MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, CORAZON DE JESUS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ADRIANO…

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing and seeking to reverse and set aside:
a) the decision dated November 23, 1995 of the Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 159; and b)
the resolution dated May 28, 1996 denying reconsideration of said decision.

The generative facts of the case are as follows:

On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government Center Site Purposes
certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San
Juan, Metro Manila.

Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned
proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased
an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said
squatters. Only after resettling these
squatters would the municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal
government center on the subject land.

After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the
Municipality of San Juan started to develop its government center by
constructing the INP Building, which now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the
Fire Station Headquarters, and the site to house the two salas of the Municipal
Trial Courts and the Office of the Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon are the Central
Post Office Building and the Municipal High School Annex Building.

On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July
26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending
Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory
proclamation pertinently reads as follows:

PROCLAMATION NO. 164

AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1716, DATED FEBRUARY 17, 1978, WHICH
RESERVED FOR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT CENTER SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METROPOLITAN
MANILA, ISLAND OF LUZON, BY EXCLUDING FROM ITS OPERATION THE PARCELS OF LAND
NOT BEING UTILIZED FOR GOVERNMENT CENTER SITES PURPOSES BUT ACTUALLY OCCUPIED
FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES AND DECLARING THE LAND OPEN TO DISPOSITION UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, AS AMENDED.

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C.
AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1716,
dated February 17, 1978, which established for municipal government center site
purposes certain parcels of land mentioned therein situated in the Municipality
of San Juan, Metro Manila, by excluding from its operation the parcels of land
not being utilized for government center site purposes but actually occupied
for residential purposes and declaring the land so excluded, together with
other parcels of land not covered by Proclamation No. 1716 but nevertheless
occupied for residential purposes, open to disposition under the provisions of
the Public Land Act, as amended, subject to future survey, which are hereunder
particularly described as follows :

Lot 1 (Port.) Psu-73270

x x x x x x x x x

Lot 4 (Port.) Psd-740

and Psd-810

x x x x x x x x x

Lot 5 (Port.) Psu-73270

x x x x x x x x x

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

(Sgd.)

CORAZON C. AQUINO

By the President :

(Sgd.)

CATALINO MACARAIG,
JR.

Acting Executive Secretary

(Rollo, pp. 148-151.)

On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association,
Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for
prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order against the Municipal
Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to
enjoin them from either removing or demolishing the houses of the association
members who were claiming that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them
by Proclamation No. 164.

On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the
petition, ruling that the property in question is being utilized by the
Municipality of San Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition set
forth in Proclamation No. 164 is absent.

The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed in a
decision dated July 17, 1991. This
decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered on April 8, 1992.

Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment,
private respondents hired a private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision
plans of the land in question, submitting the same to respondent Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their application
for a grant under Proclamation No. 164.

To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents,
petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against
respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association.

The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality,
enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the parcels of land covered by
Proclamation No. 164.

The Court of Appeals reversed, hence, the present recourse.

Cutting through the other issues, it would appear that
ultimately, the central question and bone of contention in the petition before
us boils down to the correct interpretation of Proclamation No. 164 in relation
to Proclamation No. 1716.

Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of
Appeals by hammering on the issue of res judicata in view of the fact
that an earlier judgment, which had become final and executory, had already
settled the respective rights of the parties under Proclamation No. 164. This notwithstanding, petitioner reiterates
the reasons why the court had previously ruled in favor of petitioner’s rights
over the subject property against the claims of private respondents.

We find good legal basis to sustain petitioner’s position on the
issue of res judicata insofar as the particular area covered by
Proclamation No. 164, which was the subject matter of the earlier case, is
concerned.

The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former
judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action (Mangoma vs. Court of Appeals, 241
SCRA 21 [1995]).

The existence of the first three elements can not be
disputed. As to identity of parties, we
have ruled that only substantial identity is required and not absolute identity
of parties (Suarez vs. Municipality
of Naujan, 18 SCRA 682 [1966]). The
addition of public respondent DENR in the second case will thus be of no
moment. Likewise, there is identity of
cause of action since the right of the municipality over the subject property,
the corresponding obligation of private respondents to respect such right and
the resulting violation of said right all remain to be the same in both the
first and the second actions despite the fact that in the first action, private
respondents were the plaintiff while in the second action, they were the
respondents.

The last requisite is identity of subject matter. Res judicata only extends to such
portion of land covered by Proclamation No. 164 which the court ruled may not
be automatically segregated from the land covered by Proclamation No.
1716. It does not include those
portions which are outside the coverage of Proclamation No. 1716.

Withal, reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be
justified upon the above premise and our discussion may properly end here. However, there exists a more basic reason
for setting aside the appealed decision and this has reference to a fundamental
and gross error in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 on October 16, 1987 by
then President Aquino.

Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative power vested
upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be
amended by an equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of
legislation. After the so-called
bloodless revolution of February 1986, President Corazon Aquino took the reigns
of power under a revolutionary government. On March 24, 1986, she issued her historic Proclamation No. 3,
promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the
Freedom Constitution. Under Article II,
Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise
legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution. Then came the ratification of the draft
constitution, to be known later as the 1987 Constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987,
President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was
already solely on Congress.

Although quite lamentably, this matter has escaped the attention
of petitioner as well as the courts before which this case has already passed
through, this Court cannot help noticing this basic flaw in the issuance of
Proclamation No. 164. Because this
unauthorized act by the then president constitutes a direct derogation of the
most basic principle in the separation of powers between the three branches of
government enshrined in our Constitution, we cannot simply close our eyes and
rely upon the principle of the presumption of validity of a law.

There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed
to be valid (Salas vs. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 [1970]; Peralta vs.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978]). However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted
by legislature. This presumption cannot
apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive
branch. For this Court to allow such
disregard of the most basic of all constitutional principles by reason of the
doctrine of presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back to its
sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus, also, it is in the discharge of this task that we take this
exception from the Court’s usual practice of not entertaining constitutional
questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately
argued.

We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was
an invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent
Department of Environment and Natural Resources is hereby permanently ENJOINED
from enforcing Proclamation No. 164.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Romero, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.