G.R. No. 124130. June 29, 1998
GOVERNOR PABLO P. GARCIA, THE PROVINCE OF CEBU; TOMAS R. OSMEÑA; MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA, THE CITY OF CEBU; ALLAN C. GAVIOLA, CITY ADMINISTRATOR; JOSE A. GUISADIO, CITY PLANNING A…
PANGANIBAN, J.:
injunction against any infrastructure project, such as the Cebu South
Reclamation Project, “in order not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of
essential government projects” or frustrate “the economic development
effort of the nation.” This Court will not tolerate a violation of this
prohibition.
Statement of the Case
Petitioners, through Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assail the
validity of three Orders of Judge Jose P. Burgos of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu.[1] The first
assailed Order, dated February 22, 1996, denied herein Petitioner Tomas
R. Osmeña’s Omnibus Motion with Opposition to the Application for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, which prayed that said application be
cancelled or its hearing deferred, and that the temporary restraining
order already issued in favor of herein private respondent be lifted.[2]
The respondent judge’s previous voluntary inhibition was set aside
by the second assailed Order dated March 12, 1996, which reads as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration
is granted and accordingly, the order of the Presiding Judge in
voluntarily inhibiting himself from further sitting in the case dated
February 26, 1996 is reconsidered and set aside.Set this case for another hearing on the application for
preliminary injunction on March 15, 1996 at 10 o’clock in the morning
whereby defendants are ordered to show cause if any they have why the
injunction should not be granted.SO ORDERED.”[3]
Meanwhile, the preliminary injunction sought by herein private
respondent was granted by respondent judge who, in his third assailed
Order dated March 18, 1996, ruled in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in order to preserve the
status quo, upon the filing of an injunction bond with this Court in the
amount of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos, let a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued, hereby enjoining all the defendants, their
assigns, agents and representatives or anyone acting for any or all of
them or in their behalf from implementing the memorandum of agreement
dated September 11, 1995, attached and marked as Annex ‘V’ in the
original complaint dated January 18, 1996, except the construction of
the Cebu South Coastal Road, and all other agreements/contracts of
defendants concerning the Cebu South Reclamation Project tending to
deprive plaintiff of its prior contractual rights in the said Cebu South
Reclamation Project until further orders from this Court.The amount of the required bond shall answer for all damages that
the defendants may sustain by reason of the injunction should the Court
finally decide that plaintiff was not entitled thereto.SO ORDERED.”[4]
The Facts
In their pleadings, the parties tried their best to give detailed
accounts of the factual antecedents of this case. In fairness to them,
the Court hereby reproduces in toto their respective narrations.
Petitioners’ Version
“A. The Project
1. The Cebu South Reclamation Project (hereinafter referred to as
the “PROJECT”) is a FOUR BILLION PESO (P4,000,000,000.00) project of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred
to as the “GOVERNMENT”), funded out of a loan taken out by the
government from the Government of Japan, through its international
financing institution, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(hereinafter referred to as the “OECF”).2. The loan was made possible by virtue of an Exchange of Notes
between the Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and Japan,
whereby the latter extended a total loan package of ONE HUNDRED BILLION
NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR MILLION YEN (Y101,964,000,000.00) [sic] to
finance certain specified and listed projects of the former. Among these
projects to be financed by the loan is the Cebu South Reclamation
Project. (Refer to Annex “E”- Petition)3. The project is an integral part of the Third Phase of
the Metro Cebu Development Projects (hereinafter referred to as “MCDP
III”), which has been favorably endorsed and approved by the President
of the Republic of the Philippines, Fidel V. Ramos, as “one of the
projects of the national government.” (Refer to Annex “F”- Petition)4. The project has likewise been approved by the National
Economic and Development Board (the “NEDA”), of which the President is
the Chairman, as an ICC Project, by virtue of NEDA Resolution No. 1,
Series of 1995. (Refer to Annex “G”- Petition)5. The project is further certified as a project of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by the Department of
Foreign [Affairs], through its Secretary, Domingo E. Siazon. (Refer to
Annex “H”- Petition)6. In due course, loan agreements in implementation of the
Exchange of Notes between the two governments were executed between the
OECF and [P]etitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (the “LANDBANK”).
Under these agreements, the City of Cebu was designated as the project’s
implementing agency. (Refer to Annex “I”- Petition)7. In accordance with the Constitution, the loan package
to finance, among others, the Cebu South Reclamation Project, was
granted final approval by the Monetary Board, by virtue of Resolution
No. 1260 issued on 07 November 1995. (Refer to Annex “J”- Petition)8. The loan arrangements having been entered into, and the
funds ready for release to the City of Cebu, the implementing agency of
the project, the City of Cebu, the Department of Public Works and
Highways (the “DPWH”) and the Metro Cebu Development Project Office (the
“MCDPO”) executed, on 11 September 1995, the “Implementing Arrangement
for Metro Cebu Development Project Phase III (MCDP III)” (Refer to Annex
“K” – Petition), under which agreement is outlined the procedure for
implementation of the project as well as the rights and obligations of
the parties thereto.B. The Suit Filed Below by Private Respondent
9. On 19 January 1996, [P]rivate [R]espondent Malayan Integrated
Industries Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “MALAYAN”), filed a
case for “Specific Performance, Declaration of Nullity, Damages and
Injunction, with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order” against herein petitioners, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-18292, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. (Refer to
Annex “L” – Petition) The case was raffled to Branch 17 of the said
court.10. Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95, a
summary hearing was conducted by respondent [j]udge to determine the
propriety of issuing the temporary restraining order (TRO) prayed for by
[R]espondent Malayan in its complaint.11. During the summary hearing to determine whether the temporary
restraining order (TRO) should issue, defendants questioned the
jurisdiction of the court to issue the same, citing Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1818, which provides:“Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute,or controversy involving an infrastructure project,
or a mining, fishery, forest, or other natural resource development
project of the government, or any public utility operated by the
government, including among others public utilities for the transport of
the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or government officials from
proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any
such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.” (Sec. 1, P.D. 1818; emphasis supplied)12. It was also pointed out to herein respondent [j]udge that the
Supreme Court, in Administrative Circular 13-93, pursuant to P.D. 1818,
and in implementation of the policy behind the law, prohibited all
judges of all courts from issuing TRO’s and/or writs of preliminary
injunction against the implementation of government infrastructure
projects.13. It was further manifested that the Supreme Court, observing
non-compliance with the above-cited Circular by judges of trial courts
was compelled to reiterate its earlier prohibition, with a warning
against further violation, for their “strict compliance”, under Administrative Circular No. 68-94, issued on 3 November 1994, which states:“There have been reports that despite Circular 13-93, dated March 5, 1993, some
courts are still issuing temporary restraining orders and/or
preliminary injunctions even in cases, disputes, or controversies
involving government infrastructure projects in violation of Section 1 of P.D. 1818 x x x“xxx xxx xxx “
In order to obviate complaints against the indiscriminate
issuance of restraining orders and court injunctions against government
public utilities and infrastructure projects in gross violation of the
aforesaid Presidential Decree, the provision of Circular No. 13-93 issued on March 5, 1993 is hereby reiterated for your strict compliance.“xxx xxx xxx” (Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 68-94; emphasis supplied)
14. In gross violation of the law and the circulars of the
Honorable Supreme Court, however, respondent [j]udge issued a temporary
restraining order on 5 February 1996, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:“The verified complaint being sufficient in form and substance
and in order to preserve the status quo, all the defendants and their
agents, employees, workers and all persons acting in their behalf are
temporarily restrained from implementing the alleged memorandum
of agreement dated September 11, 1995, and any and all such other
agreements/contracts entered into by any and all of the defendants,
covering the Cebu South Reclamation Project consisting of 330 hectares
more or less” (Refer to Annex “M” – Petition)15. The hearing on [R]espondent Malayan’s application for the
writ of preliminary injunction was set for 14 February 1996. During the
said hearing, [P]etitioner Tomas R. Osmeña filed an Omnibus Motion for:
(a) the immediate lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order; (b) the
cancellation of the hearing on the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction; and (c) the outright dismissal of the complaint.
