THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CHOA CHIOK (ALIAS CHUA CHIOK) ET AL., DEFENDANTS. SEE PIN AND CHUA SE TONG, APPELLANTS.

The assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, on the 11th day of
July, 1916, presented a complaint against said defendants, charging them with a
violation of section 3 of Act No. 2381. The complaint alleged that said
defendants did, on or about the 10th day of July, 1916, in the city of Manila,
P. I., then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly visit
and were present at an opium joint in said city where opium, its derivatives and
compounds were smoked or otherwise used in and upon the human body and were
unlawfully sold and otherwise disposed of. The complaint further alleged that a
number of said defendants had theretofore been convicted one or more times of a
violation of the Opium Law. Upon said complaint the defendants were arrested,
arraigned, and tried. At the conclusion of the trial, some were acquitted and
some were convicted. Said appellants were found guilty of the crime charged in
the complaint, and each was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two
months, and to pay a fine of P100, and, in case of insolvency, to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay their proportional amount of the costs. From
that sentence each appealed.

The appellants in their first assignment of error alleged that the lower
court committed an error in not dismissing the complaint against the defendants
at the close of the evidence of the prosecution. We have held in the case of
United States vs. Romero (22 Phil. Rep., 565) that; “Whether or not the
evidence presented by the prosecuting attorney, at the time he rests his case,
is sufficient to convince the court that the defendant is guilty, beyond a
reasonable doubt, of the crime charged, rests entirely within the sound
discretion and judgment of the lower court. The error, if any be committed by
the denial of this motion, can only be corrected on appeal by showing that the
evidence was in fact insufficient, and then the sentence of the lower court will
be reversed for failure of evidence only.”

An examination of the proof adduced at the time said motion was made shows
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged.
We see no reason, therefore, for reversing or modifying the sentence of the
lower court by reason of the first assignment of error. (Quison vs.
Salud, 12 Phil. Rep., 109.)

In their second assignment of error the appellants alleged that the lower
court committed an error in admitting proof as to the general reputation of the
house, for visiting which the defendants and appellants were prosecuted. In
reply to that contention it may be said that this court, in the case of United
States vs. Sy Toon (p. 736, ante), decided :

“That a certain place is ‘an opium joint’ can be established by proof of
facts and circumstances including evidence of the general reputation of the
house.” {See also the case of States vs. Steen [101 N. W., 96], cited
in support of that doctrine.)

The proof upon the general reputation of the alleged smoking joint shows that
a number of people, at different times, had been arrested in said place for a
violation of the Opium Law; that the place was frequented by a large number of
Chinamen; that the doors leading into the rooms where opium was found, together
with apparatus for injecting and smoking opium, was strongly barricaded; that a
large number of Chinamen were in the room at the time “the policemen arrived on
the occasion of the arrest of the present defendants; that immediately upon
receiving notice of the presence of the policemen, a great number of them
escaped; that the place had been raided a number of times by policemen; that it
was understood among the policemen to be an opium joint; that nearly all of the
witnesses who testified for the defense were persons who knew the place and had
been convicted from one to five times each for violation of the Opium Law. We
think the proof fully establishes the fact that said house was an opium joint
and that the defendants visited the same knowing its general character. This
conclusion answers not only the second assignment of error but as well the
fourth and fifth.

The appellants in their third assignment of error alleged that the lower
court committed an error in giving credit to the declaration of the witnesses
for the prosecution. While certain discrepancies in minor details may be pointed
out in the declaration of the different witnesses for the prosecution, upon the
main facts they agree. The judge who tried the cause saw the witnesses and heard
their declarations and was thereby enabled to discern from their manner of
giving their testimony whether or not they were entitled to credit. He gave them
full credit, and we find no reason in the record for changing or modifying his
conclusions.

For all of the foregoing reasons, and finding as we do that the evidence
shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants are guilty of the crime
charged, the sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Carson, Araullo, Street, and Malcolm, JJ.,
concur.