G.R. No. 126363. June 26, 1998
THE CONGREGATION OF THE RELIGIOUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES JEROME AND TERESA PROTASIO, RESPONDENTS.
MARTINEZ, J.:
has filed this petition for review on certiorari, urging us to reverse
the decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals dated September 12, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 43311, entitled
“SPS. JEROME and TERESA PROTASIO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus, THE
RELIGIOUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY, Defendant-Appellant.” The decision
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil
Case No. 29,960-91, ordering the petitioner to return the possession of
the disputed land to the respondents-spouses and to pay them damages.
The facts of this case, as found by the respondent court,[2] are as follows:
On December 26, 1964, Gervacio Serapio, the grandfather of herein
respondents-spouses Jerome and Teresa Protasio, sold to herein
petitioner, the Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary, two
(2) lots identified as Lot No. 5-A and Lot No. 5-C which were covered by
TCT Nos. 14834 and 14835, respectively. In between Lot No. 5-A and Lot
No. 5-C is Lot No. 5-B. Petitioner did not buy it when it was offered
for sale by Gervacio Serapio. In 1978, Gervacio died and his estate
consisting of several parcels of land was settled extra-judicially among
his heirs.
In October of 1989, respondents-spouses purchased Lot No. 5-B
from the heirs of Gervacio Serapio. Accordingly, TCT No. 148595 was
issued in their name. Sometime in November of 1989, respondents-spouses
had the subject Lot No. 5-B surveyed and they discovered that 664 square
meters of their 858 square meters property was fenced and occupied by
petitioner. They also found out that a building for the boys’ quarters
and a portion of petitioner’s gymnasium were constructed inside Lot No.
5-B. The encroachment by petitioner on respondents-spouses land was made
without the latter’s knowledge and consent. Despite repeated demands by
respondents-spouses, petitioner failed and refused to (1) restore to
the spouses possession of the encroached property; (2) demolish the
improvements constructed thereon, and (3) pay damages and back rentals.
Thus, on September 23, 1991, a complaint for recovery of possession of
real property, damages, back rentals and attorney’s fees was filed by
respondents-spouses against the petitioner. The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. 20,960-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 15. In answer to the complaint, petitioner admitted that it
occupies part of the litigated property but averred that Lot No. 5-B was
supposed to be a road lot that would give their Lots 5-A and 5-C means
of entry and egress to the public road and, therefore, was beyond the
commerce of man. Petitioner further claims that respondents-spouses, as
successors-in-interest of Gervacio Serapio, have the obligation to
respect the perpetual use of Lot No. 5-B ceded to it by Serapio.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of respondents-spouses and against the petitioner. It rejected
petitioner’s claim of being a builder in good faith of the improvements
it introduced on the disputed lot of respondents-spouses. The
dispositive portion of the decision dated July 30, 1993 reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the defendant (now petitioner):
1. To vacate the part of the plaintiffs’ (now respondents-spouses’)
lot covered by TCT No. 148595 it is presently occupying and to
peaceably return the possession to the plaintiffs at its own expense.2. To demolish the buildings and improvements it introduced on the lot of the plaintiffs at its own expense.
3. To pay one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages.
4. To pay back rentals of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) with
legal interests to be computed from January 31, 1991 until fully paid.5. To pay one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as attorney’s
fees, four thousand pesos (P4,000.00) as litigation expenses and the
costs of suit.“SO ORDERED.”[3]
Upon appeal by petitioner to the respondent court, the latter affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.
Still dissatisfied, petitioner now comes to us via the present
petition, assailing the respondent court’s decision on the following
grounds:
“I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS’ ANCESTOR, GERVACIO SERAPIO, HAD CEDED TO THE PETITIONER THE
PERPETUAL USE OF LOT 5-B.II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRIEVOUSLY IGNORED THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM HAD CLEARLY BEEN
BARRED BY LACHES.III
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
AWARDED ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE FORM OF BACK RENTALS WITHOUT PROOF TO
SUPPORT THE SAME.IV
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS –
(A) IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR THE AWARD NOR PROOF OF THE SAME.