The Omnibus Motion was subsequently adopted by the defendants below.
(Refer to Annex “N” – Petition)16. The thrust of the Omnibus Motion was that the court below
had, under P.D. 1818, no jurisdiction and no compelling reason to issue
any TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation
of a government infrastructure project. Since it had no jurisdiction to
issue such TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, much less does it
have the jurisdiction to entertain any application for the injunctive
writ.17. The Omnibus Motion likewise refuted respondent [j]udge’s
arguments in its Order dated 5 February 1996 granting the TRO, wherein
he attempted to remove the case from the ambit of P.D. 1818 thus:(a) the ruling in Genaro R. Reyes Construction, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 234 SCRA 116 applies to the case at bar;(b) “plaintiff is not asking for enjoining the infrastructure
project x x x [but] the enjoining of the contract to be awarded to
another entity”;(c) “inclusion of reclamation of submerged lands as being
covered under the term ‘infrastructure project’ [is a] classification
[that] has yet to be determined in the light of existing Presidential
Proclamations, Orders and/or Executive Memorandums.”18. Respondent Judge — apparently to verify whether the project
was an infrastructure project of the national government — required
defendants below, petitioners herein, to show proof that the project had
the approval of the President of the Republic of the Philippines.19. In compliance with the order of respondent [j]udge,
petitioners, during the continuation of the hearing on the Omnibus
Motion, set on 16 February 1996, presented the documents mentioned above
(Refer to Annexes “D” to “J” – Petition), proving that the project had
the favorable recommendation and approval, not only of the President,
but likewise of the NEDA, and certified as a project of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Insofar as the loan agreements were concerned, the Exchange of Notes
(Annex “D”) and the resolution of the Monetary Board (annex “J”)
approving the loan agreement were presented. All requirements for the
implementation of a perfected contract are present and submitted to the
court.20. Following the presentation of the foregoing documents,
respondent [j]udge gave the parties five (5) days to submit their
respective memoranda on the Omnibus Motion, after which the incident
would be deemed submitted for resolution.21. On 21 February 1996, the parties filed their respective
memoranda. As the memorandum for [R]espondent Malayan contained
misstatements of the facts of the case, petitioner Tomas R. Osmeña filed
a “Reply to Plaintiff’s Memorandum” at 9:00 o’clock in the morning of
the following day, 22 February 1996.22. With unusual dispatch in a time frame of only a few hours,
however, and under suspicious circumstances, in the afternoon of the
same day, 22 February 1996, respondent [j]udge had issued an Order
(Refer to Annex “A” – Petition), a quite comprehensive five-page
resolution denying petitioners’ Omnibus Motion, received by petitioners
on 23 February 1996.23. Without having to consider the unusual haste with which the
Order was issued — considering that it was issued the day immediately
after the last day for the filing of the memoranda, and on the day, and
just hours after petitioner Osmeña’s “Reply to Plaintiff’s Memorandum”
was filed, the Order dated 22 February 1996 was highly irregular for the
most obvious reasons.24. A cursory review of the Order dated 22 February 1996 would
reveal that it has practically decided the case on the merits, on a mere
resolution of an incident in the main case. The Order denying the
Omnibus Motion has practically ruled that: (a) [R]espondent Malayan has
valid, existing and enforceable contracts of reclamation approved by the
President of the Philippines; (b) petitioners’ reclamation project did
not have the approval of the President; and (c) petitioners were
violating [R]espondent Malayan’s contracts.These were precisely the issue[s] in the main case for specific performance.
24.1 It would be relevant to mention that in so ruling,
respondent Judge practically considered “evidence” which were
non-existent in favor of [R]espondent Malayan, and suppressed the
evidence presented by petitioners.25. [I]n view of the actions of respondent [j]udge, [P]etitioner
Osmeña filed, on 23 February 1996, an Omnibus Motion, praying, among
other things, for the voluntary inhibition of respondent [j]udge on the
ground of partiality manifested by the Order of 22 February 1996, which
practically decided the case on the merits in favor of [R]espondent
Malayan, in a resolution of a mere incident in the case.26. In an Order dated 26 February 1996, respondent [j]udge voluntarily inhibited himself. (Refer to Annex “O” – Petition)
27. Respondent Malayan, however, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order of voluntary inhibition, to which
petitioner Osmeña filed an Opposition.28. In the meantime, petitioner Osmeña had filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated 22 February 1996 denying the Omnibus
Motion, with the cautionary notice that it was not to be deemed as a
waiver of their opposition to the motion for reconsideration filed by
[R]espondent Malayan of respondent [j]udge’s Order of voluntary
inhibition. Instead, the said Motion for Reconsideration with Cautionary
Notice was to be heard by the court to which the case was to be
eventually re-raffled, and scheduled for hearing on 22 March 1996.29. On 12 March 1996, however, respondent [j]udge reversed
himself and reconsidered his Order of voluntary inhibition dated 26
February 1996, and set the hearing on [R]espondent Malayan’s application
for the writ of preliminary injunction for 15 March 1996. (Refer to
Annex “C” – Petition)30. Since the Motion for Reconsideration with Cautionary Notice
was still pending resolution (and the hearing thereon yet to be
conducted on 22 March 1996), petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
Resetting of the hearing, considering that the Motion for
Reconsideration with Cautionary Notice — which questioned the court’s
jurisdiction to entertain the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction — was prejudicial to the hearing set for 15 March 1996,
since it would determine whether or not such proceedings should continue
or not.31. During the hearing on 15 March 1996, however, respondent [j]udge denied petitioner Osmeña’s Urgent Motion for Resetting.
