G.R. No. 12616. November 02, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DANIEL PAGADUAN, EVARISTO LIMPIN AND FRANCISCO MASIBAY, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
MALCOLM, J.:
existence of the Filipino Revolutionary Government.
On June 26, 1916, an amended information was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, charging Daniel Pagaduan, Francisco Masibay, Evaristo
Limpin, and Modesto Raingin with the crime of robbery with homicide. The
defendants on arraignment entered a plea of not guilty and at the same time set
up what amounted to a special plea of autrefois acquit. After trial
before the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge of First Instance, Modesto
Raingin was acquitted, Daniel Pagaduan, Evaristo Limpin, and Francisco Masibay
were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua).
These last named defendants have appealed.
As introductory to a statement of the facts, a few preliminary observations
are in order. And first, it is to be noted that seventeen years elapsed between
the alleged perpetration of the crime and the institution of the prosecution.
The duty of the court to resolve all reasonable doubt in favor of the accused is
thus intensified. Delay in the commencement of a criminal action creates a
suspicion unless explained. The motive of the prosecution in suddenly assuming
activity after long continued silence, when the accused have made no effort to
escape and the witnesses are available, may well be questioned. Herein, it is
suggested by the evidence and in the argument that personal and political
reasons actuated the prosecution. We proffer no comment as to this, but only
mention it as offering a possible ulterior explanation of the prosecution. The
lapse of time may also result in the destruction of affirmative evidence tending
to establish the innocence of the accused. Again, and from an entirely different
standpoint, the testimony of witnesses such as are found in the present case,
while rightly subject to careful scrutiny, should not be rejected if found to be
reasonable and consistent and not contradicted by evidence from any reliable
source. These principles are here set forth, not as establishing any new and
novel doctrines, but merely, in synthesis, as indicative of the attitude of this
court as disclosed in numerous decisions. (See especially U. S.
vs. Mante [1914], 27 Phil., 134; U. S. vs. Briones [1914], 28
Phil., 367; U. S. vs. Cardona [1917], 36 Phil, 438.) Notwithstanding,
however, instead of giving the accused the benefit of these views, the trial
judge, in his decision, after making statements which would inevitably lead to
acquittal, continually nullifies the same, by failing to believe the evidence
for the defense. As opposed to such an attitude, we approach a statement of the
case, remembering not alone the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused, but that the passage of time may have produced an unfavorable effect on
the chances of the defense, remembering that, under such conditions, the
prosecution must establish its case by evidence which taken together is found to
be clear and convincing, and remembering, finally, that the testimony of the
witnesses for the defense are not to be rejected without good reason but are to
be given, in view of the circumstances of this case, special consideration.
The statements just made fail to disclose the unusual features presented by
this appeal. In order to get the situation clearly before us, we must make a
finding of the salient facts in chronological and historical form.
In May, 1899, the war between the American and Revolutionary forces in the
Philippines was on. The Filipino Government, from the standpoint of
International Law, was of the class known as “de facto government.”
(Macleod vs. U. S. [1912], 229 U. S., 416.) The capital of the
Revolutionary Government was at Tarlac. General Aguinaldo was the Commanding
General and President of the Revolutionary Government. General Luna was in
command of the Revolutionary forces in the north. Colonel Pablo Tecson, who
previously had been Secretary and Member of the Revolutionary Congress and
Secretary of the Mixed Civil and Military Commission, in May, 1899, was Auditor
to the Commanding General and President. General Pablo Padilla was military
governor of Nueva Ecija. Santiago Guimson was a “Juez instructor.” Benito
Calderon was a “Delegado de justicia” in Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija. The northern
provinces, including the Province of Nueva Ecija, were under the control of the
Revolutionary Government. Local administration adapted from the system in force
under Spain was in operation. The municipality of Zaragoza, Province of Nueva
Ecija, had such a local organization. Vicente de Castro, now deceased, was the
president or local chief of Zaragoza. Daniel Pagaduan, defendant, was “Delegado
de policia.” Francisco Masibay, defendant, was “Delegado de rentas.” Evaristo
Limpin, defendant, was a policeman in Zaragoza.
General Luna had earlier issued an order to the authorities of the
Revolutionary Government under his jurisdiction to hunt down and kill all spies.
The defendant Pagaduan testified that this order was in substance as follows:
“There having come to the notice of the Office of the Secretary of War that with
frequency some Chinamen serve as spies for the American forces, it is hereby
decreed to all civil or military officials that upon the approach of the
American forces to their town or towns, they immediately order the arrest of the
Chinese residents in the respective towns, and should they arouse suspicion that
they are spies, or be found to be under such circumstances as to prejudice our
Government, that they be ordered executed.” This order was received in Zaragoza.
Certain Chinese in the municipality had been suspected of being spies of the
Americans. Acting, therefore, pursuant to the circular of General Luna and under
the direct order of the municipal president, on one of the days of May, 1899,
the houses of these Chinese were sacked. The Chinese, nine in number, were
conducted to the municipal building. A little later, the Chinese were taken to
the barrio of Balucot and killed. The present defendants with others
participated directly in the execution of these deeds.
