G.R. No. 125788. June 05, 1998
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), PETITIONER, VS. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN AND AEROCOM INVESTORS & MANAGERS, INC., RESPONDENTS.
MARTINEZ, J.:
In its continuing search for “ill-gotten wealth”, herein
petitioner Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed in
the Sandiganbayan on July 22, 1987 a case (Civil Case No. 0009) for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against
Manuel H. Nieto, Jose L. Africa, Roberto S. Benedicto, Potenciano
Ilusorio, Juan Ponce Enrile and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. alleging, in
substance, that said defendants acted as “dummies” of the late strongman
and devised “schemes” and “strategems” to monopolize the
telecommunications industry. Annexed to the complaint is a listing of
the assets of defendants Nieto and Africa, among which are their shares
of stock in private respondent Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc.
(Aerocom).[1]
Almost a year later, the PCGG sought to sequester Aerocom under a writ of sequestration dated June 15, 1988,[2] which was served on and received “under protest” by Aerocom’s president on August 3, 1988.[3]
Seven (7) days after receipt of the sequestration order, Aerocom
on August 10, 1988 filed a complaint against the PCGG (docketed as Civil
Case No. 0044)[4] urging the
Sandiganbayan to nullify the same on the ground that it was served on
Aerocom beyond the eighteen (18)-month period from the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution as provided for in Section 26, Article XVIII
thereof which reads:
“Sec. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or
freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation
to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more
than eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution.
However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the
Congress may extend said period.“A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case.
The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall
forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before
the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action
or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification.
For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or
proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance
thereof.“The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted
if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.”
In its amended answer dated May 19, 1992,[5]
the PCGG specifically alleged that Aerocom has no cause of action
against it since the issuance of the writ of sequestration on June 15,
1988 was well-within the 18-month constitutional deadline counted from
February 2, 1987, the date when the people, in a plebiscite,
overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 0044, Aerocom filed on July 5, 1995 a Manifestation and Motion[6]
praying that the Sandiganbayan direct the PCGG to release and
distribute the dividends pertaining to the shares of Aerocom in all
corporations where it owns shares of stock. Commenting thereon,[7]
the PCGG opposed the release of the dividends on the argument that “the
fact that plaintiff (Aerocom) is mentioned in Annex “A” of the
complaint filed in Civil Case No. 0009 is a clear indication that the
shares thereof are likewise sequestered.”
The Sandiganbayan in its Resolution promulgated on January 31, 1996[8]
acted favorably on Aerocom’s Manifestation and Motion and thus ordered
the PCGG to release the dividends pertaining to Aerocom except the
dividends on the sequestered shares of stock registered in the names of
Manuel Nieto and Jose Africa in POTC, ETPI and Aerocom, on the following
findings:
“A close scrutiny of Annex `A’ of the complaint in Civil Case No.
0009, entitled `Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose L. Africa, Manuel
H. Nieto, Jr., and Roberto S. Benedicto’, does not show, that herein
plaintiff Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc., as a corporation, was
itself sequestered. What was sequestered are the shares of stock of
Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. and Jose L. Africa in Aerocom Investors &
Managers, Inc.“Defendant PCGG is under estoppel from denying that it has in fact
recognized and confirmed the non-sequestration status of herein
plaintiff, as a corporation, by releasing the cash dividends due to the
plaintiff from Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC
for short) per its Resolutions dated June 29, 1993 and May 6, 1994. The
said PCGG Resolution, dated June 29, 1993 (Annex “A”, Manifestation and
Motion, p. 330, record) refers to its approval to release the POTC cash
dividends declared in 1989 and 1991 pertaining to the shares of herein
plaintiff Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc. in Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation. On the other hand, PCGG Resolution No.
94-066 dated May 6, 1994 refers to its approval releasing the POTC cash
dividends declared in 1993 and `accruing to the shares of stocks in
POTC, registered under the name of Aerocom Investors & Managers,
Inc., except cash dividends pertaining to the personal shares of Mr.
Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. in POTC and likewise his shares of stocks in
Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc.’ (Annex `B’, Manifestation and
Motion, p. 331, record).“There is no dispute that herein plaintiff, as a corporation, has a
juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders.”
After a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the Sandiganbayan per Resolution promulgated on May 7, 1996,[9]
the PCGG filed the present petition for certiorari on August 16, 1996
assailing the Sandiganbayan order for the release of the dividends as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In compliance with
the Resolution of this Court dated September 2, 1996[10]
which also granted the temporary restraining order prayed for by the
PCGG, Aerocom filed its comment on the petition on September 11, 1996[11] to which, the PCGG on November 21, 1996 filed a reply.[12]
The petition must fail.
There is merit in the initial point amplified by Aerocom in its
comment that the instant certiorari proceedings brought by the PCGG is
an improper remedy under the circumstances. From a reading of its
January 31, 1996 Resolution granting Aerocom’s Manifestation and Motion,
(as heretofore quoted), as well as the May 7, 1996 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan has virtually passed
upon the pivotal issue involved in Aerocom’s complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the writ of sequestration (Civil Case No.
0044) – i.e., whether or not Aerocom’s sequestration was in order. That
court’s finding to the effect that Aerocom was not validly sequestered,
clearly, was a final adjudication on the merits which is reviewable by
the appellate court only through an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The PCGG should have availed of the remedy of appeal filed
within the statutory fifteen (15)-day period and not a petition for
certiorari, as the arguments the PCGG propounds in support of its
challenge on the Sandiganbayan Resolutions would amount to a digging
into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment.[13] At this juncture, “[i]t must emphatically be reiterated,” to borrow the words of Mr. Justice Regalado in Purefoods Corp. vs. NLRC,[14] “since
so often is it overlooked, that the special civil action for certiorari
is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. The reason for the rule is simple. When a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it
of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would
not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable
through the original civil action of certiorari.”
Equally worth recalling is that certiorari is not and cannot be
made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available[15] but was lost thru the fault or negligence of petitioner,[16] as in this case.
Even if we disregard such procedural flaw, the substantial contentions of the PCGG fail to invite judgment in its favor.
First. We cannot subscribe to the PCGG’s theory that, as
the first paragraph of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution
speaks only of “The authority to issue . . .”, then there is
faithful compliance with the 18-month constitutional deadline by the
mere issuance of the writ of sequestration within that time-frame (June
15, 1988) even if service thereof on Aerocom was effected thereafter
(August 3, 1988).
The obvious intendment behind the 18-month period, as well as the
six (6)-month time-limit for the filing of the corresponding judicial
action, is to ensure the protection of property rights and to serve as a
necessary safeguard against an overzealous exercise by the State,
acting as “bounty-hunters” so to speak, of its power of sequestration
which, as described by Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in her
concurring opinion in BASECO v. PCGG,[17]
is an “extra-ordinary, harsh and severe remedy.” For this reason, “(I)t
should be confined”, J. Herrera continues, “to its lawful parameters
and exercised, with due regard, in the words of its enabling laws, to
the requirements of fairness, due process, and Justice.” The probable
evil of governmental abuse is best avoided and the dictates of
“fairness”, “due process” and “Justice” are truly heeded under an
interpretation of Section 26, Article XVIII as requiring both the
issuance of the writ and notification to, or more precisely, the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the entity/entities to be sequestered
via valid service thereof, to be effected within the 18-month period. A
writ of sequestration, therefore, runs the risk of being struck down as
invalid if and when the twin requirements of issuance and service are
not satisfied within the deadline.
Such is the fate of the subject writ of sequestration,
unfortunately. Whether the 18-month period expired on July 26, 1988 (as
claimed by Aerocom, in line with the computation of time under Article
13 of the Civil Code and the ruling in “National Marketing Corp. v.