32. Again, with unusual dispatch, on 18 March 1996, respondent
[j]udge issued two (2) Orders, one granting the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by [R]espondent Malayan (Refer to Annex “B” –
Petition), and another one denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration with Cautionary Notice — both issued even
before the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration with Cautionary
Notice which was yet scheduled for 22 March 1996.33. Hence, this petition for certiorari, questioning: (a) the
validity of the Orders of respondent [j]udge dated 22 February 1996
claiming it had the jurisdiction to entertain and to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners’ government infrastructure
project, and the Order of 18 March 1996, granting the writ of
preliminary injunction; and (b) the validity of the Order of respondent
[j]udge dated 12 March 1996, reconsidering his earlier Order of
voluntary inhibition, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.”[5]
Private Respondent’s Version
“On May 22, 1967, Proclamation No. 200-A was issued which
reserved for national improvement purposes, a certain parcel of land of
the [p]ublic [d]omain situated in the foreshore of the District of San
Nicolas, Pardo, Cebu City and Tangkey, Talisay, Cebu. This area was
transferred and relinquished by the President of the Philippines to the
Province of Cebu in behalf of the [n]ational [g]overnment, subject to
private rights, if any there be. Copy of said proclamation was attached
as Annex “4” to respondents’ Comment.On January 11, 1973, Presidential Decree No. 3-A was issued which
decreed that the reclamation of land under water, whether foreshore or
inland, throughout the Philippines belong to and are owned by and
limited to the [n]ational [g]overnment or to any person authorized by it
under a proper contract.On October 14, 1977, pursuant to and in accordance with the
above-said Proclamation No. 200-A and Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 3-A, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu and the then Cebu Provincial Governor
Eduardo R. Gullas granted, awarded and authorized private respondent to
undertake the actual and physical reclamation and development works of
the foreshore, submerged and offshore areas of Three Hundred Fifty (350)
hectares, more or less, which is a portion of the approximate area of
5,386,800 square meters or 438.6800 hectares, as described in
Proclamation No. 200-A. Copy of said Award was attached as Annex “5” to
the Comment of respondents.On October 31, 1977, a Contract of Reclamation and Development
was entered into, signed and executed by and between the Province of
Cebu, represented by then Governor Eduardo R. Gullas, and private
respondent. Copy of said Contract was attached as Annex “6” to the
Comment.The said Contract of Reclamation and Development dated October
31, 1977 between Cebu Province and private respondent was authorized by
Resolution No. 475 dated October 4, 1977 of the Sangguniang Bayan [sic]
Panlalawigan of Cebu.On September 15, 1978, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu and
then Cebu Governor Eduardo R. Gullas considered and approved the request
of private respondent dated August 25, 1978 that the reclamation area
of 350 hectares, more or less be increased from 350 hectares to 625
hectares, more or less. Copy of said resolution was attached as Annex
“7” to respondent’s Comment.On October 7, 1978, the Second Supplemental Contract of
Reclamation and Development between the Province of Cebu and private
respondent was entered into, signed and execu[t]ed by and between the
Province of Cebu and private respondent. Copy of said contract was
attached as Annex “8” to the respondents’ Comment.On January 15, 1979, a Contract of Reclamation and Port
Development was entered into, executed and signed by and between private
respondent and Amsterdam Ballast Dredging Corporation (BALLAST) in
connection with and regarding the reclamation area of 625 hectares of
the foreshore, submerged and offshore areas from Pasil, Cebu City, to
Tangke, Talisay, Cebu to Kawit Island and then to Pasil, Cebu City. Copy
of said contract was attached as Annex “9” to respondents’ Comment.On February 7, 1979, a Memorandum dated February 7, 1979
addressed to then President Marcos, was submitted by the Province of
Cebu, represented and signed by then Governor Eduardo R. Gullas, and the
City of Mandaue, represented and signed by then City Mayor Demetrio M.
Cortes for final consideration and approval. Copy of said memorandum was
attached as Annex “10” to respondents’ Comment.When the Province of Cebu and the City of Mandaue submitted to
the President the Cebu South Reclamation Project for approval per
memorandum dated February 7, 1979, attached as Annex “10” to
respondents’ Comment, it was premised on the following consideration as
stated in the first paragraph of said memo:“In our earnest desire to contribute our share to the program
of Your Excellency and of our government on industrialization,
industrial dispersal and regional development in the New Society, the
Province of Cebu and the City of Mandaue have authorized, subject to
your Excellency’s reclamation of 625 and 360 hectares of foreshore and
offshore lands in South Cebu from Pasil, Cebu City to Tangke, Talisay,
Cebu by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 200-A, promulgated on
May 22, 1967 (ANNEX “B”), which gives the Province of Cebu the authority
to administer these areas within the City of Cebu, and, in Mandaue
City, from Subangdaku to the Cabahug Coastways, by virtue of Sec. 94 of
Republic Act No. 5519, which vests ownership and possession of all
foreshore lands and submerged lands of the public domain in the City of
Mandaue (ANNEX ‘C’), respectively, under contracts of Reclamation and Port Development with Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation,
hereto attached as Annexes “D” and “E”, which we believe offer the most
advantageous terms for the Province of Cebu, and City of Mandaue and
the [n]ational [g]overnment because not a single centavo will be spent
by the government in return for its share in the reclaimed areas and the
operation of the international and domestic port facilities thereof,
not to mention the socio-economic impact that the projects will create
in the Visayas and Mindanao.” (Emphasis ours)On August 13, 1979, the Cebu South Reclamation Project was
presented by the Province of Cebu and Mandaue City, was considered and
approved in principle by then President E. Marcos, as per Presidential
Memorandum directive dated August 13, 1979 and a copy thereof is
attached as Annex “Q” of the petition. Among the salient provisions of
said presidential approval are:“a. That within twelve (12) months after the issuance of
[p]residential directive authorizing the Project, a detailed and
integrated development plan on land use including technical, economic,
marketing and financial feasibility studies be submitted to the
President for approval, otherwise, project approval may be deemed
automatically revoked; to enable the PEA to exercise its
responsibilities as the representative of the [n]ational [g]overnment as
landowner, the person or entity chosen by the contractor to undertake
the detailed feasibility studies shall report directly to the PEA;x x x
