SISENANDO PALARCA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CATALINO BAGUISI ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. The suit was filed against certain defendants
alleged to be unlawfully in possession of a part of the property claimed by
plaintiff. Affidavits were filed here, after the case was submitted, for the
purpose of showing that the value of the property in dispute is in excess of
P10,000.

The record of this case is in such a condition that we are unable to render a
final judgment, but are compelled to return it to the trial court for further
action.

Plaintiff contends, and the record shows, that the decision in this case was
rendered by a judge who did not hear the evidence, and that at the time the
decision was rendered no transcription had been made of the stenographic notes
of the testimony of several important witnesses. Under these circumstances, it
is evident that the trial judge was not in a position to make complete findings.
While this court has held that it is not necessary that cases should be decided
by the judge before whom the evidence was taken, if he ceases for any reason to
exercise judicial authority in the particular court in which the case was tried
before rendering his decision, and must be decided by the successor of auch
judge, it is obviously necessary that the judge by whom the decision is rendered
shall have either heard the witnesses or read the transcript of the stenographic
record of their testimony. When the trial judge neither hears the witnesses nor
reads their testimony, his findings and conclusions based upon an examination of
only a part of the record cannot be accepted as a proper disposition of the
case. Nor can this defect be remedied by the inclusion of the missing evidence
in the record brought before this court on appeal. We exercise
appellate jurisdiction only over cases tried in the Court of First
Instance. To require us to examine evidence which has not been heard or even
read by the trial judge, is to require us to do something which the law does not
authorize. We must, therefore, return the case to the trial court, in order that
complete and specific findings may be made there upon all the issues of fact
raised by the pleadings, and that upon such findings the court below may render
judgment in accordance with its opinion as to the law applicable to the case. It
will not be necessary, of course,, to retake the evidence.

In cases of this nature, in which an action in ejectment is brought against
several defendants, each claiming individually the ownership of a certain tract
of land apparently embraced within the area of the larger tract claimed by
plaintiff, the trial court should make specific findings upon the evidence, with
respect to the property claimed by each defendant, should determine whether or
not it is included within the boundaries of the tract claimed by plaintiff, and
if the defense of prescription is interposed, the length of time which in the
opinion of the court the evidence shows that each of the defendants and their
predecessors in interest have been in possession of the land, and the facts
tending to show the character of that possession, as being adverse or not.

While it is not strictly necessary for us to say anything more in disposing
of this appeal, we have deemed it advisable, following the practice adopted in
other similar cases, to indicate our opinion upon a matter of fundamental
importance in this litigation. The action being in ejectment, it is incumbent
upon the plaintiff to show title in himself to the land in question—he cannot
rely upon the weakness of the title of the defendants. From an examination of
the documents upon which plaintiff relies, if appears that he contends that the
original owner of the land in dispute transmitted his title to the persons named
as grantors in the deed of April 15, 1911 (Exhibit B), who in turn conveyed it
to plaintiff. It appears, however, from an examination of the deed of April 15,
1911, that several of the persons purporting to have joined in the conveyance,
to plaintiff were minors. There is nothing to show that any judicial
authorization was obtained by the sale of the interests of these minors. As to
some of them, it appears that an attempt has been made to transfer their
interests by having their grandmother sign “for myself and my grandchildren.” As
to others a similar attempt to convey their interests was made by their mother.
As to the interests of these minors, if any, in the land in question, such a
conveyance is absolutely void. If those minors had any interest in the land in
question at the time the deed of April 15, 1911, was executed, they still retain
those interests. At best, therefore, this deed could have produced only a
community property between plaintiff, as successor to the interests of the
adults, who signed the deed, and the minors. The plaintiff, so far as the record
shows, is not, as he asserts, the sole owner of the land—leaving out of
consideration for the time being the question as to whether any part of it
belongs to defendants—but merely a cob’wner with the minors, who appear by the
terms of the deed of April 15, 1911, to have been the owners at that time of an
undivided interest in the property. We hold that a coowner cannot maintain an
action in ejectment without joining all other persons interested. Section 114 of
the Code of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest, and that any person who has an interest in
this subject matter and who is a necessary party to a complete determination of
the questions involved, should be made a party to the proceeding. The same
article provides, in its last paragraph, that if any person having an interest
in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, refuses to
join as plaintiff with those having a like interest, he may be made a defendant,
the fact of his interest and refusal to join being stated in the complaint. Were
the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be maintained by a person owning
merely an undivided interest in any given tract of land, a judgment in favor of
the defendant would not be conclusive as against the other coowners not parties
to the suit, and thus the defendant in possession of the property might be
harassed by as many succeeding actions of ejectment, as there might be coowners
of the title asserted against him. The evident purpose of section 114 is to
prevent the multiplicity of suits by requiring the person asserting a right
against the defendant to include with him, either as coplaintiffs or as
codefendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that the whole
matter in dispute may be determined pnce and for all in one litigation.

We desire to call the attention of counsel, furthermore, to the very
unsatisfactory condition of the briefs filed in this case. It is the duty of the
attorney to aid the court by making specific reference to those parts of the
record upon which they rely for support in their contentions regarding the
facts. (Rules of the Supreme Court, article 19.) Unless this is done, it is not
incumbent upon us to explore the record for the purpose of discovering evidence
upon which to reverse the findings of the trial judge, merely because the
appellant made a motion for the new trial, and excepted to its denial. The
presumption is that the findings of the trial court are correct and the burden
rests upon the appellant to state explicitly wherein the court is believed to
have erred and to designate specifically, by reference to the page of the
record, all the evidence upon which he relies to demonstrate his contention. The
statute does not impose upon us the absolute duty of reviewing the evidence in
civil cases coming before us by bill of exceptions when a motion for a new trial
upon the statutory grounds has been made and denied, but merely provides we
may do so. (Code of Civil Procedure, Section 497, paragraph 2.) The
pressure of work upon this court is so great that we cannot, in justice to other
litigants, undertake to make an examination of the voluminous transcript of the
testimony, unless the attorneys who desire us to make such examination have
themselves taken the trouble to read the record and brief it in accordance with
our rules.

The judgment of the court below is set aside, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. No costs will be allowed on
this appeal. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, Street and
Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Malcolm, J., concurs in the result.