PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. YAMASHITO RONQUILLO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Ronquillo

The Case

This is People versus Ronquillo, a criminal appeal decided in April 2002. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Yamashito Ronquillo, together with several others, for a night of explosion and gunfire inside a residential compound in Quezon City that left houses burned and two persons dead. The trial court convicted Ronquillo of murder for the killing of Feliciana Bacolongan, and he brought the case to the Supreme Court. The case matters to a reviewee because it gathers in one place the rules on positive identification, on conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability, and on the weight of a lone but credible eyewitness against the defense of alibi.

Procedural History

Seventeen persons were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with multiple arson, attempted murder, and double murder with multiple frustrated and attempted murder. Only four were arrested and arraigned, and all four pleaded not guilty, so a joint trial followed. In its joint decision of August 1994, the trial court acquitted all four of multiple arson and of attempted murder, and acquitted three of them of the murder charge on reasonable doubt. It convicted only Yamashito Ronquillo of murder for the killing of Feliciana Bacolongan, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify her heirs. Ronquillo moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied for lack of merit. He then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, raising as errors the finding of positive identification, the finding of conspiracy, and the conviction on the lone testimony of Baltazar Bacolongan.

Facts

On the evening of January 6, 1991, at about six o'clock, a loud explosion was heard inside the Manresa Compound in Barangay Manresa, Quezon City. The explosion set several houses on fire, and several men going out of the compound fired shots inside it. The shooting lasted about an hour and stopped only when two city councilors arrived. Five houses were burned, two persons were killed, and several others were injured.

Baltazar Bacolongan testified that he and his wife Feliciana were walking home when they heard the explosion. They ran to their house and found it on fire. As Feliciana was about to climb the stairs, she fell, wounded in the stomach. Baltazar placed her on his lap, looked toward the direction of the shot, and saw the appellant Yamashito Ronquillo and several others firing their guns beside the fence along Mauban Street. His wife died on the way to the hospital. His neighbor Mely de Guzman also testified that she saw the appellant and others firing, but she did not identify any of the four accused in open court.

Ronquillo denied the killing and put up alibi. He testified that he was home, that he heard the explosion and the shots from about fifty meters away, and that he went out only after the shooting stopped. The police investigator testified that when he interviewed Baltazar at the hospital on the night of the incident, Baltazar did not name the assailants; Baltazar named the appellant only in an affidavit executed eleven days later.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that Baltazar Bacolongan positively identified the appellant as one of the perpetrators.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding conspiracy in the commission of the offense.
• Whether or not the appellant was convicted beyond reasonable doubt on the lone testimony of Baltazar Bacolongan.

Applicable Provisions

The decision rests on the definition of conspiracy in the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

This is the hinge of the conviction: because the appellant and his armed companions acted in concert, the act of one became the act of all, and it became immaterial who among them fired the fatal bullet.

The decision also applies the qualifying circumstance of treachery under the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Treachery qualified the killing from homicide to murder, and it is the circumstance that raised the appellant's liability to the higher offense.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the identification was positive and credible. The supposed inconsistency between Baltazar's testimony on direct examination that the appellant was in front of the house and his testimony on cross-examination that the appellant was beside the fence at the back was not a real contradiction: when Baltazar said the appellant was in front of their house, he meant at the fence along Mauban Street fronting the house. The Court noted that the appellant's own house was the first house near that fence, about three meters away, that the fence was only half the height of the house, and that the appellant and his companions were about five meters from the house. The wound on Feliciana's stomach was consistent with assailants positioned beside that fence.

On the claim that the place was dark, the Court relied on the testimony of Severina Navoa that the lights went off because of the fire and not because of a brownout, and that there were lights outside the compound, and on Mely de Guzman's testimony that their side of the compound was well lighted by the burning houses. On the claim that Baltazar did not name the appellant at the hospital, the Court upheld the trial court's observation that the investigator's initial report did not state that he interviewed Baltazar at all, unlike its express statement that he interviewed other victims. The Court held that the appellant's remaining arguments were mere conjectures that cannot prevail over a positive identification.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the trial court that the appellant and his armed companions, seen firing their guns immediately after his wife was shot, acted in concert. Conspiracy having been established, the act of each was the act of all, and it was immaterial who discharged the fatal bullet. Treachery qualified the killing to murder.

On the third issue, the Court held that the conviction rested on a lone but credible eyewitness, and that such testimony, when positive and unrebutted by anything but alibi and conjecture, is sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Doctrine

First, positive identification by a single credible eyewitness suffices to convict; minor or apparent inconsistencies in the witness's testimony, when explained by the physical setting and the witness's position, do not destroy credibility. Second, conspiracy, as defined in the Revised Penal Code, makes the act of one the act of all, so that it is immaterial who among the conspirators fired the fatal shot. Third, treachery, as defined in the Revised Penal Code, qualifies the killing to murder when the means employed specially insure its execution without risk to the offender. Fourth, alibi cannot prevail over positive identification, especially where the appellant was shown to be at or near the scene.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Yamashito Ronquillo for murder and his sentence of reclusion perpetua, with the order to indemnify the heirs of Feliciana Bacolongan, and the appeal was dismissed.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and it is immaterial who among the conspirators fired the fatal bullet. Examiners use this case to test positive identification by a lone eyewitness, the sufficiency of circumstantial consistency in testimony, and the interplay of conspiracy and treachery in qualifying a killing to murder.