“d. That Cebu City and Mandaue City shall enter into contract
with Public Estates Authority for the reclamation project pursuant to
E.O. 525. The PEA is authorized to determine the terms and conditions
necessary for the implementation of the aforecited conditions including
specification of the sharing scheme and other requirements of government
entities on the reclaimed areas. Furthermore, the PEA is authorized to
review, modify, and approve all contracts entered into or arising out of
the reclamation project consistent with existing government regulations
and national interests considerations. Finally, consideration of equity
requires that option rights of first refusal for a period as may be
determined by PEA, shall be granted to private entities which have made
initial investments on the project.” (Emphasis ours)In other words, herein private respondent was granted by said
[p]residential directive option rights of first refusal to undertake the
project because of the initial investments it made on the project.On August 1, 1980, as provided in Presidential Memorandum
directive dated August 13, 1979 to submit within twelve (12) months
after the issuance of the said Presidential Memorandum directive the
detailed feasibility study for approval and “to enable the PEA to
exercise its responsibilities as the representative of the [n]ational
[g]overnment as land owner, the person or entity chosen by the
contractor to undertake the detailed feasibility studies shall report
directly to the PEA”, the Province of Cebu, the City of Mandaue, the
City of Lapulapu and the Municipality of Cordova submitted said
feasibility study to the President for approval, copy of which was
attached as Annex “12” to respondents’ Comment.The Province of Cebu and private respondent entered into, signed
and executed a Confirmatory Agreement dated November 1979, by virtue of
which the services of MALAYAN was contracted to undertake the
preparation and making of the said Detailed and Integrated Development
Plan on Land use, etc., of the Cebu South Reclamation Project at no cost
to the Province of Cebu. Copy of said Confirmatory Agreement was
attached as Annex “13” to the respondents’ Comment.The said Confirmatory Agreement acknowledged that it was the
private respondent which made initial investments in the Cebu South
Reclamation Project and the entity granted the right of first refusal or
option rights to undertake the project as follows:“WHEREAS, the Memorandum dated 13 August 1979 embodied the
proviso that option rights of first refusal shall be granted to private
entities who have made initial investments in the reclamation projects;WHEREAS, the MALAYAN INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, which
had made initial investments in the projects and had, as a matter of
fact, been previously bound by a contract with the PROVINCE OF CEBU to
undertake the reclamation project in South Cebu evidenced by Document
No. 145; Page No. 30; Book No. VI; Series of 1977 before Notary Public
Justino K. Hermosisima, by these presents have offered to undertake and
prepare, for and in behalf of the PROVINCE OF CEBU, the detailed
feasibility study for the reclamation of the areas in the Municipalities
of Talisay and Cordova, Province of Cebu, in conjunction and
coordination with the Cebu South and the Mandaue Reclamation Projects,
and which offer had been accepted by the PROVINCE OF CEBU as the
consequence of the Reclamation contract by and between the two entities
similarly reconfirmed in a communication dated October 4, 1979;”On January 4, 1980, a Confirmatory Agreement was entered into,
executed and signed by and between the City of Cebu, and private
respondent in which they confirmed, affirmed, approved and agreed that
the Cebu South Reclamation Project dated January 15, 1979 between
MALAYAN and BALLAST which was approved by the Province of Cebu and City
of Mandaue and were approved in principle by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, that its corresponding plan on land use, including technical,
economic, marketing and financial feasibility studies of the Project be
undertaken by the aforesaid Local Goverment units concerned and to be
submitted to the PEA and the President of the Philippines within twelve
(12) months after the issuance of the Presidential Memorandum directive
dated August 13, 1979, and in compliance with the above-said
requirements, the City of Cebu hired, awarded, engaged and contracted
the services of private respondent to undertake and prepare in behalf of
the City of Cebu the detailed and integrated development plan on land
use, etc., of the Project covering the reclamation area of 400 to 625
hectares, more or less, without any single expense, funding and at no
cost whatsoever to the City of Cebu. Copy of said Confirmatory
Agreemen[t] was attached as Annex “14” to the respondents’ Comment.Again, the City of Cebu recognized the option right or right of
first refusal of private respondent to undertake the project as the
entity [which] had made initial investments in the project as follows:“WHEREAS, the President also directed that option rights of
first refusal shall be granted to private entities which have made
initial investments in the reclamation projects;WHEREAS, the MALAYAN INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, which
has made initial investments on the project, and in fact, was previously
contracted by the Province of Cebu by virtue of Proclamation No 200-A,
P.D. No. 3-A and Executive Order No. 525 to undertake the reclamation
project for and in the City of Cebu and the Municipality of Talisay,
Province of Cebu, and prior to which MALAYAN INTEGRATED had already
invested substantial sums of money, time and effort in preparatory
activities on said reclamation projects, by these presents have offered
to undertake the detailed and integrated development plan on land use,
[including] feasibility studies as required by the President, and the
CITY OF CEBU has accepted the said offer of MALAYAN INTEGRATED
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION;”On January 24, 1980, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) and the
City of Cebu entered into a Memorandum of Understanding which recognized
the pre-emptive right of plaintiff to undertake the project as
recognized in the Presidential directive dated August 13, 1979.“6. Pursuant to the Presidential Directive dated August 13,
1979, to accord pre-emptive rights for the actual prosecution of the
reclamation project to private entities which have made initial
investments on the project:”Copy of said Memorandum of Understanding was attached as Annex “15” to respondents’ Comment.
On August 1, 1980, on the basis of the Confirmatory Agreement
dated November 1979 between the Province of Cebu and private respondent
and the Confirmatory Agreement dated January 4, 1980 between the City of
Cebu and the City of Cebu have awarded, hired, engaged and contracted
the services of private respondent to undertake and prepare, in behalf
of the Province of Cebu and the City of Cebu without any single expense,
funding and at no cost to said Province of Cebu and City of Cebu, the
detailed and integrated development plan on land use, etc., of the Cebu
South Reclamation Project, the Province of Cebu thru then Eduardo R.
