the nature of the crimes committed by him, that he
is not entitled to have the penalties prescribed for those crimes reduced in
degree under the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act
No. 2142.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of one parricide
(parricidio), two murders (asesinatos) and one frustrated
murder, in that he unlawfully took the life of his wife Aring, of Isidro Torres
and of Juan Labonete, and made a frustrated attempt upon the life of Taclid,
each of these offenses being marked with the aggravating circumstance of
“treachery” (alevosia), deliberate premeditation (premeditacion
conocida), and abuse of confidence.

As we have said already, the evidence does not sustain a finding that the
crimes were marked with the aggravating circumstance of deliberate premeditation
(premeditation conocida); and we are of opinion that the aggravating
circumstance of “treachery” (alevosia) which marked the acts of the
accused must be held to include as one of its elements the abuse of confidence,
which the trial judge treated as a separate and distinct aggravating
circumstance.

For all of the offenses of which the accused was convicted in the court
below, the trial judge imposed the death penalty, that is to say the penalty
prescribed for the most serious crime committed, in its maximum degree, and for
this purpose made use of the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code. But as
indicated in the case of The United States vs. Balaba, ( ante,
p. 260) recently decided wherein the controlling facts were substantially
similar to those in the case at bar, “all the penalties corresponding to the
several violations of law” should have been imposed under the express provisions
of article 87, and, under the ruling in that case, the trial court erred in
applying the provisions of article 89 of the code.

We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be reversed,
and the accused convicted (1) of parricide (parricidio), in that he
unlawfully took the life of his wife Aring, this crime being marked with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery ( alevosia) and no extenuating
circumstance; (2) of the murder (asesinato) of Juan Labonete marked
with neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstance, treachery
(alevosia) having been taken into consideration as a special or
qualifying circumstance to characterize the crime as murder
(asesinato); (3) of the murder (asesinato) of Isidro Torres,
marked with neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstances; (4) of the
frustrated murder of Taclid, marked with neither aggravating nor extenuating
circumstances; and that the following separate penalties should be imposed upon
him, to be executed in accordance with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal
Code: (1) The penalty of death for the parricide of his wife Aring; (2) the
penalty of life imprisonment for the murder of Labonete; (3) the penalty of life
imprisonment for the murder of Torres; (4) the penalty of 12 years and one day
of cadena temporal for the frustrated murder of Taclid; and that in
addition to these penalties there should be imposed upon him the accessory
penalties prescribed by law as to each of the principal penalties, the
indemnification of the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and
the costs of the proceedings in both instances.

Before finally disposing of this case some comment may properly be made on
the request of the Attorney-General for a more definite ruling as to the
practice which should be followed in admitting evidence after a plea of guilty
by the accused. Citing Wharton on Criminal Evidence (Vol. 2, pp. 1323-4) in
support of his contention that a plea of guilty is conclusive when
formally made on the issue, unless shown to have been made by mistake, or to
have been secured by fraud, the Attorney-General says that “in the case of U. S.
vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil. Rep., 91) the judgment of the lower court,
sentencing the defendant to the death penalty after a plea of guilty without any
evidence being taken, was reversed by this court and a new trial ordered. In the
decision this court invited attention to the ‘rule of practice recommended’ in
the cases of U. S. vs. Talbanos (6 Phil. Rep., 541) and U. S.
vs. Rota (9 Phil. Rep., 426) and held that, ‘while there is no law
requiring it’ in every case where the death penalty may be imposed ‘it
is advisable for the court to call witnesses for the purpose of
establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant.’

“The result of the above decisions, reversing the judgments of conviction
rendered by the court below, is to cause some doubt as to the essential weight
to be given to judicial confessions and as to the quantity of evidence which is
considered necessary by this court to be taken in order to support a judgment of
conviction after a plea of guilty.”

In one of the cases cited by the Attorney-General, U. S. vs.
Talbanos (supra), this court expressly held that a plea of “guilty” to
a complaint which clearly charges the commission of an offense, even a capital
crime, is sufficient, without the introduction of evidence, to sustain a
judgment of conviction of the offense charged. This doctrine has been
steadfastly adhered to by this court, and would seem to be the doctrine for
which the Attorney-General is contending, and in support of which he cites an
array of authority which cannot be successfully challenged.