(B) IN THE FACE OF EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE PURCHASERS IN BAD FAITH.”[4]
The above-quoted errors allegedly committed by the respondent court call for a review of its findings of facts.
As a general rule, the re-examination of the evidence submitted by the
contending parties during the trial of the case is not a function that
this Court normally undertakes inasmuch as the findings of facts of the
respondent court are generally binding and conclusive on the Supreme
Court.[5] The jurisdiction of
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law,[6] not of fact, unless
the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the
evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on misapprehension
of facts.[7]
Petitioner contends that its case should be treated as an
exception to the said general rule since the respondent court
“overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.”[8]
Let us examine these “relevant facts” which the respondent court allegedly overlooked when it rendered the assailed decision.
First. Petitioner maintains that Gervacio Serapio, the original
owner of the land in question (Lot 5-B), had in his lifetime
represented, committed and warranted that the said lot would be for
petitioner’s perpetual use as a road lot, it being the only access to
the public road for Lot 5-A and Lot 5-C, and to each other.[9]
In support of this posture, petitioner cited the document entitled “Agreement Of Purchase And Sale”[10]
dated July 8, 1959, executed between Gervacio Serapio and petitioner,
which Agreement shows a sketch attached thereto as Annex “A”[11]
indicating the location of the two (2) lots subject of the Agreement
and two (2) proposed roads, the Simeon de Jesus St. and Padre Faura St.
(which is the disputed Lot B). Petitioner argues that “without that map
(sketch) and the implicit assurance that goes with it, there could not
have been a sale.”[12]
There is nothing significant in the said sketch which would
justify a reversal of the findings and conclusions reached by the
respondent court. It is merely a sketch of the location of the two (2)
lots subject of the sale. There is no express or implied agreement in
said annex containing the sketch which would confirm petitioner’s claim
that Geronimo Serapio “had ceded to the petitioner the perpetual use of
Lot 5-B.” If petitioner’s claim was true, then the same could have
easily been inserted as an additional agreement between the parties.
That it was not made so, only shows that petitioner’s claim is nothing
but a mere conjecture, which has zero evidentiary weight. Section 9,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides in part that where, as
here, “the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.” Simply put, any oral evidence of an agreement should be excluded when after all, the existing agreement is already in writing.[13] Thus, we are not prepared to disturb the following findings and conclusions of the respondent court:
“Appellant first argues that the original owner of the subject
land, Gervacio Serapio, had intended, represented and warranted that the
same would be for its perpetual use as a road lot. Involving as it does
a transmission of real rights, this claim should be based on something
more concrete than bare allegations and speculations. In the instant
case, however, there is notably no concrete evidence supporting
appellant’s claim.“Appellant would have Us believe that the map attached to the
Agreement of Purchase and Sale between it and Gervacio Serapio,
containing as it does the proposed roads in the area, implicitly carries
the assurance that Gervacio Serapio had made with respect to said
proposed roads.“Even the most careful perusal of the map attached to the Agreement
of Purchase and Sale between appellant and Gervacio Serapio, however,
does not reveal anything other than that it merely shows the location of
the lots subject of such Agreement. Indeed, from the Agreement itself,
it is clear that said map was attached simply to identify the location
of the lots covered by the Agreement; and that reference to the map was
simply as follows –x x x, the SELLER by these presents PROMISE TO SELL to said BUYER, these portions of land more particularly identified and designated as Lot Nos. “A” and “C” in the sketch hereto attached and marked as Annex “A,” xxx. (Exh. 16, Agreement of Purchase and Sale) [underline ours]
“There being no provision in the Agreement, whatsoever, regarding
the subject lot, or the grant of its use unto appellant, We cannot now
accept appellant’s bare allegations on Gervacio Serapio’s representation
and warranty that the subject land would be for its perpetual use as a
road lot. At any rate, it has been ruled that in case of doubt in the
provisions of the Deed of Sale, the least transmission of rights should
prevail (Gacos vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 8).“The rest of appellant’s arguments in support of its claim
regarding perpetual use of the subject land as a road lot are nothing
but mere speculations which, as We have stressed, cannot suffice for Us
to uphold any transmission of real rights. Being painfully bereft of
concrete evidence, said claim of appellant must be brushed aside.”[14]
Even if we were to accept as true petitioner’s stance that Lot 5-B
was intended by Gervacio Serapio as a road right of way for petitioner’s
perpetual use, still a grant of a right of way in favor of petitioner
does not legally entitle it to occupy part of the said lot which is registered in respondents-spouses’ name, more so to introduce permanent improvements thereon such as a gymnasium and a boys’ quarters/dormitory.