Gullas, the City of Cebu thru then City Mayor Florentino S. S. Solon,
the city of Mandaue thru then City Mayor Demetrio M. Cortes, the City of
Lapulapu thru then City Mayor Maximo V. Patalingjug, Jr., and the
Municipality of Cordova, Cebu thru Municipal Mayor Celedonio B. Sitoy,
filed and submitted on August 1, 1980 the corresponding Detailed and
Integrated Development Plan on Land use, including technical, economic,
marketing and financial feasibility studies of the Cebu South
Reclamation Project for the final consideration and approval by the
Public Estates Authority and the Office of the President and the
President of the Philippines. Copy of said document was attached as
Annex “12” to respondents’ Comment.On August 12, 1980, private respondent, for and in behalf of the
Province of Cebu, City of Cebu, City of Mandaue, City of Lapulapu,
Municipality of Talisay, Municipality of Cordova, in relation to the
above-said Memorandum dated August 1, 1980 as required, also filed and
submitted to the Office of the President and the President of the
Philippines thru the PEA the additional copies of the said complete
Project Studies and the Detailed and Integrated Development Plan on Land
Use, etc., of the Metro Cebu Reclamation and Development Project which
includes the Cebu South Reclamation Project. Copy of said document was
attached as Annex “16” to respondents’ Comment.On September 29, 1980, on the basis of the aforesaid Memorandum
dated August 1, 1980 the PEA, in its MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT dated
September 29, 1980 indorsed and recommended to the President the final
consideration and approval of the Detailed and Integrated Development
Plan on Land Use of the Cebu South Reclamation Project. Copy of said
document was hereto attached as Annex “17” to the respondents’ Comment.Since Septembe[r] 19, 1980, when the PEA approved the Metro Cebu
Reclamation and Development Project covering the reclamation area of
4,910 hectares, which include the Cebu South Reclamation Project
covering 625 hectares, and its corresponding detailed and integrated
development plan on land use, etc., as per MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT dated
September 29, 1980, the President of the Philippines has not yet
approved the detailed and integrated development plan on land use,
including technical, economic, marketing and financial feasibility
studies of the said project.On December 29, 1995, the Office of the President thru President
Staff Director Vicente A. Galang, issued 1st Indorsement to the effect
that the detailed and integrated development plan on land use of the
project is still pending final consideration and approval by the
[O]ffice of the President until now or at the present date. Copy of said
resolution was attached as Annex “18” to the respondents’ Comment.On January 12, 1996, the Office of the President thru
Presidential Staff Director Vicente A. Galang, issued an official
certification that the Cebu South Reclamation Proj[e]ct covering 360
hectares, has already long been considered and approved by the Office of
the President and the President of the Philippines as per Presidential
Memorandum directive dated August 13, 1979 but its corresponding
detailed and integrated development plan on land use, including
technical, economic, marketing and financial feasibility studies of the
project which was filed and submitted by the Province of Cebu, City of
Cebu, City of Mandaue, City of Lapulapu and Municipality of Cordova with
the PEA and the Office of the President on August 1, 1980 per
Memorandum dated August 1, 1980 and approved by the PEA in favor of the
above-mentioned Local Government units concerned per MEMO FOR THE
PRESIDENT dated September 29, 1980, is still pending final consideration
and approval by the Office of the President. Copy of said certification
was attached as Annex ”19” to respondents’ Comment.When the Province of Cebu and the City of Mandaue submitted to
the President the Cebu South Reclamation Project for approval per
memorandum dated February 7, 1979, it was premised on the following
consideration as stated in the first paragraph of said memo:“In our earnest desire to contribute our share to the program
of Your Excellency and of our government on industrialization,
industrial dispersal and regional development in the New Society, the
Province of Cebu and the City of Mandaue have authorized, subject to
your Excellency’s approval, pursuant to PD 3-A (ANNEX “A”), the
reclamation of 625 and 360 hectares of foreshore and offshore lands in
South Cebu from Pasil, Cebu City to Tangke, Talisay, Cebu by virtue of
Presidential Proclamation No. 200-A, promulgated on May 22, 1967 (ANNEX
“B”), which gives the province of Cebu the authority to administer these
areas within the City of Cebu, and, in Mandaue City, from Subangdaku to
the Cabahug Coastways, by virtue of Sec. 94 of Republic Act No. 5519,
which vests ownership and possession of all foreshore lands and
submerged lands of the public domain in the City of Mandaue (ANNEX “C”),
respectively, under contracts of Reclamation and Port Development with Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation,
hereto attached as Annexes “D” and “E”, which we believe offer the most
advantageous terms for the Province of Cebu, and City of Mandaue and
the National Government because not a single centavo will be spent by
the government in return for its share in the reclaimed areas and the
operation of the international and domestic port facilities thereof, not
to mention the socio-economic impact that the projects will create in
the Visayas and Mindanao.” (Emphasis ours)This was so because under Executive Order No. 525 dated February
14, 1979, all reclamation projects are subject to approval by the
President. After the reclamation project is approved by the President,
the project shall be undertaken by the Public Estates Authority (PEA) or
through a proper contract executed by the PEA with any person or
entity. This is so provided in Section 1 of said Executive Order which
reads as follows:“SECTION 1 – The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All
reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through
a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; provided,
that, reclamation projects of any National Government agency or entity
authorized under its Charter shall be undertaken in consultation with
the PEA upon approval of the President.”In other words, the President does not approve reclamation contracts but approves only the reclamation project.
The President approved in principle the Cebu South Reclamation
Project on August 13, 1979 as shown by Exhibit “A-13”. The approval was
in principle only pending submission and presidential approval of a
detailed and integrated feasibility study on the land use of said
project. What is unique in said presidential approval was that it
recognized the reclamation contracts earlier entered into by plaintiff
with the Province of Cebu and the City of Mandaue by giving plaintiff
option rights of first refusal to undertake the project, when said
presidential memorandum stated:“ x x x x
Finally, considerations of equity requires that option rights
of first refusal for a period as may be determined by PEA, shall be
granted to private entities which have made initial investments on the
project.”The presidential memorandum also directed the PEA, City of Cebu
and the City of Mandaue to enter into contracts with the PEA for the
Cebu South Reclamation Project and the Mandaue Reclamation project,
respectively.Conformably, with said presidential directive, the PEA and the
City of Cebu entered into a memorandum of understanding with respect to
the Cebu South Reclamation project wherein paragraph 6 of its Section
II, it [sic] provided that the City of Cebu was obliged “to accord
pre-emptive rights for the actual prosecution of the reclamation project
to private entities which have made initial investments on the
project”, which entity is no other than herein plaintiff. This option of
first refusal or pre-emptive rights of plaintiff to undertake the
actual prosecution of the project has never been cancelled, or
rescinded.The herein private respondent filed this case for injunction when
the respondents issued an invitation to bidders, Exhibit “A-21”
particularly section 3.2 thereof which provides “for the conduct of
tenders and subsequent evaluation of bids” for the Cebu South
Reclamation Project. In other words, the petitioners were going to
entertain bids from private contractors for the undertaking of the Cebu
South Reclamation Project in violation of the preemptive rights or right
of first refusal of private respondent to prosecute the project.”[6]
In a Resolution dated March 27, 1997, the Court granted
petitioners’ prayer and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the trial judge from enforcing the assailed orders and from conducting
further proceedings in this case.[7]
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated July 30, 1997, petitioners summarized the issues as follows:[8]
“I
Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
issuing the orders dated 22 February 1996 and 18 March 1996, in
contumacious violation of Presidential Decree No. 1818, and Supreme
Court Administrative Circulars Nos. 13-93 and 68-94.II
Whether or not, in grave abuse of discretion, the order dated 22
February 1996 and the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction
had the effect of practically deciding the case on the merits.III
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the
writ of preliminary injunction, as the applicant, [R]espondent Malayan,
had no clear and unmistakable right to be protected by the injunctive
writ.IV
Respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in not dismissing
the complaint outright, the alleged cause of action being admittedly
premature, and a mere expectancy, or having otherwise been barred by
prescription and/or laches.V
Whether respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing
the order dated 12 March 1996, reconsidering his earlier order of
voluntary inhibition, there being strong grounds — as respondent judge
himself admits — for his voluntary inhibition.VI
Whether or not, as claimed by private respondent, the omnibus
motion to dismiss filed below by petitioners was a mere scrap of paper.VII
Whether or not, as claimed by private respondent, a motion for
reconsideration was necessary before the filing of the present
petition.”
