THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO LAHOYLAHOY AND MARCOS MADANLOG, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This case is submitted to the Supreme Court for review of a decision of the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, sentencing the defendants
Pedro Lahoylahoy and Marcos Madanlog to death upon a complaint charging the
crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the circumstances stated
below.

It appears that in the year 1912 some ten or a dozen people were living on
the small island of Sicogon, in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Balasan,
Province of Iloilo. Two of these were an aged couple named Francisco Seran and
his wife Juana. Two others were Roman Estriba and his wife Rosa. The latter
couple had two children Miguela and Bartolome, aged at that time respectively
about 14 and 9 years. Upon the night of the commission of the crime charged in
the complaint the two children were staying with Juana, their grandmother, in a
house some distance removed from that occupied by Roman and Rosa and located
farther back from the shore. The grandfather, Francisco, had gone to the beach
as was his custom to watch for turtles. After the grandmother and the children
had gone to rest on a mat where they slept together, and probably only a short
while after it had become dark, the two accused appeared and demanded money of
Juana. She gave them P100 in money in response to this demand, and the accused
then required the three to leave the house and go in the direction of the sea.
When the party had arrived at or near the beach, a further demand was made upon
the old woman for money, which demand she was unable to comply with. Lahoylahoy
then struck her with a bolo just below her breast, killing her instantly. The
two children were at the time close to their grandmother, and being greatly
frightened, they ran away separately for some distance and remained hidden
during the night in the bushes.

The next morning the children made their way to the house where the old
couple had lived, which was vacant; but they there found each other and
proceeded together to the house of their parents. Going in that direction they
stopped at the house of their sister, the wife of the defendant Madanlog. When
they went a little later to the house where their parents had lived, the fact
was revealed that Francisco, Roman, and Rosa had also been killed. All the
bodies were collected and buried early in the morning by the two accused,
assisted by Eugenio Tenedero, son-in-law of Lahoylahoy. The two children Miguela
and Bartolome say that they were threatened with death if they should make
complaint. Nevertheless their lives were spared, and for sometime they stayed
with their sister in the home of Madanlog; and after staying for a long time on
the island; they were afterwards taken to the home of another sister, named
Dionisia Estriba, at Escalante, on the Island of Panay. They here revealed the
facts above narrated. This sister, Dionisia, afterwards filed the complaint in
this case. Pedro Lahoylahoy was arrested first; and when he was examined before
the justice of the peace, he made a confession in which he stated that the four
deceased persons had been killed by Madanlog, with his assistance.

At the trial the two children gave a very consistent account of the robbery
and of the murder of their grandmother; but the boy said that he did not
remember that Madanlog was present when Lahoylahoy struck the fatal blow.
Another important witness for the prosecution was Eugenio Tenedero, the
son-in-law of Lahoylahoy. This witness testified that the defendants killed the
four deceased persons, and that early in the morning they came to his house and
required him to help them bury the dead, which he did. The accused gave no
explanation to Tenedero of their motive or of the reason for the commission of
the deed, and told him not to tell anybody. During the next day or two after the
tragedy above narrated, the defendant Madanlog went to the house where Francisco
and Juana had lived and carried away some palay, some dawa,
three pigs, and a trunk containing wearing apparel. We believe that the
asportation of these things should not be considered as a continuation of the
acts of robbery and murder previously committed, but rather as a spoliation of
the estate of a deceased person. It results that the only property taken in the
act of robbery was the P100 obtained from Juana.

As against Madanlog, the case rests chiefly upon the testimony of Miguela,
who says he was present at the robbery and at the murder of Juana. His guilt is
also indicated by his own conduct subsequent to the murder. We are satisfied
with the conclusion reached by the lower court with respect to the sufficiency
of the evidence, and we have no doubt of the guilt of both the accused.