Tecson,” 29 SCRA 70) or on August 2, 1988 (the PCGG’s position), the
fact remains that service of the writ on Aerocom on August 3, 1988 was
made beyond these dates. The PCGG’s theory that the mere issuance of the
writ within the 18-month deadline will suffice, is just too dangerous
to accept. Imagine a scenario where the PCGG may have actually tarried
in the issuance of the sequestration order to the prejudice of the
would-be sequestered entity, and all that the PCGG has to do to cover
its mistake is to conveniently ante-date the writ so as to feign timely
compliance. That would, in effect, be allowing the PCGG to employ a
subterfuge to validate what may in fact be a purely whimsical, unfounded
and an “afterthought” takeover of corporate property. The Constitution
does not and can never tolerate such a deceptive maneuver. Service of
the writ of sequestration within the 18-month period, then, is an
imperative measure to guard against this kind of mischief, for it will
certainly give the assurance that the writ was genuinely issued within
that constitutional deadline.
Second. The PCGG cannot justify its failure, as found by the Sandiganbayan,[18]
to file the corresponding judicial action against Aerocom within the
six (6)-month period as provided for under the same constitutional
provision in focus (Section 26, Article XVIII, second paragraph) by the
fact that Aerocom was mentioned in the complaint of the PCGG in Civil
Case No. 0009 (the Nieto, Africa, et al. case) and in Annex “A” thereof
notwithstanding that Aerocom was not impleaded as party-defendant, and
on the argument that the filing of Civil Case No. 0009 against the
“Nieto, Africa, et al. group” is enough compliance with the “judicial
action” requirement. The case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376, January 23, 1995,
relied upon by the PCGG, has no rightful application, inasmuch as this
Court’s pronouncements therein, in answer to this crucial question:
“DOES INCLUSION IN THE COMPLAINTS FILED BY THE PCGG BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF CORPORATIONS BEING `DUMMIES’ OR
UNDER THE CONTROL OF ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE DEFENDANTS NAMED THEREIN AND
USED AS INSTRUMENTS FOR ACQUISITION, OR AS BEING DEPOSITARIES OR
PRODUCTS, OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH; OR THE ANNEXING TO SAID COMPLAINTS OF A
LIST OF SAID FIRMS, BUT WITHOUT ACTUALLY IMPLEADING THEM AS DEFENDANTS,
SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A
SEIZURE EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1, s. 1986, THE
CORRESPONDING `JUDICIAL ACTION OR PROCEEDING’ SHOULD BE FILED WITHIN THE
SIX-MONTH PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 26, ARTICLE XVIII, OF THE (1987)
CONSTITUTION?”,
presuppose a valid and existing sequestration of the unimpleaded corporation/s concerned. Thus –
“1) Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution does not, by its
terms or any fair interpretation thereof, require that corporations or
business enterprises alleged to be repositories of `ill-gotten
wealth,’ as the term is used in said provision, be actually and formally
impleaded in the actions for the recovery thereof, in order to maintain in effect existing sequestrations thereof;“2) complaints for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth which merely
identify and/or allege said corporations or enterprises to be the
instruments, repositories or the fruits of ill-gotten wealth, without
more, come within the meaning of the phrase `corresponding judicial
action or proceeding’ contemplated by the constitutional provision
referred to; the more so, that normally, said corporations, as
distinguished from their stockholders or members, are not generally
suable for the latter’s illegal or criminal actuations in the
acquisition of the assets invested by them in the former;“3) even assuming the impleading of said corporations to be
necessary and proper so that judgment may comprehensively and
effectively be rendered in the actions, amendment of the complaints to
implead them as defendants may, under existing rules of procedure, be
done at any time during the pendency of the actions thereby initiated,
and even during the pendency of an appeal to the Supreme Court – a
procedure that, in any case, is not inconsistent with or proscribed by
the constitutional time limits to the filing of the corresponding
complaints `for’ – i.e., with regard or in relation to, in respect
of, or in connection with, or concerning – orders of sequestration,
freezing, or provisional takeover.’” xxx xxx xxx (underscoring supplied)
There is no existing sequestration to talk about in this case, as the
writ issued against Aerocom, to repeat, is invalid for reasons
hereinbefore stated. Ergo, the suit in Civil Case No. 0009 against Mr.