Thus, what is actually at issue here is not whether the
petitioner could use Lot 5-B in question as a road, but rather whether
the petitioner could legally possess/occupy part of the said lot. This
is, in fact, the only issue as agreed upon by the contending parties
during the pre-trial conference of this case before the trial court.[15]
As discussed earlier, petitioner has no right whatsoever to possess and
construct permanent structures on the questioned land owned by
respondents-spouses. Petitioner admits in its answer to the complaint
that it introduced improvements on the subject lot without the consent
and knowledge of respondents-spouses.[16] It is thus a builder in bad faith. Again, we find no reversible error in the following ruling of the respondent court:
“Which leads us to a discussion of whether or not appellant was in
bad faith in introducing improvements on the subject land. It cannot be
denied that appellant never gained title to the subject land as it
admits to not having purchased the said lot (TSN, p. 81, November 9,
1992). Neither has appellant successfully shown any right to introduce
improvements on the said land (its claim of grant of perpetual use of
the same as a road lot and its right to build on a right of way both
having been rejected above). This being so, it follows that appellant
was a builder in bad faith in that, knowing that the land did not belong
to it and that it had no right to build thereon, it nevertheless caused
the improvements in question to be erected.“Next, appellant claims that granting that it was in bad faith,
appellees and their predecessors-in-interest were equally guilty of bad
faith in allowing the construction of the improvements. This bad faith
on the part of the appellees and their predecessors-in-interest should,
however, have been proved at the hearing below, for in the absence of
such proof, it must be presumed that with the unlawful trespass upon the
subject land, the buildings were commenced thereon without the
knowledge and consent of the owners thereof (Rivera vs. Archbishop of
Manila, 40 Phil. 717). Again, We find such proof absent in the instant
case.”[17]
Second. Petitioner contends that the respondent court struck down its
defense of laches “with a grossly erroneous and unfair declaration that
since the private respondents themselves did not sleep on their rights,
there could be no laches.”[18]
Suffice it to state that no evidence was presented by petitioner during
the trial to prove that the improvements constructed on the subject
property were made during the lifetime of Gervacio Serapio, nor that
Serapio, his heirs or respondents-spouses were aware of, much less
tolerated, the said structures so as to make them guilty of laches. In
this regard, we find the respondent court’s disputation on the issue of
laches proper:
“Neither are We convinced by appellant’s argument that appellee’s
claim is barred by laches. In Olizon vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 148,
the Supreme Court once again defined laches –xxx as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier: it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.“Here, the improvements introduced by appellant were finished in
1988. In November 1989, a month after appellees purchased the subject
lot, they had the same surveyed, after which they immediately sought to
inform the appellant about the encroachment they had discovered (TSN,
pp. 8-11, August 26, 1992). Thereafter, on October 26, 1990, appellees,
through their lawyer, sent a demand letter to appellant regarding the
matter, followed by another demand letter dated January 31, 1991.
