SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS AND MARIA HONTIVEROS, PETITIONERS, VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 25, ILOILO CITY AND SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS AND TEODORA AYSON, RESPONDENTS.

Spouses Hontiveros versus Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros against the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, and the spouses Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners sued for damages arising from a land registration case that, they claimed, deprived them of income from a parcel of land in Jamindan, Capiz. The trial court dismissed their complaint outright, on the ground that it was not verified as Article 151 of the Family Code requires and that earnest efforts toward a compromise were not shown. The case matters because the Supreme Court uses it to fix two things every examinee must know: the correct mode of appeal from a final order of a regional trial court raising pure questions of law, and the exact reach of the family-compromise requirement, which does not apply once a stranger to the family is a party.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed their complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25. The private respondents answered, denying the material allegations and setting up defenses, including the absence of earnest efforts toward a compromise. The petitioners then filed an amended complaint inserting an allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but were unsuccessful. The private respondents answered the amended complaint and denied that allegation.

The petitioners moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court denied the motion, but on its own initiative dismissed the case, holding that the complaint was not verified as Article 151 of the Family Code requires and that it did not believe earnest efforts had really been made. The petitioners moved for reconsideration; the motion was denied. They then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, raising pure questions of law. The private respondents objected that the proper remedy was an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals and that the trial judge should have been impleaded as a respondent.

Facts

On December 3, 1990, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. They alleged that they owned a parcel of land in Jamindan, Capiz, covered by a certificate of title issued pursuant to a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, which had modified an earlier decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in a land registration case filed by Gregorio Hontiveros. They claimed that the filing of that land registration case deprived them of income from the land, consisting of rentals from tenants, and that the private respondents acted in bad faith in filing the case and in withholding possession.

In their answer, the private respondents denied that they were married, saying that Gregorio was a widower and Teodora was single. They alleged that possession had already been transferred to the petitioners in August 1985 by virtue of a writ of possession, and that since then the petitioners had been receiving the rentals directly. They also invoked the absence of any allegation of earnest efforts toward a compromise, since Augusto and Gregorio are brothers, and pleaded prescription and good faith. Teodora denied having any proprietary interest in the land.

The petitioners amended their complaint to allege that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but had failed. The private respondents denied this. The petitioners then moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court denied the motion but dismissed the case, doubting that the complaint, being unverified, truly showed earnest efforts at reconciliation between the two feuding brothers. It also reasoned that Teodora had not been shown to be Gregorio's wife or to have acquired any interest in the land, so that the earlier ruling excusing the compromise requirement where a stranger is involved did not apply. Reconsideration was denied, and the petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper mode of appeal from a final order of a regional trial court that raises only questions of law.
• Whether or not the trial court may dismiss a complaint on its own initiative, without any motion to that effect by a party.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of the verification required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
• Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code applies where a stranger to the family is a party to the suit.
• Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code is constitutional, as an alleged amendment of the Rules of Court.

Applicable Provisions

Article 151 of the Family Code provides:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

This is the provision the trial court used to dismiss the complaint, and the Court construes it to determine whether verification is jurisdictional and whether the suit falls within its coverage.

Article 150 of the Family Code, which fixes who are members of the same family, is the provision the Court uses to define the phrase in Article 151. The Court states that under this provision the phrase refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood.

Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, on judgment on the pleadings, provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. -- Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of the party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

This governs the petitioners' motion, which the trial court correctly denied because the answer tendered genuine issues of fact.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition for review on certiorari was the correct remedy. The order of November 23, 1995 was a final order, because it disposed of the pending action and put an end to the litigation, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do except execution. The remedy against a final order is appeal, not certiorari. Since the questions raised were purely questions of law, the appeal had to be taken to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court also rejected the argument that the trial judge had to be impleaded as a respondent.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on its own initiative. A court cannot dismiss a case without a motion, except in a few instances: if the plaintiff fails to appear at the trial, fails to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time, fails to comply with the rules or an order of the court, or if the court finds it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. None of these exceptions was present. Moreover, the trial court itself found that judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate because the damages were specifically denied and had to be proved, so a trial was necessary.

On the third issue, the Court held that the absence of verification does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter. Verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that the matters alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the truth of the allegations, it could simply have ordered the petitioners to verify them, or waived strict compliance in the interest of justice. Mere suspicion or doubt is not a ground for dismissal; only if it is later shown that the efforts were not really exerted may the case be dismissed.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that Article 151 does not apply, because the suit is not exclusively among family members. The inclusion of Teodora Ayson as a defendant and of Maria Hontiveros as a plaintiff takes the case out of the provision's ambit. Relationship by affinity is not given legal effect in this jurisdiction, so a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not a member of the same family for purposes of Article 151. Teodora and Maria are therefore strangers to the Hontiveros family, and the compromise requirement does not bind the petitioners.

On the fifth issue, the Court declined to pass upon the constitutionality of Article 151. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis mota, the very heart of the controversy, and the Court's conclusion made it unnecessary to do so.

Doctrine

First, a final order of a regional trial court that raises only questions of law is appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not by ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Second, a court may not dismiss a case on its own initiative except in the narrow instances the Court enumerated; where the answer tenders genuine issues of fact, judgment on the pleadings is improper and a trial must be held.

Third, the verification required by Article 151 of the Family Code is a mere formal requirement and does not affect jurisdiction; the court should order the correction rather than dismiss the complaint.

Fourth, the requirement of earnest efforts toward a compromise under Article 151 applies only to suits exclusively between members of the same family, meaning the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Relationship by affinity, such as that of a sister-in-law, is not given legal effect, so the presence of a stranger to the family takes the case out of the provision.

Disposition

The petition was granted, the order of dismissal was set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the decision.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that Article 151 of the Family Code requires earnest efforts toward a compromise only in suits exclusively among members of the same family, and a stranger to the family, including a sister-in-law, takes the case out of its coverage. Examiners use this case to test the proper mode of appeal on pure questions of law and the non-jurisdictional nature of verification under the family-compromise rule.