Nieto and Mr. Africa as shareholders in Aerocom is not and cannot ipso
facto be a suit against the unimpleaded Aerocom itself without violating
the fundamental principle that a corporation has a legal personality
distinct and separate from its stockholders. Such is the ruling laid
down in PCGG v. Interco[19] reiterated anew in a case of more recent vintage – Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corp. and Allied Banking Corp.[20] where this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco,[21] hewed to the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla[22] in the very same Republic v. Sandiganbayan case herein invoked by the PCGG, to wit:
“x x x failure to implead these corporations as defendants and
merely annexing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a
violation of their right to due process for it would in effect be
disregarding their distinct and separate personality without a hearing.“In cases where stocks of a corporation were allegedly the fruits
of ill-gotten wealth, it should be remembered that in most of these
cases the stocks involved constitute a substantial if not controlling
interest in the corporations. The basic tenets of fair play demand that
these corporations be impleaded as defendants since a judgment in favor
of the government will undoubtedly substantially and decisively affect
the corporations as distinct entities. The judgment could strip them of
everything without being previously heard as they are not parties to the
action in which the judgment is rendered.“x x x. Holding that the `corresponding judicial action or
proceeding’ contemplated by the Constitution is any action concerning or
involving the corporation under sequestration is oversimplifying the
solution, the result of which is antagonistic to the principles of
justice and fair play.“x x x the actions contemplated by the Constitution should be
those which include the corporation not as a mere annex to the complaint
but as defendant. This is the minimum requirement of the due process
guarantee. Short of being impleaded, the corporation has no
standing in the judicial action. It cannot adequately defend itself. It
may not even be heard.“On the x x x opinion that alternatively the corporations can be
impleaded as defendants by amendment of the complaint, Section 26,
Article XVIII of the Constitution would appear to preclude this
procedure, for allowing amendment of the complaint to implead
theretofore unimpleaded corporations would in effect allow complaints
against the corporation to be filed beyond the periods fixed by said Section 26.xxx xxx xxx
“While government efforts to recover illegally amassed wealth
should have support from all its branches, eagerness and zeal should not
be allowed to run berserk, overriding in the process the very
principles that it is sworn to uphold. In our legal system, the ends do
not always justify the means. Wrongs are never corrected by committing
other wrongs, and as above-discussed the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
does not and should never justify unreasonable intrusions into
constitutionally forbidden grounds. x x x.”
The last area of discussion touches on the doctrine of estoppel. Let
us rewind the events for a clear understanding of the issue involved.
During the pendency of the Aerocom complaint against the PCGG,
the latter approved the release of the cash dividends declared in the
years 1989, 1991 and 1993 accruing to the shares of stock of Aerocom in
the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Co. (POTC) per PCGG
Certification dated June 29, 1993[23] and Resolution No. 94-066 dated May 6, 1994 which read, respectively:
“OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENTC E R T I F I C A T I O N
“This is to certify that the following is an excerpt of the Minutes
of the Executive Committee Meeting held on June 18, 1993 at the PCGG
Commission Room, 6th Floor, Philcomcen Bldg., Pasig, Metro Manila:“03 POTC/AEROCOM INVESTORS, INC./MANUEL NIETO, JR.
“After deliberation on the letter-request dated May 30, 1993 of
Aerocom Investors, Inc. and Mr. Manuel Nieto, Jr. thru counsel, the
Commission has resolved to approve the release of the POTC cash
dividends declared in 1989 and 1991.“The Chairman further instructed Comm. Guiao to pursue the settlement with Mr. Nieto on more favorable terms to the government.
“Done on this 29th day of June, 1993 at Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines.
CERTIFIED CORRECT:
(SGD.)
ELIZABETH J. TRINIDAD
Commission Secretary”___________________ _______________________
“REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENTRESOLUTION NO. 94-066
“WHEREAS, the request of Polygon Investors, Inc. and Mr. Jose
Africa and Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc. and Mr. Manuel H.
