REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. CLAUDE A. MILLER AND JUMRUS S. MILLER, RESPONDENTS.

Republic versus Miller

The Case

This is a petition brought by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, against the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, both American citizens, to overturn a decree of adoption that allowed them to adopt a Filipino child. The Republic's central objection is that the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, prohibits aliens from adopting, and the spouses filed their petition on July 29, 1988, only days before that prohibition took effect. The case matters because it fixes the rule on vested rights in adoption: the law in force when the petition is filed governs, and a later disqualification cannot reach back to destroy a right already fixed.

Procedural History

The spouses filed a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City. The trial court heard the petition and, on May 12, 1989, rendered a decision granting the adoption, declaring the minor freed from all obligation of obedience and support with respect to his natural parents and declaring him the child of the petitioners by adoption, with his surname changed from Madayag to Miller. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic, appealed in due time to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on April 17, 1996, certified the case to the Supreme Court because the petition raised only questions of law. By resolution adopted on September 23, 1996, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal and treated it as one via certiorari from a decision of the Regional Trial Court on pure questions of law.

Facts

Claude A. Miller, thirty eight years old, and Jumrus S. Miller, forty years old, are husband and wife, married on June 21, 1982, and both American citizens. They were childless and did not expect to have a child of their own union on account of a medical problem of the wife. Claude A. Miller was a member of the United States Air Force, as airman first class, assigned at Clark Air Base since January 26, 1985, and the family maintained their residence in Angeles City since 1985.

The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Junior and Zenaida Magno. Born on July 14, 1987, in San Fernando, La Union, the minor had been in the custody of the spouses since the first week of August 1987. Poverty and deep concern for the future of their son prompted the natural parents, who had no visible means of livelihood, to have their child adopted by the spouses, and they executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption. The Department of Social Welfare and Development recommended approval of the petition, on the basis of its evaluation that the spouses were morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the adoption would be to the minor's best interest and welfare.

On July 29, 1988, the spouses filed their verified petition to adopt. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, a few days after the filing. The trial court granted the petition, and the Republic appealed, contending that the spouses, being aliens, were disqualified under the Family Code.

Issues

• Whether or not the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family Code, when the petition for adoption was filed before the effectivity of that Code under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which allowed aliens to adopt.
• Whether or not the enactment of the Family Code impaired the right of the respondent spouses, who are aliens, to adopt a Filipino child, the right having become vested at the time of the filing of the petition.

Applicable Provisions

The decision refers to the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, and to the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time the petition was filed. The Court states the governing rule on jurisdiction in this language:

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.

This rule bears on the case because the sufficiency of the petition and the jurisdiction of the trial court are measured by the law in force when the action commenced, not by the later Family Code.

The Court also states the rule on when jurisdiction, once attached, may be lost:

Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

This bears on the case because the subsequent effectivity of the Family Code could not divest the trial court of jurisdiction already acquired over the petition.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the court may allow the adoption. The issue was not new. The Court had already ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code did not impair the right of the respondent spouses to adopt a Filipino child, because the right had become vested at the time of the filing of the petition and is governed by the law then in force. The Court defined a vested right in these words:

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.

It added that vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Family Code did not impair the vested right. An alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under Article 184 of that Code, may continue with the petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code. The Court grounded its ruling on jurisdiction: the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action, and once it attaches it cannot be ousted by subsequent events. The Court closed with the policy behind adoption, holding that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration, and that every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Doctrine

An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family Code, acquired a vested right that cannot be affected by the subsequent enactment of a law disqualifying him. The law in force at the time of the filing of the petition governs the petition, and the court that acquires jurisdiction over it retains that jurisdiction until it fully disposes of the case; subsequent events cannot oust it. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, and it includes an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. Adoption statutes are humane and salutary, and the interests and welfare of the child are of paramount consideration.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court granting the petition for adoption, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family Code acquired a vested right governed by the law then in force, and the later disqualification cannot impair it. Examiners use this case to test the interplay of vested rights, the retroactive reach of a new statute, and the rule that jurisdiction is fixed by the law in force at the commencement of the action.