In the case of U. S. vs. Dineros (18 Phil. Rep., 566) we said that
“the essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the accused on
arraignment admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of
the consequences and meaning of his act.” The effect of that ruling is to make
it clear that the doctrine -just referred to is not applicable unless the plea
of “guilty” is in truth and in fact made under the conditions indicated, that is
to say on arraignment, freely and voluntarily, as an express admission of the
guilt of the accused of the offense with which he is charged, and with full
knowledge of the consequences and the meaning of his act. A mere formal plea of
“guilty” made under compulsion, or under any condition other than those just
indicated will not suffice.

If the accused does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the
offense charged, if he is not advised as to the meaning and effect of the
technical language so often used in formal complaints and informations in
qualifying the acts constituting the offense, or if he does not clearly
understand the consequences by way of a heavy and even a capital penalty flowing
from his admission of his guilt of the crime in the precise technical manner and
form in which it is charged, his plea of guilty should not be accepted; and if
accepted, it should not be held to be sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Our experience has taught us that it not infrequently happens that, upon
arraignment, accused persons plead “guilty” to the commission of the gravest
offenses, qualified by marked aggravating circumstances, when in truth and in
fact they intend merely to admit that they committed the act or acts charged in
the complaint, and have no thought of admitting the technical charges of
aggravating circumstances. It not infrequently happens that after a formal plea
of “guilty” it develops under the probe of the trial judge, or in the course of
the statement of the accused made at the time of the entry of his plea, or upon
the witness stand, that the accused, while admitting the commission of the acts
charged in the information, believes or pretends to believe that these acts were
committed under such circumstances as to exempt him in whole or in part from
criminal liability. Clearly, a formal plea of guilty entered under such
circumstances is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of the aggravated crime
charged in the information.

As will readily be understood, the danger of the entry of improvident pleas
of this kind is greatly augmented in cases wherein the accused is a member of an
uncivilized tribe, or a densely ignorant man who speaks a dialect unknown to his
own lawyer, to the trial judge, and to the court officers other than the
interpreter. In the course of the last fifteen years we have had before us a
number of instances wherein members of uncivilized tribes have pleaded guilty to
the commission of crimes marked with one or more aggravating circumstances, for
which the prescribed penalty is that of death, life imprisonment, or a long term
of imprisonment. In not a few of these cases the evidence, taken under the rule
of practice in this jurisdiction, has disclosed the fact that the crimes
actually committed were not marked with the aggravating circumstances set forth
in the information, and in some cases it has developed that the accused was
either wholly or partially exempt from criminal liability.

The case now under consideration well illustrates the danger of accepting
formal pleas of “guilty” without further investigation. As will be seen from the
information set out above, the accused, a Moro, was charged with inflicting a
fatal wound on one Taclid. He pleaded guilty to this charged,
apparently under the advice of counsel, in open court and in the presence, of
the trial judge and the fiscal. But it appears from the evidence that this very
man Taclid, whom the accused admitted he had fatally wounded, was then present
in court, and later appeared as a witness against the accused, having entirely
recovered from his wound so far as can be gathered from the record. Furthermore,
by his plea of guilty the accused formally admitted that he had shot his
different victims with premeditacion conocida (deliberate
premeditation) and yet, from the evidence taken at the trial, it appears that
most, if not all of the shots were fired without any, the slightest
premeditacion conocida (deliberate premeditation), as that term is used
in the code.

Will it be contended in the light of these experiences, that this court is
not justified in indicating to the trial judges that “while there is no law
requiring it,” nevertheless, in capital cases especially, “it is advisable for
the court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the
degree of culpability of the defendant” notwithstanding his formal plea of
“guilty?” (U. S. vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. Rep., 541.)

As we said in the case of U. S. vs. Rota (9 Phil. Rep., 426):

“There is no provision of law which prohibits the taking of testimony where
the accused enters a plea of ‘guilty,’ and that procedure is the proper and
prudent course, especially in cases where grave crimes are charged, and where
the court is required to exercise its discretion in imposing a more or less
severe penalty in view of all the circumstances attending the commission of the
crime.”