Nieto, Jr. was taken up in the Executive Committee Meeting of this
Commission held on May 5, 1994;“WHEREAS, it appears that Mr. Jose Africa and Mr. Manuel H. Nieto,
Jr. are both defendants in Civil Case No. 009 before the Sandiganbayan,
and representation has been made that Aerocom Investors & Managers,
Inc. is not sequestered.“NOW, THEREFORE, RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) hereby interposes no
objection to the release of the cash dividends declared in 1993 and
accruing to the shares of stock in Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Co. (POTC) registered under the name of Aerocom
Investors & Managers, Inc., except the cash dividends pertaining to
the personal shares of stock of Mr. Manuel Nieto, Jr. in POTC and
likewise, his shares of stock in Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc.“On the other hand, the release of the cash dividends declared in
1993 and previous years which are accruing to the shares of stock in
POTC registered in the name of Polygon Investors, Inc. and Mr. Jose
Africa is hereby deferred.“DONE this 6th day of May, 1994 at Pasig, Metro Manila.
(SGD.)
MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO
Chairman(SGD.) (SGD.)
REYNALDO S. GUIAO HERMILO R. ROSAL
Commissioner Commissioner
(SGD.) (SGD.)
JULIET C. BERTUBEN HERMINIO A. MENDOZA
Commissioner Commissioner”
The PCGG issued the aforequoted “Certification” and “Resolution 94-066” apparently on the basis of a “Memorandum”[24]
prepared by Atty. Ismael B. Sanchez, former legal counsel of the PCGG,
advising the latter not to interpose any objection to the release of the
POTC cash dividends. A portion of the “Memorandum” reads:
“THE ISSUES:
- Is there legal basis to withhold the release of the POTC cash
dividends declared in 1989 and 1991 in favor of Mr. Nieto and Aerocom?- Was the sequestration order over Aerocom issued validly?
“As to the first issue.
“As resolved by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of October 2,
1991 and January 25, 1993, the PCGG has no authority to withhold
satisfaction and release of dividends to stockholders whose shares in
POTC are not and have never been sequestered. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
ruled:`We have gone over the pleadings filed by the parties, and we find
that herein petitioners, whose stockholdings in the POTC are not
sequestered, have the right to the payment of their respective
dividends. Respondent PCGG has no authority to withhold satisfaction and
release of the same.’“There is nothing in the records of the Commission to show that a
sequestration order issued against the shares of Mr. Nieto Jr. and
Aerocom in POTC. A distinction must be made in the matter of
sequestration of the corporation itself and the sequestration of
corporate shareholdings in another corporation. (Please see NOTE above
regarding sequestration of Aerocom) The sequestration refers to Aerocom
as a corporation.“Being similarly situated as the petitioners in Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 118 and considering the relevant facts stated above, it is the
opinion of the undersigned that the POTC dividends due Mr. Nieto and
Aerocom may be released to them.“As to the second issue.
“With respect to the writ of sequestration issued on June 15, 1988
against Aerocom and served on August 3, 1988, the following points are
to be considered:“(1) It may be argued that this writ is a `midnight’ sequestration
order considering the date of its issuance and the date it was served on
Aerocom, that is, four (4) days before the expiration of the authority
of PCGG to issue sequestration or freeze order as provided under Section
26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.“(2) The sequestration order in question was issued after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution exactly on June 15, 1988. As such,
the sequestration order can only be issued upon showing a prima facie
case of ill-gotten wealth. Nothing was mentioned in the writ against
Aerocom of any ground or basis for its issuance. It just stated that the
company is placed under sequestration.“(3) Even assuming that it was valid when issued, the sequestration
order was never implemented. In fact, in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No.
044, the PCGG through the Office of the Solicitor General agreed not to
implement the sequestration order as earlier discussed.“(4) PCGG has not filed any action against Aerocom. In the Interco
case, the Supreme Court, citing Section 26, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, has ruled and held `the sequestration or freeze order is
deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is
commenced as herein provided.’ Any action or proceeding against Aerocom
should have been commenced or filed within six (6) months from June 15,
1988.“CONCLUSION:
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it our considered opinion and
recommendation that the Commission interpose no objection to the release
of the POTC cash dividends declared in 1989 and 1991 in favor of Mr.
