PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PO1 ALLAN TEJADA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Tejada

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Police Officer One Allan Tejada, a prosecution for rape on two counts, decided by the Supreme Court on automatic review of a death sentence. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it shows how the Court treats the testimony of a child victim of rape, it shows how the "sweetheart defense" is weighed against the plain denial of a young complainant, and it shows how alibi is assessed against positive identification. It is also a study in the standard of proof for the extreme penalty, because the Court struck down the death sentence even as it affirmed the conviction.

Procedural History

Two informations for rape were filed against the accused before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38, one for an incident on April 3, 1995 and one for an incident on May 16, 1995. The two cases were consolidated on the motion of the prosecution. On arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty, and a joint trial followed. On June 16, 1996, the trial court rendered a joint decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape on two counts, sentencing him to death in each case, ordering him to pay moral damages of 50,000 pesos in each case, and ordering him to acknowledge and support the child born to the complainant. The case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review, the mode then prescribed for cases in which the death penalty is imposed.

Facts

Charisse Mendoza was born on May 19, 1982, and lived in barangay Quibaol, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Her paternal grandmother, Lourdes Mendoza, owned a house about 120 meters away. Living there were Charisse's first cousin Sandra Tejada, Sandra's husband Allan, who was a member of the Region One Philippine National Police Mobile Force, and their two children. On April 2, 1995, the grandmother, believing Allan would not come home, asked Charisse to spend the night there to accompany Sandra. Charisse slept on a sofa on the ground floor. Around ten in the evening she was awakened by a tricycle and heard Allan call for his wife, who opened the door for him. He took his supper and went upstairs.

At dawn the following day, Charisse woke to find her legs pinned against the sofa and Allan sitting beside her. When she asked what he was doing, he told her to keep quiet, held her hands, covered her mouth, and warned her not to shout or he would shoot her and her father. He then went on top of her, removed her short pants and underwear and his own shorts and brief, repeated the threat, and inserted his penis into her vagina, making coitus movements that caused her pain. After ejaculating, he warned her again not to reveal the incident. He went upstairs while she stayed on the sofa and wept until six in the morning. She did not report the incident to her grandparents because she was frightened by the long firearm kept in the kitchen, which reminded her of his threat.

On May 15, 1995, Charisse and her siblings were again brought to the grandmother's house because their father was leaving for Manila. Between ten and eleven in the evening, Allan came home from La Union. At early dawn the following day, Charisse was awakened when she felt Allan near her feet pulling her blanket. He held her hands, covered her mouth, and told her not to shout. He removed her pants and underwear and his own shorts and brief, went on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made coitus movements, telling her not to shout or he would kill her and her father. She tried to wake her siblings but could not. Afterwards he told her that if she revealed the incident he would tell her father that they were having an affair. On October 25, 1995, Charisse complained of stomach pains, and an ultrasound examination showed she was twenty weeks and four days pregnant. Confronted by her mother, she revealed that Allan was responsible. She gave birth to a baby boy on February 23, 1996. The accused did not deny sexual contact but claimed the complainant was his sweetheart and that the acts happened on other dates, and he set up alibi for the two dates charged.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the complainant despite the alleged contradictions between her testimony in court and her sworn statement.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in not believing the defense of alibi of the accused.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the accused.

Applicable Provisions

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 7659, defines rape and fixes its penalty, and it is the provision under which the informations were filed and the accused convicted:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or violence; 2. By employing intimidation; 3. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 4. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death. When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; 2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; 3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; 4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; 5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim; 6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and 7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.

The Court used this provision to test whether the qualifying circumstances that would justify death were alleged and proved, and it held they were not.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court did not err in crediting the complainant. Her narration of both incidents was candid, straightforward, and unflawed by any material inconsistency, and she never wavered on cross-examination. The Court stressed that when a minor says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed, and that the trial judge, who observed the witness's facial expressions, gestures, and tone of voice, is in the best position to determine credibility. On the alleged contradictions, the Court held that discrepancies as to the exact dates of the rape are inconsequential, since the date of commission is not an essential element of the crime, what is material being the occurrence of the rape and not the time of its commission. The complainant satisfactorily explained that she had written June 1995 in her sworn statement by mistake, because she was nervous at the time. The Court also rejected the sweetheart defense, holding that allegations of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof, and here there were no letters, notes, photos, or mementos, and the complainant was a little over twelve years old, while the accused was fourteen years older and the husband of her own cousin.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court did not err in rejecting the alibi. The accused did not deny sexual contact with the complainant, and his alibi could not overcome her positive identification of him as her rapist.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. The Court explained that the death penalty could be imposed only if the qualifying circumstances under Article 335, as amended, were both alleged in the information and proved at trial. Here, the informations alleged only force and intimidation, and did not allege that the victim was under eighteen years of age and that the offender was a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, nor that the offender was a member of the Philippine National Police. The Court therefore reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in each case, while affirming the award of moral damages and the order to acknowledge and support the child.

Doctrine

First, the testimony of a child victim of rape is given full weight and credence, because when a minor says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Second, discrepancies in the testimony of a complainant as to the exact dates of the rape are inconsequential, since the date of commission is not an essential element of the crime, what is material being the occurrence of the rape and not the time of its commission. Third, the sweetheart defense is a much-abused affirmative defense that must be supported by convincing proof, and it cannot prevail against the positive and candid testimony of a young complainant. Fourth, alibi cannot overcome positive identification. Fifth, and most important for the penalty, the death penalty under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 7659, may be imposed only when the qualifying circumstances are both alleged in the information and proved at trial; otherwise the penalty is reclusion perpetua.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape on two counts but reduced the penalty in each case from death to reclusion perpetua, while sustaining the award of moral damages and the order to acknowledge and support the child.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the death penalty under Article 335, as amended, requires that the qualifying circumstances be both alleged in the information and proved at trial. Examiners like to use this case to test the rule on the credibility of child victims of rape, the inconsequence of discrepancies as to dates, the rejection of the sweetheart defense, and the requirement that qualifying circumstances be alleged in the information.