In the case of U. S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil. Rep., 91), we reversed a
judgment convicting the defendant on his formal plea of “guilty” and sentencing
him to death, and sent the case back for a new trial, on the ground that after
an examination of the whole record, we could not rid our minds of a doubt as to
whether the accused fully and clearly understood the nature and effect of his
plea. In that case the information charged the defendant with the crime of
asesinato (murder), marked with a series of aggravating circumstances
couched in highly technical terms, and set forth so as to necessitate the
imposition of the death penalty upon conviction of the crime thus charged in the
information. The defendant being a Moro, whose language was unknown to the trial
judge and the court officers other than the interpreter, and no evidence having
been taken, the court inclined to doubt that sufficient pains had been taken to
make certain that the accused fully understood the nature and consequences of
his plea—a doubt which the meager record of the proceedings in the court below
was insufficient to remove. In capital cases, this court is required by law to
review the record of the proceedings of the court below, whether the accused
appeals or not, and to confirm, modify, or reverse the judgment on this record,
and we were of opinion that we could not confirm the imposition of the death
penalty upon the plea entered at the trial, in the absence of a satisfactory
showing in the record that, under the peculiar circumstances of that case, the
precise meaning and legal effect of the information, and the consequences of the
entry of a formal plea of “guilty” thereto, were fully apprehended by the
uncivilized Moro defendant.

It is no undue or unreasonable burden to place upon the state, in the
prosecution of grave criminal charges, to require the production of sufficient
evidence, aside from or in addition to a plea of “guilty,” to establish
independently the commission of the crime, or at least to leave no room for
reasonable doubt in the mind of either the trial court or this court, on review,
as to the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the
part of the accused as to the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty;
and, further, to develop the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or less degree of
severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.

In the case at bar, while it may well be doubted that the accused intended by
his plea of guilty to admit the truth of the technical relation of aggravating
circumstances set forth in the information, nevertheless, it cannot be doubted
that he did intend to admit, and did in fact admit that he shot the persons
mentioned in the information at the time and place set forth therein, and this
admission read together with the evidence leaves no room for reasonable doubt as
to his guilt as hereinbefore indicated. Accordingly, we are able to dispose of
the case notwithstanding the apparent irregularity of the proceedings. The
irregularity manifestly did not have the effect of prejudicing any substantial
right of the accused, his trial having proceeded to all intents and purposes as
though he had in fact plead “not guilty” as charged, at the same time formally
admitting the shooting of the persons mentioned in the information at the time
and place indicated therein.

We may say then, in response to the request for a ruling on this subject by
the Attorney-General:

(1) The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal trial is that the
accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full
knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear
understanding of the precise nature of the crime or crimes charged in the
complaint or information.

(2) Such a plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment, is
sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information,
even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the
defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof.

(3) There is nothing in the law in this jurisdiction which forbids the
introduction of evidence as to the guilt of the accused, and the circumstances
attendant upon the commission of the crime, after the entry of a plea of
“guilty.”

(4) Having in mind the danger of the entry of improvident pleas of “guilty”
in criminal cases, the prudent and advisable course, especially in cases wherein
grave crimes are charged, is to take additional evidence as to the guilt of the
accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime.

(5) The better practice would indicate that, when practicable, such
additional evidence should be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
independently of the plea of guilty, or at least to leave no room for reasonable
doubt in the mind of either the trial or the appellate court as to the
possibility of a misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the precise
nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty.

(6) Notwithstanding what has been said, it lies in the sound judicial
discretion of the trial judge whether he will take evidence or not in any case
wherein he is satisfied that a plea of “guilty” has been entered by the accused,
with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act.

(7) But in the event that no evidence is taken, this court, if called upon to
review the proceedings had in the court below, may reverse and send back for a
new trial, if, on the whole record, a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the
accused did in fact enter the plea of “guilty” with full knowledge of the
meaning and consequences of the act. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J.,
Johnson, Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.

---

MALCOLM, J., concurring:

In view of the decision in United States vs. Balaba, I concur in the
result.