PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. HILARIO REBAMONTAN ALIAS “AYONG,” ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Rebamontan

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Hilario Rebamontan, known in his barangay as Ayong, a man charged with murder for the fatal stabbing of Pedro Cagrado, Junior, on an evening in April 1994 in San Julian, Eastern Samar. The case comes to us on automatic review of a death sentence, and it matters for two reasons. First, it fixes the doctrine of treachery when the assailant walks past his victim, takes his position behind him, and strikes only as the victim turns. Second, and more importantly for the bar, it is a clean illustration of the rule on indivisible penalties: where the law prescribes reclusion perpetua to death and no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attends the killing, the lesser penalty must be imposed. The trial court imposed death. The Supreme Court reduced it.

Procedural History

The accused was charged by Information with murder, with evident premeditation and treachery alleged. He was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch One, rendered its sentence finding him guilty of murder and imposing death, together with an award of 50,000 pesos as indemnity for the death of the victim and the costs. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case went to the Supreme Court on automatic review. In his appellant's brief the accused abandoned his theory of self-defense and assailed only three things: the appreciation of treachery, the refusal to credit voluntary surrender, and the imposition of the death penalty.

Facts

Around six o'clock in the evening of April 22, 1994, several neighbors were conversing at the corner of Jacinto and Mabini Streets in Poblacion, San Julian, Eastern Samar. About thirty meters away stood a basketball court. One of them, Lucas Calinaya, looking toward the court, saw the accused stab Pedro Cagrado, Junior, with a small sharp bolo locally called a depang. The accused had first walked in front of the victim without any sign of his design, then positioned himself behind him. As the victim turned to face him, the accused delivered the thrust, hitting him in the right chest just below the right nipple. The victim had no warning and could not parry the blow.

Bleeding, Pedro ran toward Lucas and the others, with the accused giving chase. He reached the fence of Lucas's house, fell, and died there. The accused stopped and walked away toward Barangay Three, Campalao. A cousin of the victim informed a neighbor, SPO4 Nandino Doligon, who went to the scene, learned from the people that the accused had gone toward Lakandula Street, looked for him there, and, on being pointed to Burgos Street, found him. The officer called out to him as a friend, told him he was under arrest, took the weapon tucked at his waist, handcuffed him, and brought him to the municipal station. The next day a medico-legal examination showed the cause of death to be severe hemorrhage in the thoracic cavity from a penetrating stab wound that fractured the seventh rib.

The accused claimed self-defense: that the victim had stabbed at him twice and missed, and that he drew his depang and struck. The trial court rejected this, finding no convincing evidence that the victim was the unlawful aggressor, and found treachery present because the attack was sudden and unexpected. It refused to credit voluntary surrender because the accused was picked up by the police officer after the latter had inquired from eyewitnesses, and mere absence of resistance is not surrender.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in convicting the accused of murder.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the extreme penalty of death upon the accused.

Applicable Provisions

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the law restoring the death penalty for heinous crimes, defines and penalizes murder. It fixes the penalty that governs the whole third issue:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

The Court reads this provision, as amended, to prescribe the range of reclusion perpetua to death for murder, which is why the presence or absence of modifying circumstances becomes decisive.

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code supplies the rule on the application of indivisible penalties. It is the provision on which the reduction of the sentence rests:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: 1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. 2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

Because no generic aggravating circumstance attended the killing, the second paragraph of this article commands the lesser of the two indivisible penalties.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that treachery was properly appreciated. Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. Its essence is the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack upon an unsuspecting and unarmed victim who gives no provocation. Two conditions must concur: the malefactor employs a means or manner of execution that ensures his safety from any defensive or retaliatory act of the victim, and that means or manner is consciously and deliberately adopted. Both were present. The eyewitness testified that the accused came from a store, passed in front of the victim, and struck at the very moment the victim turned to face him; the victim did not know he was about to be stabbed and could not parry. The Court stressed that the fact the victim was already facing the assailant when the blow landed did not erase the treachery, for even a frontal assault is treacherous where it is sudden and totally unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.

On the second issue, the Court held that voluntary surrender was not established. The requisites are that the offender has not actually been arrested, that he surrenders to a person in authority or the latter's agent, and that the surrender is voluntary. Here it was the police officer who searched for the accused immediately after learning from eyewitnesses who had done the killing. The accused did not resist and admitted the stabbing, but his arrest was already imminent. To be voluntary, surrender must be spontaneous and deliberate, showing an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities.

On the third issue, the Court held that the death penalty could not be imposed. Even with treachery qualifying the killing as murder, the imposition of death is not automatic. The law prescribes the range of reclusion perpetua to death, and it is an elementary rule that where two indivisible penalties are prescribed and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. No generic aggravating circumstance was present. The trial court therefore erred in imposing death, and the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Doctrine

Three rules are worth carrying into the examination room. First, treachery requires two conditions: that the means, method, or manner of execution ensures the offender's safety from the victim's defense or retaliation, and that it is consciously and deliberately adopted. The essence of treachery is the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack on an unsuspecting and unarmed victim who gives no provocation. An attack that begins from behind and lands as the victim turns is treacherous even if the blow itself is frontal, because the victim had no chance to defend himself.

Second, voluntary surrender requires that the offender has not actually been arrested, that he surrenders to a person in authority or the latter's agent, and that the surrender is voluntary, spontaneous, and deliberate, showing an intent to submit unconditionally. Failure to resist arrest, or a peaceful admission of the act when the police come looking for you, is not voluntary surrender.

Third, and this is the heart of the case, where the law prescribes two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty must be applied under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Murder carries reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248, so absent any generic aggravating circumstance, death may not be imposed.

Disposition

The trial court's decision was affirmed with modification: the accused was sentenced to reclusion perpetua instead of death, and no pronouncement was made as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: where two indivisible penalties are prescribed and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Examiners use this case to test whether you know that death is never automatic in murder, and to test treachery where the assailant positions himself behind an unsuspecting victim and strikes as the victim turns.