LEONCIO AND ENRIQUETA, BOTH SURNAMED BARRERA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ROSENDO C. PALABASAN, RESPONDENTS.
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Barrera versus Court of Appeals
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari brought by the spouses Leoncio and Enriqueta Barrera against Rosendo Palabasan, asking the Supreme Court to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Barreras sued for reconveyance with damages, claiming that a house and lot in Bangkal, Makati was wrongfully registered in Palabasan's name. The case matters because it gathers in one decision three rules a Bar candidate must hold firmly: the requisites of an action for reconveyance based on fraud, the limited life of a judgment that is not executed within five years, and the reason Article 1544 of the Civil Code on double sale does not apply where only one sale was ever consummated.
Procedural History
The spouses Barrera filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment declaring that Palabasan had validly acquired title to the property, treating the case as one of double sale of an immovable and applying the second paragraph of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. The spouses Barrera appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court in full. The appellate court, however, disagreed with the trial court's theory: it found Article 1544 inapplicable because there was no sale between Salome and the spouses Barrera. The Barreras moved for reconsideration, and the Court of Appeals denied the motion. The spouses Barrera then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, and the Court gave due course to the petition.
Facts
Azalia Salome owned a house and lot in Bangkal, Makati, covered by a transfer certificate of title, and she mortgaged the property to Country Bankers Insurance and Surety Company to secure a loan. On July 1, 1966, she sold the property to Rosendo Palabasan. The old title was cancelled and a new title was issued in the names of Rosendo Palabasan and Bella Palabasan.
In April 1989, the spouses Barrera sued Palabasan for reconveyance with damages. They alleged that they had possessed the property since 1962 under a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage that was never notarized; that Salome executed a notarized deed of sale with assumption of mortgage in their favor on March 31, 1966; that they settled Salome's obligations with the bank; that they tried to redeem the property but could not, because Palabasan had redeemed it and the title was released to him; that in 1970 they signed a blank document meant to be Palabasan's authority to sell the land for them; and that in 1975 they were surprised to learn that the blank document had become a contract of lease making them lessees and Palabasan the lessor.
Palabasan answered that he bought the property from Salome on June 30, 1966, after paying her obligation with the bank; that the deed of sale was registered and a new title issued in his name; that the Barreras were in possession as Salome's lessees; and that a contract of lease was executed between him and the Barreras in 1970. He claimed the Barreras had no right to reconveyance.
Issues
- Whether or not respondent Palabasan is the owner of the property in question.
- Whether or not there was a double sale of an immovable property that would call for the application of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Applicable Provisions
Article 1544 of the Civil Code, on double sale, provides:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The Court held this provision inapplicable, because a double sale presupposes two valid sales of the same thing, and here only one sale was ever consummated.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, on the period to enforce a judgment, provides:
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.
This provision fixes the outer limit of ten years within which a judgment may be enforced by independent action after the five-year period for execution by motion has lapsed.
Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
The Court used this rule to hold that the earlier judgment finding Palabasan the lawful owner had become stale and could not be invoked in this case.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that Palabasan is the owner of the property. An action for reconveyance is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the decree, so long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does not reopen the registration proceedings; it only seeks to show that the person who secured registration is not the real owner. Fraud may be a ground for reconveyance, but the party seeking it must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. Mere allegations of fraud are not enough; intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right must be specifically alleged and proved, and the burden of proof rests on the petitioners. The Barreras offered no proof of misrepresentation or concealment in the registration, and against the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, their claim that the title was tainted with fraud must fail.
Weighing the evidence, the Court found Palabasan's proof far stronger: the certificate of title, the tax declaration, the deed of absolute sale dated June 30, 1966, the contract of lease naming him as lessor and Leoncio Barrera as lessee, and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pasig finding him the lawful owner. The Barreras had only the unnotarized 1962 deed, the March 31, 1966 deed, and the testimonies of Cenon Mateo and Leoncio Barrera. Salome's testimony in the earlier ejectment case was stricken from the record because she died before cross-examination, and the trial court sustained the objection to its offer. The Court also held that the Pasig judgment could not be invoked because it had become stale, and it quoted the rule:
The reason is that after the lapse of the five-year period, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which judgment must be enforced, as all other ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in the regular form. Such action must be filed within ten (10) years from the date the judgment became final.
The Court added that a certificate of title is absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership in favor of the person whose name appears therein, binding and conclusive upon the whole world.
On the second issue, the Court held that there was no double sale. There was insufficient proof of any sale between Salome and the Barreras. The March 31, 1966 deed conditioned the sale on the Barreras' payment of Salome's obligation with the bank, and they submitted no evidence of compliance beyond Leoncio Barrera's self-serving testimony. There being no consummation of that contract, no ownership passed to them. The 1962 transaction likewise never materialized, as their own counsel admitted. The only sale that materialized was Salome's sale to Palabasan, which enabled him to redeem the property and secure the title in his name.
Doctrine
- An action for reconveyance is the remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name, available after one year from the decree provided the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value; it does not reopen the registration but only shows that the registered owner is not the real owner.
- Fraud as a ground for reconveyance must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, both of the claimant's title and of the fact of fraud; mere allegations will not do, and the burden rests on the plaintiff.
- A certificate of title is absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership in favor of the person named therein, binding and conclusive upon the whole world.
- A judgment may be executed by motion within five years from its entry; thereafter it is reduced to a mere right of action that must be enforced by ordinary civil action within ten years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, and if not so enforced, the action prescribes.
- Article 1544 of the Civil Code applies only where the same thing has been validly sold to different vendees; where only one sale was consummated, there is no double sale and the provision does not apply.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with no pronouncement as to costs.
Remember This
Memorize this line: no double sale, no Article 1544 — a second sale that was never consummated because its condition was unproven cannot defeat a registered title. Examiners use this case to test reconveyance based on fraud, the five-year and ten-year rules on enforcing judgments, and the requisites of double sale under Article 1544.