An important question arises upon the matter of the complaint in connection
with the proof as to the ownership of the property which was taken by the
accused. The part of the complaint here material to be considered reads as
follows:

“The aforesaid accused taking advantage of the darkness of the night,
voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and by means of force on the things, took
and appropriated to themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the
owner thereof, the sum of P100, 5 bayones of palay, 4
bayones of dawa, and 1 trunk which contained various wearing
apparel, of the total value of P150, the property of Roman Estriba; in
consequence thereof and on the occasion of the said robbery, the aforesaid
accused criminally and with known premeditation and treachery, killed Roman
Estriba, Rosa Galoso, Francisco Seran, and Juana.”

According to the proof the person robbed was Juana; while the complaint
charges that the property taken belonged to Roman Estriba. What is the effect of
this variance between the language of the complaint and the proof? Subsection 5
of section 6 of General Orders No. 58 declares that a complaint or information
shall show, among other things, the names of the persons against whom, or
against whose property, the offense was committed, if known. The complaint in
this case therefore properly contained an averment as to the ownership of the
property; and upon principle, in charging the crime of robbery committed upon
the person, the allegation of the owner’s name is essential. But of course if
his name cannot be ascertained, it may be alleged that it is unknown.

From the fact that the name of the injured person may, in case of necessity,
be alleged as unknown it should not be inferred that the naming of such person,
when known, is of no importance. Where the name of the injured party is
necessary as matter of essential description of the crime charged, the complaint
must invest such person with individuality by either naming him or alleging that
his name is unknown. (Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th ed., sees.
Ill, 112.) It is elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be
alleged as matter essential to the proper description of the offense.

“To constitute larceny, robbery, embezzlement, obtaining money by false
pretenses, malicious mischief, etc., the property obtained must be that of
another, and indictments for such offenses must name the owner; and a variance
in this respect between the indictment and the proof will be fatal. It is also
necessary in order to identify the offense.” (Clark’s Criminal Procedure, p.
227. See also page 338.)

Now a complaint charging the commission of the complex offense of robbery
with homicide must necessarily charge each of the component offenses with the
same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate
complaints. It is well recognized in this jurisdiction that where a complex
crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the
component offenses the defendant can be convicted of the other. The mere
circumstance that the two crimes are so related as to constitute one transaction
in no way affects the principles of pleading involved in the case. To permit a
defendant to be convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof
shows that he robbed an entirely different person, when the first was not
present, is violative of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and in
addition, is subject to the criticism that the defendant is thereby placed in a
position where he could not be protected from a future prosecution by a plea of
former conviction or acquittal. If we should convict or acquit these defendants
to-day of the robbery which is alleged to have been committed upon the property
of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could be prosecuted tomorrow
for robbery committed upon the property of Juana; and the plea of former
jeopardy would be of no avail.

Reference to a few accredited decisions from American courts will make this
clear.

In Comm.vs. Hoffman (121 Mass., 369), it was held that an acquittal
on an indictment for breaking and entering the dwelling house and stealing
therein, the property of A, is no bar to a complaint for stealing in the same
dwelling house at the same time the property of B, without proof that A and B
are the same persons.

In Comm. vs. Andrews (2 Mass., 409), the defendant in an indictment
for receiving stolen goods which were the property of A, alleged that he had
been convicted of receiving stolen goods the property of B. The plea was
adjudged insufficient, although it was alleged that the two parcels of stolen
goods were received by the defendant of the same person, at the same time, and
in the same package, and that the act of receiving them was one and the
same.

In Alexander vs. State (21 Tex. Cr. App., 406; 57 Am, Rep., 617), it
was held that where the goods of two different owners were stolen at the same
time, an acquittal on an indictment for stealing the goods of one would not
constitute a bar to an indictment for stealing the goods of the other; though it
was observed that if the defendant had been convicted upon the first trial, he
would have been protected from the second prosecution. (See Wright
vs. State, 17 Tex. Cr. App., 152.)

In Comm. vs. Wade (17 Pick. [Mass.], 395), the offense of burning a
building was charged, and the indictment stated that the owner was a certain
individual (naming him). It was held that, although the name might possibly have
been omitted altogether, yet as the indictment did allege the name, the
allegation of ownership was material, being descriptive of the offense, and must
be proved.