The first, second, third and fourth issues are closely related and will be discussed together.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Preliminary Injunction Void and Improper
Section 1 of PD 1818 distinctly provides that “[n]o court in the
Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case,
dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project x x x of
the government, x x x to prohibit any person or persons, entity or
government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project, x x x or pursuing any lawful
activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.”[9]
At the risk of being repetitious, we stress that the foregoing
statutory provision expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue
injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of an
infrastructure project.[10]
In the case at bar, the assailed March 18, 1996 Order of respondent
judge specifically enjoined petitioners from implementing their
Memorandum of Agreement dated September 11, 1995[11]
(except as to the Cebu South Coastal Road), which pertains to the
implementation of the Metro Cebu Development Project, Phase III, a major
component of which is the Cebu South Reclamation Project. The
petitioners were also enjoined from acting on or implementing all other
contracts involving the said reclamation project. The issuance of said
writ of preliminary injunction evidently constitutes a blatant violation
of PD 1818. The assailed Order is therefore void for being issued with
grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction. On this ground
alone, the Court may already grant the petition. Nonetheless, we will
proceed to discuss the other issues raised.
Reclamation Is an
Infrastructure Project
Private respondent claims that the Cebu South Reclamation Project is not an infrastructure project.[12] This is erroneous and misleading. In Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[13]
the Court unequivocally held that “the reclamation of foreshore and
submerged lands along the coast of Mandaue City up to the Cebu City
boundary for the purpose of developing the reclaimed area into an
industrial and trading center with a modern harbor and port facilities
for both domestic and international commerce” is an infrastructure project as contemplated under PD 1818.[14]
Private respondent should know this not only because everyone is
presumed to know the law, but also because it was a principal party in
that case.
Cebu South Reclamation Project
Approved by the President
Private respondent further contends that, in spite of the
prohibition in PD 1818, the questioned injunctive writ may still validly
issue against petitioners, because the latter have not sufficiently
shown that (1) “[t]he City of Cebu has a contract with the Public
Estates Authority (PEA) to undertake the Cebu South Reclamation Project
under P.D. 3-A,” (2) “[t]he PEA has favorably endorsed the Cebu South
Reclamation Project for approval by the President pursuant to Executive
Order No. 525,” and (3) “[t]he President has approved the Cebu South
Reclamation Project pursuant to P.D. 525.”[15] The Court is not persuaded.
In the August 13, 1979[16]
Memorandum on the Cebu South and Mandaue Reclamation Project, the
President of the Philippines addressed this clear statement to the city
mayors of Cebu and Mandaue, the chairman of the PEA and others
concerned: “Pursuant to P.D. 3-A and E.O. 525, and upon recommendation
of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), the reclamation project covering
985 ha.[,] more or less, of Cebu South and Mandaue foreshore areas is
hereby approved in principle; and the City of Cebu and the City of
Mandaue are hereby authorized to undertake the reclamation of subject
areas x x x.”[17] Furthermore, even the certification from the Office of the President dated January 12, 1996,[18]
presented in evidence by respondent itself, certifies that the Cebu
South (and Mandaue) Reclamation Project “has been previously considered
and approved by the Office of the President and by the President of the
Philippines, then His Excellency President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in favor
of the Province of Cebu, City of Cebu, City of Mandaue, the Public
Estates Authority and others concerned as the proponents x x x.”[19] The approved reclamation project is distinct from the reclamation contract itself.
Private Respondent Has No Vested
Right Violated by a Public Bidding
Private respondent argues that PD 1818 cannot be invoked to stop
the issuance of a preliminary injunction in this case, as the acts of
petitioners are tantamount to a violation of its vested rights. It
claims “ x x x a right to seek judicial intervention and relief when
petitioners violated its right of first refusal by issuing invitations
to bid the project to other contractors, without affording private
respondent its right of first refusal.”[20] We disagree.
Undisputed is the fact that the private respondent and the
government have not entered into any validly approved and effective
reclamation contract covering the Cebu South Reclamation Project. The
City of Cebu and private respondent’s Contract of Reclamation dated
October 31, 1977[21] was never
approved by the President. Their Confirmatory Agreement dated January
4, 1980 merely shows that the City of Cebu engaged private respondent
“to undertake and prepare the detailed and integrated development plan
on land use, including technical, economic, marketing and financial
feasibility studies x x x” of the Cebu South Reclamation Project.[22]
Incidentally, the aforementioned certification, issued by the Office of
the President on January 12, 1996, manifests that private respondent’s
development plan and feasibility studies, submitted pursuant to the said
Confirmatory Agreement, are the items pending final consideration and
approval of the President.
Private respondent alleges that the injunctive writ merely
protected its alleged right of first refusal which arose from the
President’s August 13, 1979 Memorandum addressed to the concerned public
officials, stating that “considerations of equity [require] that option
rights of first refusal for a period as may be determined by the PEA
shall be granted to private entities which have made initial investments
on the project.”[23] This memorandum, however, must be construed in harmony with the aforecited PD 1818 and PD 1594,[24]
which prescribed the policies, guidelines, rules and regulations for
government infrastructure contracts. Said memorandum certainly could not
be construed as a law authorizing a repeal of PD 1818 and PD 1594.
Indeed, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,[25]
whether expressly or impliedly. There is no express repeal of said
laws, as they were not even mentioned in the memorandum, either by
number or by text. Neither can there be an implied repeal, since it was
not “convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated” that the mention in
the memorandum of a right of first refusal was so repugnant and
inconsistent with said laws as to defy harmonization. Basic is the rule
in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored.[26]
In addition, the memorandum was merely an expression of an executive
directive to subordinates, not a legislative enactment. Hence, it cannot
obviate the operation of PD 1818 and PD 1594. Section 4 of PD 1594
provides:
“SEC. 4. Bidding. — Construction projects shall
generally be undertaken by contract after competitive public bidding.