Finally the Complaint was filed on September 23, 1991. All told, We do
not find laches to have set in to effectively bar appellees from the
claims contained in their Complaint. By any indication, the lapse of a
mere three (3) years from the time the improvements were constructed up
to the time of the filing of the Complaint cannot be construed as
sufficient to hold the complainant as barred by laches. Especially so
since during the interim, appellees were diligent in having the subject
land surveyed and in sending demand letters to appellant.”[19]
Third. Petitioner claims that the respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it awarded respondents-spouses actual damages
in the form of back rentals of P15,000.00 a month, plus the legal rate
of interest, to be reckoned from January, 1991, without proof to support
the same. We have examined the respondents-spouses’ complaint and the
testimony of respondent Jerome Protasio on the matter of back rentals
prayed for in the complaint, and we find no factual basis how such award
was arrived at. Thus, we have to discard such award of damages. A party
is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proved.[20]
Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but
must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.[21] These damages cannot be presumed,[22]
and the courts in making such award of damages must point out specific
facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or
actual damages are borne.[23]
Fourth. We also agree with the petitioner that the respondent
court should not have awarded respondents-spouses moral damages of
P100,000.00 simply because their complaint did not specifically ask for
such relief. Moral damages must be disallowed when it is not
specifically prayed for in the complaint.[24] It is elementary that in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like,[25] both of which are absent in this case.
Finally. We further agree with the petitioner that the award of
attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 should be eliminated for lack of factual
basis and legal justification. The only evidence to support
respondents-spouses’ claim for attorney’s fees is the testimony of
Jerome Protasio to the effect that his agreement with the law firm
handling his case is that he is obligated to pay “25% of the obligation
receivable x x x.”[26] That is
all. Both the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals likewise did
not cite specific factual basis to justify the award of attorney’s fees,
which is in violation of the proscription against the imposition of a
penalty on the right to litigate.[27] As we enunciated in Refractories Corporation of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court:[28]
“x x x. The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than
the general rule and counsel’s fees is not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit. The discretion of the court to award attorney’s fees
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code ‘demands factual, legal and
equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without
a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and
conjecture.’ In all events, the court must state the reason for the
award of attorney’s fees.”
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated September 12, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 43311, is hereby
MODIFIED in the sense that the awards of back rentals, moral damages and
attorney’s fees are hereby DELETED. In all other respects, the assailed
decision is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero and concurred in by Associate Justices Cancio
C. Garcia and Eugenio S. Labitoria.
[2] CA decision, rollo, pp. 61-62.
[3] RTC decision, rollo, p. 100.
[4] Petition, rollo, pp. 15-16.
[5] De la Serna vs.
Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 325, 329 (1994); New Testament Church of God
vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 266, 270 (1995).
[6] Section 1, Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court.
[7] New Testament Church of God vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[8] Petition, p. 2; rollo, p. 9.
[9] Petition, rollo, pp. 16-18.
[10] Annex “B,” Petition, rollo, pp. 67-70.
[11] Ibid., p. 71.
[12] Petition, rollo, p. 17.
[13] See Uy Coque, et. al. vs. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405.
[14] CA decision, rollo, pp. 63-64.
[15] See Pre-Trial Conference Order dated Feb. 28, 1992, RTC record, p. 49.
[16] Par. 10, Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim; RTC rec., p. 26.
[17] CA decision, rollo, pp. 64-65.
[18] Petition, rollo, p. 23.
[19] CA decision, rollo, p. 65.
[20] Article 2199, Civil Code.
[21] Del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., 240 SCRA 348, 356 [1995],
citing Refractories Corp. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA
539; Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 34 Phil. 447.
[22] Del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., ibid., citing Capco vs. Macasaet, 189 SCRA 561.
[23] Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, et. al., ibid., citing Malonzo vs. Galang, 109 Phil. 16; Medelo vs. Gorospe, 159 SCRA 248.
[24] Darang vs. Belizar, et. al., 19 SCRA 214-216.
[25] See Article 2217, Civil Code of the Philippines; Darang vs. Belizar, et. al., ibid., at p. 222.
[26] TSN, August 26, 1992, pp. 13-14.
[27] Refractories Corporation of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 539, 547.
[28] Ibid.