These occurrences, coming to the notice of General Aguinaldo, Colonel Tecson
was ordered to make an investigation. No one was in a better position to know
what happened at this investigation than Colonel Tecson, the man who conducted
it. We are shown no reason which would authorize us to conclude, as did the
trial court, that the vital part of Colonel Tecson’s testimony “is unworthy of
belief.” Moreover, Santiago Quimson, Juez instructor, and Benito
Calderon, Delegado de justicia, corroborated Colonel Tecson’s
remembrance of this investigation. Colonel Tecson testified that he proceeded in
the hearing pursuant to the provisions of the Military Code made up of orders of
the Commanding General. After examining many persons both in Nueva Ecija and in
Tarlac, Colonel Tecson says that he found it to be true that the dead Chinese
had been spies, who had transmitted information to the Americans. As a result of
the investigation, General Aguinaldo ordered the accused to be
liberated.
Nine years passed. In October, 1908, the justice of the peace
of Zaragoza conducted an investigation of charges against Pagaduan and Masibay.
Nothing came of the investigation. Eight years more passed. And then, the
present prosecution was instituted.
Expecting contradictions and failure of memory from witnesses, some of whom
are ignorant men, because of the long period of time which has passed since the
actual events transpired, and recalling our preliminary observations the
foregoing are believed to be true facts.
Defendants and appellants assign three errors of the trial court, namely: (1)
In declaring that the accused are guilty of the crime of murder; (2) in not
declaring that the accused were previously put in jeopardy; and (3) in not
declaring that the accused are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation issued by the President of the United States on July 4, 1902. We
pass by the first assignment of error for on a bare statement of the proof
unsupported by the other contentions, the assignment could not prosper. The
second assignment of error is to the effect that the accused having been tried
and acquitted of the same charge by a tribunal of the de facto
Government, they have been twice placed in jeopardy of the same offense. A study
of this unusual question in the light of history and jurisprudence would prove
most interesting. Regretfully we abstain from such a fascinating investigation
in order to resolve the last assignment of error, which is more easily decisive
of the case.
Do the accused come within the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation of the
President of the United States of July 4, 1902? This proclamation declared:
“A full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine
Archipelago who have participated in the insurrections aforesaid (against Spain
or the United States) or who have given aid and comfort to persons participating
in said insurrections, for the offenses of treason or sedition and for all
offenses political in their character committed in the course of such
insurrections pursuant to orders issued by the civil or military insurrectionary
authorities or which grew out of internal political feuds or dissensions between
Filipinos and Spaniards or the Spanish authorities or which resulted from
internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves during
either of said insurrections.”
The Amnesty Proclamation was intended as a humane grant of mercy and grace.
Acts occurring during the stress of war, which under ordinary conditions would
merit punishment, were to be forgiven and forgotten. The Government was not to
await the passing of years, and then for some cause or other, or out of caprice,
or even for more reprehensible motives, suddenly drag citizens from their homes,
stand them before the bar of justice, and try and convict them as in the usual
criminal case.
The Amnesty Proclamation has been held to cover three classes of offenses:
(1) Purely political crimes, compendiously described in the proclamation as
“treason and sedition;” (2) common crimes “political in their character,” that
is, committed in furtherance of the interest of the insurrection, if committed
pursuant to orders from superior authority; and (3) crimes which are shown to
have had their origin in the two classes of “internal political feuds or
dissensions” named, without reference to whether they are in their nature
political or common crimes, or common crimes of a political character, and
without reference to whether they were committed under orders of a superior
authority or not. (U. S. vs. Vergara [1903], 1 Phil., 638.) How do our
facts plumb with these essential requisites of the Amnesty Proclamation? All of
the accused were officials or employees of the Revolutionary Government. The
defendants were taking part in a civil capacity against the United States in the
insurrection mentioned in the Amnesty Proclamation. Murder and robbery are the
ordinary appellations of the crimes they committed. Such are abhorrent crimes
high in the scale of infamy. The State punishes them with long imprisonment or
death. Yet, in times of war, such occurrences are not unexpected. The bloody
tragedies of the French Revolution and of the American Civil War, and, even more
recently, the events of the Russian war of liberation, convey to us a message of
toleration and commiseration. So likewise in the Philippines, the common crimes
of murder and robbery could be, and were, committed during the Revolution, under
circumstances which clothed them with a political character. These crimes
related to the Revolution, and apparently were committed to further the
interests of the Revolution. The killing of persons who were believed to be
American spies has been held, in many cases, to be crimes falling within the
scope of the Amnesty Proclamation. Even where the officer not only kills
suspected persons but robs them of their property, the robbery has been regarded
as in the nature of a reprisal and so to be pardoned with the murder.
(See U. S. vs. Alhambra [1903], 2 Phil., 80.) And finally,
herein, it is not to be forgotten that the alleged crimes were committed by
officers of the Revolutionary Government in pursuance of orders issued by their
superior military leaders.
The defendants and appellants are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
defendants and appellants are acquitted, with the costs of both instances de
officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Araullo,
JJ., concur.
JOHNSON, J., concurring:
I agree with the conclusion that
the defendants should be absolved from all liability under the complaint upon
the ground that they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of
July 4, 1902. It has been the policy of this court since its organization not to
include in a decision any doctrine or argument which is not germane to the
particular question presented. I am still of the opinion that that policy is a
wise one and should be adhered to. Questions which are, and not. which may be,
presented should be decided only.
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur. The accused are clearly
entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation.
STREET, J., concurring:
I concur on the grounds stated by Justices Carson and Johnson.