Projects may be undertaken by administration or force account or by
negotiated contract only in exceptional cases where time is of the
essence, or where there is lack of qualified bidders or contractors, or
where there is a conclusive evidence that greater economy and efficiency
would be achieved through this arrangement, and in accordance with
provision of laws and acts on the matter, subject to the approval of the
Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, the
Minister of Public Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as the case may
be, if the project cost is less than P1 Million, and of the President of
the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Minister, if the
project cost is P1 Million or more.”
In the award of government contracts, the law requires a
competitive public bidding. This is reasonable because “[a] competitive
public bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the public
the best possible advantages thru open competition. It is a mechanism
that enables the government agency to avoid or preclude anomalies in the
execution of public contracts.”[27]
Lawful and laudable, therefore, is the petitioners’ Memorandum of
Agreement mandating the City of Cebu to conduct a competitive public
bidding in implementing the Cebu South Reclamation Project. The conduct
of such public bidding is not violative of private respondent’s alleged
vested right. In the Court’s viewpoint, the said right may be considered
for the purpose of awarding the contract of reclamation, only when the
latter’s proposal are in all aspects equal to the bid of another
proponent. In this kind of situation, the private respondent’s claim to a
right of first refusal indeed entitles it to priority in the award of
the contract. But this claimed right of first refusal cannot bar another
proponent from submitting a bid or proposal.
Note, however, that under Section 4 of PD 1594, a negotiated
contract may be allowed in exceptional circumstances enumerated therein,
subject to approval by the President. Executive Order No. 380,[28]
which took effect November 27, 1989, also provided for the President’s
approval of negotiated infrastructure contracts, the cost of which, for
the Department of Transportation and Communications, amounts to P100
million and, for other departments and government corporations, P50
million. Since the project cost of the Cebu South Reclamation Project is
over 4 billion pesos,[29] it
is ineluctable that the President’s approval is required. Consequently
untenable is private respondent’s contention that its right of first
refusal ipso facto entitles it to a contract of reclamation,
because it fails to take into consideration the legal requirement that
negotiated infrastructure contracts with costs beyond the specified
ceiling must be approved by the President. Private respondent has no
legal basis to claim that, because of its initial expenses in preparing
its proposed plans and feasibility studies, it could dispense with or,
worse, arrogate unto itself the President’s power to ultimately decide
or approve a contract of reclamation. In Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[30]
the Court recognized the President’s authority to disapprove the
reclamation contract proposed by private respondent despite the latter’s
initial investments; in that case, the President approved, instead, the
contract between the City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz, Inc. et al.[31]
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction Unjustified
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the
grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Although private
respondent alleged these grounds,[32] respondent judge had the duty to take judicial notice[33]
of PD 1818 and PD 1594. These laws, based on the foregoing discussion,
ineludibly show that private respondent had no right to the relief it
sought. It is well-settled that, “before a writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complaint
that there exists a right to be protected, and that the acts against
which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right.”[34]
In hindsight, the respondent judge’s grant of the writ is truly
regrettable, as it unnecessarily delayed the implementation of an
important infrastructure project, a delay which had far-reaching
consequences on the economic development and interest of Cebu, as well
as the nation.
Second Issue:
Respondent Judge’s Voluntary Inhibition
Petitioners[35] contend that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion, when he made a volte face on his previous Order dated February 26, 1996[36]
inhibiting himself from hearing the case. In issuing said Order, Judge
Burgos noted that Petitioner Tomas Osmeña’s Motion for Inhibition raised
the ground of “prejudgment” on the basis of statements made in his
Order dated February 22, 1996. Judge Burgos disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion is granted, and
accordingly, in order to disabuse the mind of the movant and to further
faithfully serve the cause of justice, the Presiding Judge of this Court
hereby voluntarily inhibits himself from further sitting in the present
case with instruction to the Branch Clerk of Court to send the records
to the Office of the Clerk of Court for approval by the Honorable
Executive Judge Priscila S. Agana for final re-raffling.The scheduled hearing for February 26, 1996 is cancelled.
SO ORDERED.”[37]
However, respondent judge reversed his voluntary inhibition,[38]
meekly stating in his Order dated March 12, 1996 that “[t]he allegation
of prejudgment and partiality is so bare and empty as movant Osmeña
failed to present sufficient ground or proof for the Presiding Judge to
disqualify himself. The Judge realized the mistake in granting the
motion for inhibition when defendant Osmeña misled the Court in
asserting that on the same day February 26, 1996, he would be filing an
administrative case against the Judge for violation of PD 1818 and
Supreme Court Circulars issued in relation to said decree x x x. In that
eventuality, Osmeña said, the Judge would be bias[ed] and partial to
him because he [was] the complainant in the pending administrative
case.”[39]
We find merit in petitioners’ contention. Judge Burgos inhibited
himself on the basis of Petitioner Osmeña’s allegation of prejudgment.
In reversing his voluntary inhibition, respondent judge nebulously
branded Osmeña’s allegations as “so bare and empty.” Judge Burgos’ claim
that he was misled by Osmeña’s threat of an administrative case is
obviously a mere afterthought that does not inspire belief. Although
inhibition is truly discretionary[40]
on the part of the judge, the flimsy reasons proffered above are
insufficient to justify reversal of his previous voluntary inhibition.
As aptly pointed out by petitioners in their Memorandum,
“‘ xxx a judge may not rescind his action and reassume jurisdiction where good cause exists for the disqualification. Furthermore,
because a presumption arises, by reason of the judge’s prior order of
disqualification, of the existence of the factual reason for such
disqualification, where the regular judge who has been
disqualified revokes the order of disqualification, and objection is
made to such revocation, it is not sufficient for the judge to
enter an order merely saying that he or she is not disqualified; the
record should clearly reveal the facts upon which the revocation is made.’ (46 Am Jur 2d § 234, p. 321)”[41]
We deem it important to point out that a judge must preserve the
trust and faith reposed in him by the parties as an impartial and
objective administrator of justice. When he exhibits actions that give
rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and
confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit himself
voluntarily. It is basic that “[a] judge may not be legally prohibited
from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will
induce doubt [on] his honest actuations and probity in favor of either
party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The better
course for the judge is to disqualify himself.”[42]
Third Issue:
Omnibus Motion Ineffective?