It should be borne in mind that the plea of former conviction or acquittal,
or former jeopardy, is supposed to be proved by the pleadings and judgment in
the former case, supplemented only by proofs showing the identity of the party,
or parties. Courts are not accustomed to determine the plea of former jeopardy
by examining the proof to discover just what facts may have been developed in
the former case. (Henry vs. State, 33 Ala., 389; Grisham vs.
State, 19 Tex. Cr. App., 504.) In fact it is not always practicable or even
possible to produce for inspection upon the trial of this issue the evidence
which was adduced in court at the trial of the former case.

The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that when
an offense shall have been described with sufficient certainty to identify the
act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed
immaterial. We are of the opinion that this provision can have no application to
a case where the name of the person injured is matter of essential description
as in the case at bar; and at any rate, supposing the allegation of ownership to
be eliminated, the robbery charged in this case would not be sufficiently
identified. A complaint stating, as does the one now before us, that the
defendants “took and appropriated to themselves with intent of gain and against
the will of the owner thereof the sum of P100” could scarcely be sustained in
any jurisdiction as a sufficient description either of the act of robbery or of
the subject of the robbery. There is a saying to the effect that money has no
earmarks; and generally speaking the only way money, which has been the subject
of a robbery, can be described or identified in a complaint is by connecting it
with the individual who was robbed as its owner or possessor. And clearly, when
the offense has been so identified in the complaint, the proof must correspond
upon this point with the allegation, or there can be no conviction.

In United States vs. Kepner (1 Phil. Rep., 519), this court had
before it a case where the defendant was charged with estafa in the
misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without
authority. It was said that the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the
effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the check,
when in reality the bank, which cashed the warrant was the sufferer, was
immaterial. This observation was, we think, correct as applied to that case, for
the act constituting the offense of estafa was described in the
complaint with sufficient fullness and precision to identify the act, regardless
of the identity of the offended person. Section 7, General Orders No. 58, was
therefore properly applicable. It should be added, however, that the observation
to which reference has been made was, strictly speaking, unnecessary to the
decision, for it is further stated in the opinion that there was in fact an
injury to the owner of the check, which consisted of the “delay, annoyance, and
damage caused by the unlawful misappropriation of the warrant.” (U. S.
vs. Kepner, 1 Phil. Rep., 519, 526.) There is evidently nothing in the
case cited which can afford support for the idea that an erroneous allegation in
a complaint as to ownership of the property robbed is immaterial. If we should
hold that a man may be convicted of robbing one person when he is charged with
robbing another, the complaint instead of being a means of informing him of the
particular offense with which he is charged would rather serve as a means of
concealing it.

It is important to note that the complaint in this case is not defective in
form, for the charge is clear, direct, and unambiguous. No formal objection
could possibly be made by the defendants to this complaint; and their only
course, if desirous of making any defense, was to plead not guilty, as was done
in this case. The difficulty of the case arises from the facts adduced in
evidence. Section 10, General Orders No. 58, declares that no complaint is
insufficient by reason of a defect in matter of form which does not tend to
prejudice a substantial right of the defendant upon the merits. This provision
has no application to such a case as that now before us; and all arguments based
upon the circumstance that the defendants made no objection to the complaint in
the Court of First Instance are irrelevant to the matter in hand.

The case of United States vs. Manalang (2 Phil. Rep., 64) has been
called to our attention as an authority upon the point that insufficiency of a
complaint is waived by failure of the defendant to object thereto in the Court
of First Instance. It there appeared that the statutory offense with which the
defendant was charged could only be committed by a Constabulary officer. There
was no allegation in the complaint that the defendant was such; but he appeared
at the trial, testified in his own behalf, without questioning his character as
such officer. It was held upon appeal that the objection to the complaint on the
ground stated was unavailing, “as no exception was taken to this defect by
counsel for the defendant in the court below, in which it might have been
successfully raised by demurrer.”

