G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998
SPOUSES ANTONIO AND LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND GILDA CORPUZ, RESPONDENTS.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale
null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
The Case
These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this petition for review of the Decision[1] dated January 30, 1996 and the Resolution[2]
dated May 28, 1996, promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
41758, affirming the Decision of the lower court and denying
reconsideration, respectively.
On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended Complaint[3]
against her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioners-Spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a
certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private
respondent and her husband, null and void. The case was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25. In due
course, the trial court rendered a Decision[4] dated September 9, 1992, disposing as follows:[5]
“ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendants,
1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights dated March
1, 1990 (Exh. ‘A’) and the ‘amicable settlement’ dated March 16, 1990
(Exh. ‘B’) as null and void and of no effect;2. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership and
possession of plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over the remaining one-half portion
of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 which has been the subject of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. ‘A’);3. Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse defendants
Luzviminda and Antonio Guiang the amount of NINE THOUSAND (P9,000.00)
PESOS corresponding to the payment made by defendants Guiangs to Manuel
Callejo for the unpaid balance of the account of plaintiff in favor of
Manuel Callejo, and another sum of P379.62 representing one-half of the
amount of realty taxes paid by defendants Guiangs on Lot 9, Block 8,
(LRC) Psd-165409, both with legal interests thereon computed from the
finality of the decision.No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual circumstances of the case.”
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. Respondent Court, in its challenged Decision, ruled as follows:[6]
“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court in Civil Case
No. 204 is hereby AFFIRMED by this Court. No costs considering
plaintiff-appellee’s failure to file her brief, despite notice.”
Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its assailed Resolution:[7]
“Finding that the issues raised in defendants-appellants’ motion
for reconsideration of Our decision in this case of January 30, 1996, to
be a mere rehash of the same issues which We have already passed upon
in the said decision, and there [being] no cogent reason to disturb the
same, this Court RESOLVES to DENY the instant motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.”
The Facts
The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private
respondent and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband
sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal property,
consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. The
circumstances of this sale are set forth in the Decision of Respondent
Court, which quoted from the Decision of the trial court, as follows:[8]
“1. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are
legally married spouses. They were married on December 24, 1968 in
Bacolod City, before a judge. This is admitted by defendants-spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang in their answer, and also admitted by
defendant Judie Corpuz when he testified in court (tsn. p..3, June 9,
1992), although the latter says that they were married in 1967. The
couple have three children, namely: Junie – 18 years old, Harriet – 17
years of age, and Jodie or Joji, the youngest, who was 15 years of age
in August, 1990 when her mother testified in court.Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz,
with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot
located in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South
Cotabato, and particularly known as Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409
from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of
sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration was
payable in installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor
should vendee fail to pay three successive installments (Exh. ‘2’, tsn.
p. 6, February 14, 1990).2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie
Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC)
Psd-165409 to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The
latter have since then occupied the one-half portion [and] built their
house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22, 1992). They are thus adjoining
neighbors of the Corpuzes.3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June
1989. She was trying to look for work abroad, in [the] Middle East.
Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter.
She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila
however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, x x x on March 11,
1990. Plaintiff’s departure for Manila to look for work in the Middle
East was with the consent of her husband Judie Corpuz (tsn. p. 16,
Aug.12, 1990; p. 10, Sept. 6, 1991).After his wife’s departure for Manila, defendant Judie Corpuz
seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at
his place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a
cooperative. Daughter Harriet Corpuz went to school at King’s College,
Bo. 1, Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time working
as household help of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her
brother Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Joji) was going
to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money (tsn. p. 14, Sept. 6,
1991).Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father
intended to sell the remaining one-half portion including their house,
of their homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother
informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the
sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but
instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang]
would advise her father (tsn. pp. 16-17, Sept. 6, 1991).4. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz,
defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half
portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold
to defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as ‘Deed of
Transfer of Rights’ (Exh. ‘A’) the remaining one-half portion of their
lot and the house standing thereon for a total consideration of
P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in June , 1990. Transferor
Judie Corpuz’s children Junie and Harriet signed the document as
witnesses.Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5, 1990, obviously to
cure whatever defect in defendant Judie Corpuz’s title over the lot
transferred, defendant Luzviminda Guiang as vendee executed another
agreement over Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408 (Exh. ‘3’), this time
with Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original registered owner
from whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz originally bought the lot
(Exh. ‘2’), who signed as vendor for a consideration of P9,000.00.
Defendant Judie Corpuz signed as a witness to the sale (Exh. ‘3-A’). The
new sale (Exh. ‘3’) describes the lot sold as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC)
Psd-165408 but it is obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct
lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to
the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz.5. Sometime on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home. She
found her children staying with other households. Only Junie was staying
in their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered
her children together and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere
to be found. She was informed by her children that their father had a
wife already.6. For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff
was complained against by defendant Luzviminda Guiang and her husband
Antonio Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay General
Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, for trespassing (tsn.
p. 34, Aug. 17, 1990). The case was docketed by the barangay
authorities as Barangay Case No. 38 for ‘trespassing’. On March 16,
1990, the parties thereat signed a document known as ‘amicable
settlement’. In full, the settlement provides for, to wit:‘That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children,
namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave voluntarily the house of Mr.
and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any
charge, on or before April 7, 1990.FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF THE LAW.’
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain,
plaintiff went to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Paulino Santos to
question her signature on the amicable settlement. She was referred
however to the Officer-In-Charge at the time, a certain Mr. de la Cruz.