Private respondent insists that the petitioners’ Omnibus Motion[43]
dated February 14, 1996 is a mere scrap of paper, as it contained a
notice of hearing addressed only to the clerk of court with no proof of
its service to the opposing counsel.[44]
Private respondent is clutching at straws. The petitioners’ Omnibus
Motion was filed pursuant to the trial court’s own order to show cause
why the injunction should not issue. It actually partakes of a brief or
memorandum showing the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to issue the
preliminary injunction. The Omnibus Motion raised a very important
matter which the court itself could have ruled on, even motu proprio, considering that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal.[45]
Moreover, as expressed by petitioners, the issue is now moot, since the
private respondent filed an Amended Complaint giving petitioner another
fifteen days to file a responsive pleading. Within the said period,
“petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion dated 7 March 1996,
adopting the Omnibus Motion of 14 February 1996 and the Motion for
Reconsideration with Cautionary Notice against the Amended Complaint and
the application for writ of preliminary injunction therein contained.”[46]
Fourth Issue: Motion for Reconsideration Actually Filed
Finally, private respondent alleges that the petition should be
dismissed on the ground that petitioners did not file a motion for
reconsideration.[47] This allegation is negated by the simple fact that a Motion for Reconsideration with Cautionary Notice,[48] although denied by the trial court, was actually filed by petitioners within the prescribed period.
Epilogue
Litigants, lawyers and judges sometimes forget that they share the
responsibility of unclogging the dockets of the judiciary. As a
lamentable consequence, this Court is compelled to resolve cases which
are utterly bereft of merit. This is one of those cases.
Private Respondent Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation (“Malayan,” for brevity) was the petitioner in Malayan Integrated Industries, Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[49]
in which this Court, citing PD 1818, held that no writ of injunction
may be issued to prevent the implementation of the reclamation project
along the coast of Mandaue City, which was deemed an infrastructure
project. In the present case, Private Respondent Malayan, nevertheless
sought again the issuance of an injunctive writ to restrain the
implementation of a similar reclamation project in adjacent Cebu City.
In initiating the present proceedings, private respondent evidently
ignored our earlier pronouncement and unnecessarily clogged the dockets
of our courts.
The respondent trial judge, on the other hand, abetted Malayan’s
brazen disregard of this Court’s earlier ruling. Worse, he ruled that
the earlier case did not apply, because “E.O. No. 380 was not presented
by the parties for consideration by the High Court.”[50]
He maintained that EO 380, dated November 27, 1989, did not include
reclamation projects in the definition of infrastructure projects.
As earlier stated, the ruling of the trial court is lamentable. We
note that, in the first place, EO 380 did not purport to be an exclusive
enumeration of infrastructure projects. Moreover, the Supreme Court
itself held — after the effectivity of EO 380 — that reclamation
projects are deemed infrastructure projects, thereby resolving the
present question with finality. It is unfortunate that the trial court
cavalierly contravened a categorical ruling of the Supreme Court. But
even more deplorable, it insinuated that this Court did not take into
account all applicable extant laws. To propound such view is to
undermine the people’s trust and confidence in the judiciary. This, we
cannot countenance. It is opportune to remind judges of their sworn duty
to follow the doctrines and rulings of this Court.
In issuing writs of injunction, judges should observe the admonition of the Court in Olalia vs. Hizon:[51]
“It has been consistently held that there is no power the
exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution,
deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case,
than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that
should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts
of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation
upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted
lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Orders of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. CEB-18292,
dated February 22, 1996, March 12, 1996 and March 18, 1996, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order earlier issued is MADE PERMANENT.
Respondent judge is ordered to INHIBIT himself from further hearing
this case. Let Civil Case No. CEB-18292 be re-raffled and the
proceedings therein proceed with all deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.(Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[1] 7th Judicial Region, Branch 17.
[2] Rollo, p. 47.
[3] Ibid., p. 55.
[4] Ibid., p. 52. The
case was deemed submitted for resolution on August 20, 1997 when this
Court received petitioners’ Memorandum.
[5] Petition, pp. 9-16; rollo, pp. 11-18.
[6] Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 1-16; rollo, pp. 349-364.
[7] Rollo, pp. 142-145.
[8] Pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 407-408.
[9] See also Supreme Court Administrative Circular 68-94 dated November 3, 1994.
[10] Republic of the Philippines vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction, GR No. 108869, p. 5, May 6, 1997.
[11] Rollo, pp. 71-76.
[12] Memorandum for the Respondents, p. 18; rollo, p. 366.
[13] 213 SCRA 640, September 4, 1992, per Griño-Aquino, J.
[14] Ibid., pp. 649-650.
[15] Memorandum for the Respondents, p. 24; rollo, p. 372.
[16] Rollo, pp. 139-140.
[17] Ibid, p. 139.
[18] Ibid, pp. 291-293.
[19] Ibid, p. 292. See
also the Memorandum of Understanding dated January 24, 1980, which was
executed by the PEA and the City of Cebu; rollo, pp. 273-275.
[20] Memorandum for the Respondents, p. 29, rollo, p. 377.
[21] Rollo, pp. 193-197.
[22] Ibid., pp. 136-138.
[23] Rollo, p. 140.
[24] Effective on June 11, 1978.
[25] Art. 7, Civil Code.
[26] Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727, 743-744, June 28, 1996.
[27] National Food
Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 470, 481, February 9, 1996, per
Puno, J.; citing Danville Maritime, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit, 175
SCRA 701, July 28, 1989 and Malaga vs. Penachos, 213 SCRA 516, September
3, 1992.
[28] Rollo, pp. 183-184.
[29] NEDA Board Resolution No. 1 (s. 1995), p. 1; rollo, p. 63.
[30] Supra.
[31] Ibid., p. 649.
[32] Private Respondent’s Amended Complaint, pp. 33-35; rollo, pp. 114-116.
[33] Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.33
[34] China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 327, 343, December 5, 1996, per Francisco, J.
[35] Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 39-44; rollo, pp. 437-442.
[36] Rollo, pp. 134-135.
[37] Rollo, p. 135.
[38] Ibid., pp. 53-55.
[39] Ibid., p. 54.
[40] See also Pineda, Ernesto L., Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 376, 1994 ed.
[41] Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 43; rollo, p. 441.
[42] Bautista vs. Rebueno, 81 SCRA 535, 538, February 22, 1978, per Fernando, J.
[43] Supra.
[44] See Memorandum for the Respondents, pp. 33-38; rollo, pp. 381-386.
[45] De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 166, 172, June 19, 1995.
[46] Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 45.
[47] Comment, pp. 33-34; rollo, pp. 179-180.
[48] Rollo, pp. 330-341.
[49] Supra.
[50] RTC Order dated February 22, 1996, p. 2; rollo, p. 48.
[51] 196 SCRA 665, 672-273, May 6, 1991, per Cruz, J.