The following cases are also found in our Reports, showing that a complaint
may be held sufficient although the commission of the offense is charged by
inference only, provided no objection is made in the court below. (U. S.
vs. Cajayon, 2 Phil. Rep., 570; U. S. vs. Vecina, 4 Phil. Rep
, 529; U. S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 566.) In all of these cases the
complaint was demurrable for defect of substance, but the language used was so
far sufficient that the commission of the crime could be inferred. These cases
are not relevant to the case at bar, as the complaint is not demurrable for
defect of any sort.

In the light of what has been said it is evident that, by reason of the lack
of conformity between the allegation and the proof respecting the ownership of
the property, it is impossible to convict the two accused of the offense of
robbery committed by them in this case; and therefore they cannot be convicted
of the complex offense of robbery with homicide, penalized in subsection (1) of
article 503 of the Penal Code. No such difficulty exists, however, with respect
to the quadruple homicide committed upon the persons named in the complaint; and
in conformity with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code, the penalties
corresponding to all these crimes must be severely imposed. This court has
already held in United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil. Rep., 260), that
where more than one offense (not complex offenses) are charged in the complaint,
and the accused fails to demur or ask for a severance, the penalties
corresponding to all of the offenses which are charged and proved may be
imposed. The doctrine announced in that case applies with even greater propriety
to a case like that now before us, because here the statute expressly authorizes
the joining of the different offenses in one complaint. (See sec. 11, General
Orders No. 58.)

The acts causing the violent death of the four deceased must be qualified as
homicide, as the record does not satisfactorily show how and in what manner they
were executed.

Even conceding the benefits of article 11 of the Penal Code, this
circumstance, as regards both defendants is counterbalanced by the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and that the crime was committed in an uninhabited
place, and, as respects Marcos Madanlog, by that of relationship by affinity.
The accused Pedro Lahoylahoy has accordingly become liable to four penalties,
each of seventeen years four months and one day, reclusion temporal, and his
coaccused Marcos Madanlog also, to the same number of penalties of twenty years
each, reclusion temporal, for the homicide of the four deceased, each
also being liable to one-half of the costs.

In view of rule 2 of article 88 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the maximum
duration of three times the length of the most severe of the penalties to be
imposed upon the accused exceeds forty years, the judgment reviewed is reversed,
and we find that each of the accused Lahoylahoy and Madanlog should be, as they
are hereby, sentenced to suffer the aforesaid penalties of reclusion temporal,
not to exceed forty years, to the accessories prescribed by article 59, to
indemnify, severally and jointly, the heirs of each of the deceased in the
amount of Pl,000 and each to pay one-half of the costs of both instances. So
ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.

Malcolm, .J., dissents, with whom concurs Fisher, J.

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DISSENTING OPINION

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

The defendants were charged in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo with the
crime of robbery with murder. The crime took place on a small island where the
deceased lived together. The defendants were found guilty and given the death
penalty. The proof in relation to the law shows conclusively that they merit
such punishment.

The information charged that the owner of the property was Roman Estriba
while the evidence disclosed that the owner was Juana N. Seran. No objection to
the information was made in the lower court. Objection to its insufficiency was
therefore waived. (U. S. vs. Manalang [1903], 2 Phil. Rep., 64.)
Notwithstanding, and although neither the attorney for the defendant nor the
Attorney-General raises the point on appeal, this court would, by hypercritical
examination, now solemnly adjudge the information to be fatally defective and
would thereby cheat the gallows of its prey. Conceding that the court has this
prerogative, yet no substantial right of the defendants was prejudiced. Neither
the trial court, the prosecution, nor the defense were misled as to the issue
being that robbery and murder were simultaneously committed. As to which one of
the group had title to the property was relatively unimportant. Such a technical
finding in my judgment violates both the letter and the spirit of our law and
jurisprudence. “The bill of rights for the Philippines giving the accused the
right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him does not
fasten forever upon those Islands the inability of the seventeenth century
common law to understand or accept a pleading that did not exclude every
misinterpretation capable of occurring to intelligence fired with a desire to
pervert.” (Paraiso vs. U. S. [1907], 207 U. S., 368; Whitehead
vs. U. S. [1917], 245 Fed., 385; and a multitude of corroborative
authority.) To liberalize and modernize procedure should be our goal.

Judgment should be affirmed.