Nieto Jr. and Aerocom Investors, Inc.“Furthermore, appropriate instruction be given to the assigned Asset
Monitor in POTC to approve the corresponding checks covering the cash
dividends due Mr. Nieto Jr. and Aerocom Investors, Inc.”(SGD.)
ISMAEL B. SANCHEZ”
Taking into account these documents, the Sandiganbayan thus found the
PCGG to be in estoppel from denying the non-sequestered status of
Aerocom and from refusing the release of cash dividends in favor of the
latter. The PCGG takes exception to this finding on the claim that the
State should not be held vulnerable to estoppel for the acts of past
officials.
The PCGG’s contention is not persuasive under the attendant
circumstances. While we agree with the statement that the State is
immune from estoppel, this concept, as clarified by this Court thru Mr.
Justice Melo in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[25] “is understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those which are irregular.”[26]
Here, other than its bare assertion that Atty. Sanchez’s “Opinion” is
“illegal and prejudicial”, the PCGG has not presented convincing
evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of Atty.
Sanchez in rendering his “Opinion” favorable to Aerocom. In fact, no
less than PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo and the rest of the
Commissioners clearly heeded the recommendation of Atty. Sanchez by
affixing their signatures on Resolution No. 94-066 allowing the release
of the cash dividends declared in 1993 accruing to Aerocom’s shares of
stock in POTC. Elementary notions of consistency and fair play call upon
the PCGG to honor the release of the cash dividends presently requested
by Aerocom, after a similar commitment has been collectively confirmed
by its commissioners in black and white. “A ruling to the contrary”, in
the erudite language of Justice Escareal of the Sandiganbayan as adopted
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226 SCRA 314, “is not
only illogical and irrational, but inequitable and pernicious as well,
for it may open the door for capricious adventurism on the part of the
policy-makers of the land, and disregard for the majesty of the law,
which could ultimately bring about the citizenry’s loss of faith and
confidence in the sincerity of the government in its dealings with the
governed.”
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on
January 31, 1996 and May 7, 1996 are AFFIRMED in their entirety.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman.), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., on leave.
[1] Petition, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 4-6.
[2] Rollo, p. 37, Annex “C”.
[3] Rollo, p. 38, Annex “D”.
[4] Rollo, pp. 42-49, Annex “F”.
[5] Rollo, pp. 54-59, Annex “G”.
[6] Rollo, pp. 60-63, Annex “H”.
[7] Rollo, pp. 66-67, Annex “I”.
[8] Rollo, pp. 22-27, Annex “A”.
[9] Rollo, pp. 28-36, Annex “B”.
[10] Rollo, p. 82.
[11] Rollo, pp. 91-111.
[12] Rollo, pp. 132-138.
[13] Valdez, Jr. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 85129, Jan. 31, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution,
citing Padilla v. Commission on Elections, 137 SCRA 424, Batino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, 137 SCRA 698, Francis N. Tolentino, et al. v.
Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. Nos. 83071-72, July 28, 1988.
[14] 171 SCRA 415.
[15] Del Rosario v. Balagot, 166 SCRA 429.
[16] Jose v. Zulueta, 2 SCRA 574; Ago v. Buslon, 10 SCRA 202; Florendo v. CFI, 104 Phil. 661; Dela Cruz v. IAC, 134 SCRA 417.
[17] 150 SCRA 181, May 27, 1987
[18] Resolution of May 7, 1996 denying the PCGG’s motion for reconsideration, p. 6.
[19] G.R. No. 92755, July 26, 1991, En Banc Minute Resolution.
[20] 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996.
[21] Retired on February 13, 1998.
[22] Retired on August 24, 1997.
[23] Rollo, p. 124.
[24] Rollo, pp. 120-123.
[25] 226 SCRA 314, September 10, 1993.
[26] Citing “Sharp International Marketing v. CA,” 201 SCRA 299 and “Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186.