The latter in turn told her that he could not do anything on the matter
(tsn. p. 31, Aug. 17, 1990).This particular point was not rebutted. The Barangay Captain who
testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz approached him for the
annulment of the settlement. He merely said he forgot whether Mrs.
Corpuz had approached him (tsn. p. 13, Sept. 26, 1990). We thus conclude
that Mrs. Corpuz really approached the Barangay Captain for the
annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been made, plaintiff
stayed put in her house and lot.7. Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the amicable
settlement with a motion for the execution of the amicable settlement,
filing the same with the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The proceedings [are] still pending before the said court,
with the filing of the instant suit.8. As a consequence of the sale, the spouses Guiang spent
P600.00 for the preparation of the Deed of Transfer of Rights, Exh. ‘A’;
P9,000.00 as the amount they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having
assumed the remaining obligation of the Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo (Exh.
‘3’); P100.00 for the preparation of Exhibit ‘3’; a total of P759.62
basic tax and special educational fund on the lot; P127.50 as the total
documentary stamp tax on the various documents; P535.72 for the capital
gains tax; P22.50 as transfer tax; a standard fee of P17.00;
certification fee of P5.00. These expenses particularly the taxes and
other expenses towards the transfer of the title to the spouses Guiangs
were incurred for the whole Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409.”
Ruling of Respondent Court
Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s
ruling that any alienation or encumbrance by the husband of the conjugal
property without the consent of his wife is null and void as provided
under Article 124 of the Family Code. It also rejected petitioners’
contention that the “amicable settlement” ratified said sale, citing
Article 1409 of the Code which expressly bars ratification of the
contracts specified therein, particularly those “prohibited or declared
void by law.”
Hence, this petition.[9]
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public respondent the following errors:[10]
“I
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed.
II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring as
voidable contract under Art. 1390 of the Civil Code the impugned Deed of
Transfer of Rights which was validly ratified thru the execution of the
‘amicable settlement’ by the contending parties.III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not setting aside the
findings of the Court a quo which recognized as lawful and valid the
ownership and possession of private respondent over the remaining one
half (1/2) portion of the subject property.”
In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the contract of
sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely voidable, and (2) such
contract was ratified by private respondent when she entered into an
amicable settlement with them.
This Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract?
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights
was validly executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for
valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent’s consent
merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
“ART. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable,
even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of ratification.(n)”
The error in petitioners’ contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e.,
contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was
obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondent’s consent to
the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent
or absent. Gilda Corpuz, on direct examination, testified thus:[11]
“Q Now, on March 1, 1990, could you still recall where you were?
A I was still in Manila during that time.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FUENTES:
Q When did you come back to Koronadal, South Cotabato?
A That was on March 11, 1990, Ma’am.
Q Now, when you arrived at Koronadal, was there any problem
which arose concerning the ownership of your residential house at
Callejo Subdivision?A When I arrived here in Koronadal, there was a problem which
arose regarding my residential house and lot because it was sold by my
husband without my knowledge.”
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of
Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the two
lower courts:
“ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.(165a)” (Italics supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code,
the trial court adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the above
provision in this wise:[12]
“The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is
void. It becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the
equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article
166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife’s consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not
null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an
action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, the provision
of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:‘Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years
from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)’This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years x x x
during [the] marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not
carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or
encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect
by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent
of the wife is null and void.”
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation
referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the
document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during
trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through
misrepresentation and coercion.[13]
In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the
deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be
discussed later. The fact remains that such contract was entered into
without the wife’s consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the
absence of private respondent’s consent. To constitute a valid contract,
the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent,[14] the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Second Issue: Amicable Settlement
Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable,
petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the contending parties
through the “amicable settlement” they executed on March 16, 1990 in
Barangay Case No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate
courts have resolved this issue in favor of the private respondent. The
trial court correctly held:[15]
“By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil Code]
therefore, the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. ‘A’) cannot be ratified,
even by an ‘amicable settlement’. The participation by some barangay
authorities in the ‘amicable settlement’ cannot otherwise validate an
invalid act. Moreover, it cannot be denied that the ‘amicable
settlement’ (Exh. ‘B’) entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and
defendant spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. ‘A’). By express provision of law, such
a contract is also void. Thus, the legal provision, to wit:‘Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a previous
illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.’ (Civil Code of the
Philippines).In summation therefore, both the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh.
‘A’) and the ‘amicable settlement’ (Exh. ‘3’) are null and void.”
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified.[16]
Neither can the “amicable settlement” be considered a continuing
offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last
sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear:
after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against
private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an
“amicable settlement” and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for
its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing
offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer.
Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the
property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this
document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by J. Lourdes K.
Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by JJ. Jorge S. Imperial, division
chairman, and B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz; rollo, pp. 47-57.
[2] Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili replaced Justice Imperial in the special former Ninth Division; rollo, p. 58.
[3] Docketed as Civil Case No. 284; rollo, pp. 22-27.
[4] Penned by Judge Francisco S. Ampig, Jr.
[5] RTC Decision, p. 12; rollo, p. 42.
[6] CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 56.
[7] Rollo, p. 58.
[8] CA Decision, pp. 2-6; rollo, pp. 48-52.
[9] This case was submitted for decision upon receipt by the Court of private respondent’s Memorandum on November 17, 1997
[10] Rollo, pp. 91-92.
[11] TSN, August 17, 1990, pp. 16-17.
[12] Rollo, p. 37.
[13] TSN, August 17, 1990, pp. 13-14.
[14] Art. 1318, Civil Code.
[15] Rollo, p. 38.
[16] Art. 1409, Civil Code; and Tongoy vs. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 99, 119-121, June 28, 1983, per Makasiar, J.