ROMEL JAYME Y REFE, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Jayme versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is the case of Jayme versus People of the Philippines, decided by the Supreme Court in September 1999. Romel Jayme was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal by the Court of Appeals, of frustrated homicide for stabbing Ramil Cruz twice on the evening of May 25, 1992. Jayme admitted the stabbing but claimed he acted in self-defense. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clearest teaching on the third element of self-defense — the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel an attack — and on how that element must be judged from the standpoint of a man in sudden peril, not from the calm of a courtroom.

Procedural History

The Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, tried Romel Jayme for frustrated homicide and convicted him. Jayme appealed to the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty by crediting him with the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The appellate court found that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and no provocation on the part of the accused, but held that there was no reasonable necessity to draw a knife and stab the victim. Jayme then elevated the case to the Supreme Court by appeal via certiorari. The Solicitor General filed his comment, agreeing that only incomplete self-defense attended, and the petitioner filed a reply. The Supreme Court reversed and acquitted him.

Facts

At about seven o'clock in the evening of May 25, 1992, Romel Jayme was walking home along Bautista Street in Pasig, carrying a pail of water he had fetched from the public faucet. Ramil Cruz, who had come from a drinking session and was under the influence of liquor, suddenly blocked his way and boxed him without provocation. Ramil was with his brothers and three other persons. Surprised by the sudden attack, Jayme drew a knife and used it against Ramil, inflicting two stab wounds on the left side of his stomach.

Ramil's brother Edwin, a tricycle driver, rushed to help and succeeded in wresting the knife from Jayme. According to the accused, three other persons joined Ramil in attacking him, one of them hitting him on the head and causing him to drop the knife, after which he ran away. His head injury was duly proved. Ramil was hospitalized for six days and spent a total of 27,276 pesos and 20 centavos in medical expenses. The attending physician testified that the two perforating and penetrating stab wounds could each have caused death if unattended.

The defense presented Edmund Villanueva, who testified that earlier that afternoon Edwin Cruz had told him that they had an enemy and were asking for help, and that he saw Ramil Cruz come from the house of Celso Ramirez, where there was a drinking session, and suddenly box Jayme.

Issues

• Whether or not there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Ramil Cruz.
• Whether or not there was reasonable necessity for the means employed by the petitioner to repel the attack, when he drew a knife and stabbed the victim.
• Whether or not the petitioner duly proved all the essential elements of self-defense, entitling him to acquittal.

Applicable Provisions

Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Are exempt from criminal liability the following: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

This is the provision under which Jayme claimed exemption from criminal liability, and its three requisites frame the entire analysis of the Court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was unlawful aggression. The Court of Appeals itself found that the complainant was the aggressor, that the aggression was real and imminent, not merely imaginary. The Court stressed that unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude; there has to exist a real danger to the life or personal safety of the person claiming self-defense.

On the second issue, the Court disagreed with both the Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General. It held that the petitioner employed reasonable means to repel the sudden unprovoked attack. The Court considered the factual situation: it was about seven o'clock in the evening, the petitioner was walking home with a pail of water when the complainant suddenly blocked his way and attacked him with fist blows, the complainant was under the influence of liquor and was with his brothers and three other persons, and there was the element of surprise in the assault. Under that situation, in the darkness of the night, with his perception that the aggressor was armed with a knife and was ganging up on him with three or more persons, it was reasonable for the petitioner to use a knife to disable his adversary. The Court explained the standard in these words:

Reasonable necessity does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make comparisons which can easily be made in the calmness of the home. It is not the indispensable need but the rational necessity which the law requires.

The Court added that the rule of reasonable necessity is not ironclad in its application; it depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, because one who is assaulted does not have the time nor sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. In emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation, and when a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and to hold the actor irresponsible in law for the consequences. The Court also distinguished the three cases cited by the Court of Appeals — Montalbo, Gutierrez, and Madali — holding that none was applicable because the circumstances in each were totally different.

On the third issue, the Court held that the petitioner had duly proved all the essential elements of self-defense: unlawful aggression on the part of the complainant, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. He was therefore entitled to an acquittal.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code requires three concurrent elements: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Second, unlawful aggression means an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude; there must be a real danger to the life or personal safety of the person claiming self-defense. Third, reasonable necessity does not mean absolute necessity; the law requires rational necessity, judged from the standpoint of one who is assaulted and who has no time nor sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate, and choose the weapon to be used. Fourth, the rule of reasonable necessity is not ironclad; it depends on the circumstances of each case, and the accused is given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether he employed rational means to repel the aggression. Fifth, when the accused has reasonably acted upon the instinct of self-preservation, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the actor irresponsible in law for the consequences.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, acquitted Romel Jayme of the charge of frustrated homicide, and ordered costs de oficio.

Remember This

Memorize this line: reasonable necessity does not mean absolute necessity, and one who is assaulted has neither the time nor the tranquility of mind to choose his weapon. Examiners use this case to test the third element of self-defense, especially where the accused used a deadly weapon against an unarmed but sudden and unexpected attack.