GREGORIO I. ALCANTARA AND JUAN RUELO, PLAINTIFFS. GREGORIO I. ALCANTARA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. NORBERTO S. AMORANTO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

The record shows that on January 5, 1957, Gregorio I. Alcantara and
Juan Ruelo filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the present
action against defendant Norberto S. Amoranto, the incumbent mayor of
Quezon City, for the recovery of damages allegedly suffered by them as
a result of a libelous letter. It is alleged in paragraph 5 of the
complaint—

“5. That on October 23, 1955 the defendant, with the
intent of injuring the plaintiffs and of besmirching their good
reputation addressed a letter to the Office of the President of the
Philippines and caused the same to be published wherein he made the
following libelous statements against the plaintiffs, to wit;
‘complainants are trouble makers, drunkards, and have many pending
eases against them.'”

Instead of answering, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of prescription. It was argued that “from the face of the
complaint the alleged defamatory imputations were made on October 23,
1955,” so that when the complaint was filed on January 5, 1957, more
than one year after the action may be brought had already elapsed.
Plaintiffs opposed the’ motion alleging that while the defamatory
statements are contained in a letter dated October 23, 1955, the said
letter was first sent to the Office of the President by the defendant
and endorsed to plaintiffs on December S, 1955; that plaintiff
Alcantara received a copy of the letter on January 5, 1956, while his
co-plaintiff Ruelo received another copy on January 6, 1956; that the
contents of the letter came to their knowledge only on January 6, 1956,
when it was translated to them into Tagalog by a certain Honesto Vitug;
and that the one-year period of prescription, which should commence
from the day the action may be brought, must be computed from January
6, 1956, when the defamatory statements contained in the letter came to
their knowledge.

Sustaining the motion to dismiss, the lower court on January 19, 1957 issued the following order:

“The time within which to file the action id the above-entitled case having already prescribed,

“As
prayed for in the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant, the
above-entitled case is ordered dismissed, without costs. So ordered.”

Plaintiffs in due time filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
opposed by defendant. On April 3, 1957, the motion was denied, the
court holding that under paragraph 5 of the complaint the alleged
libelous letter was sent and published by defendant since October 23,
1955 and that the motion for reconsideration states “foreign matters *
* * which are not part of the complaint.” From that order, only
plaintiff Alcantara has appealed directly to this Court.

A civil action arising from libel prescribes in one year. (Article 1147, new Civil Code; Tejuco vs. E. R. Squibb & Son Phil. Corp. et al., 103 Phil., 594; Inciong et al., vs. Tolentino,^[*]
56 Off. Gaz. [50] 7618.) There being no special provisions which
ordains otherwise, that period must be counted from the day the action
could have been brought. (Article 1150, new Civil Code.) It is the
legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting
point for the computation of the period. (Tolentino’s Civil Code, Vol.
IV,1 p. 39, citing Sentencia of May 8, 1903 and Manresa 896.)

In the present proceedings, we do not think the lower court
correctly applied the law in dismissing appellant’s complaint on the
ground of prescription. The one-year limitation prescribed by law
should be counted, not from October 23, 1955, when the alleged libelous
letter was sent to the Office of the President, but from January 8,
1956, when the contents thereof came to appellant’s knowledge. A
written defamation, it is true, becomes actionable upon its
publication—that is to say, when communicated to third person or
persons as the term is understood in the law of libel. It is evident, however, that the libelous matter must first be exhibited to the person
libeled before the action could be brought. A person defamed, as
pointed out by appellant, could hardly be expected to institute the
proceedings for damages arising from libel when he has no knowledge of
the said libel. It may not be amiss to state here that under the
Revised Penal Code the period of prescription for defamation commences
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party. (People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil., 588.)

Defendant-appellee assails as unbelievable and self-serving
appellant’s claim that he actually learned of the alleged defamatory
statements only when the letter containing them was translated to him
on January 6, 1956. No evidence, however, appears to have been
presented to show the contrary. And the lower court did not make any
finding on the claim although it conducted hearings on the motion to
dismiss and on the motion for reconsideration. Instead, it regarded
said claim as “a foreign matter, which is not part of the complaint.”
Apparently, the court overlooked the fact that under the Rules a motion
to dismiss is set for hearing precisely to allow the presentation of
evidence in support of and against the contention of the defendant,
except when the motion is based on the ground of lack of cause of
action. (Zobel vs. Abreu, et al., 98 Phil., 343; 52 Off. Gaz., [7] 3592; Asejo vs. Leonso, 78 Phil., 467.)

Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside
and the case in so far as appellant Alcantara’s complaint is concerned
is ordered remanded to the court below for further proceedings. Without
costs.

Paras, C. J. Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.