PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO GASTADOR Y WAGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Gastador

The Case

People versus Gastador is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines, as plaintiff, prosecuted Antonio Gastador y Wagas for the crime of rape committed against Crisanta Balonzo-de Rosas. The accused was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and he asked the Supreme Court to reverse that conviction. The case matters to a reviewee because it gathers in one decision the settled rules on credibility of the offended party in rape, on the sufficiency of force and intimidation, on the irrelevance of the absence of spermatozoa or external marks of violence, on rape committed in a place where other people are present, and on the civil awards that follow a conviction.

Procedural History

On the first of May 1994, the complainant filed a complaint for rape before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and upon the certification of the Assistant City Prosecutor the complaint was treated as the Information. When arraigned on the first of June 1994, with the assistance of counsel de parte, the accused pleaded not guilty, and trial proceeded in due course. On the twenty-ninth of January 1996, Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties imposed by law, and declining to award damages because no evidence had been presented to prove them. The accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which decided the case in April 1999.

Facts

The complainant lived at Esteve Extension, Commonwealth, Quezon City, with her common-law husband Marlito Derosas and their one and a half month old daughter. The accused is an uncle of Marlito. On the first of May 1994, at about one o'clock in the afternoon, the accused arrived at the house looking for Marlito, and upon learning that Marlito had gone to work in Bicutan, he entered, left the shellfish he was carrying on the kitchen table, and later returned with a bottle of liquor, which he drank until about six o'clock in the evening. The complainant, who had gone out with her baby, returned at about six o'clock. As she was about to lay her baby on the bed, the accused suddenly approached her, pointed a knife at her neck, and told her that she was only a woman and that her husband was not there, so he could do as he pleased with her. She fought back, but he punched her in the stomach, causing her to lose consciousness and her baby to slip from her arms onto the bed.

When she regained consciousness, she and the accused were naked, with him on top of her doing the push and pull movement while still pointing the knife at her neck. She felt blood oozing from her vagina, and she bled profusely and continued to bleed for three more days. She kept silent throughout because she feared for her life and her baby's life. After satisfying his lust, the accused warned her not to tell her husband, otherwise he would kill her and her family.

Marlito arrived from work at about seven o'clock in the evening and saw the accused in the house, but he was not surprised because the accused was a relative who had visited them before. The complainant did not reveal what happened, but Marlito noticed her swollen eyes and the bloodstains on her short pants and on their bedsheet. She told him she was having her menstruation, which puzzled him because she had just given birth. The accused slept in the house that night, and during his slumber Marlito heard him utter words urging Cris to give in, three times, while making a pumping motion. The next morning the accused left, and it was then that the complainant told Marlito about the rape. Marlito borrowed money from their landlord, who accompanied them to the barangay chairman, who referred them to the police station, where the complainant executed her sworn statement. She was examined by a medico-legal officer on the third of May 1994, and the findings were that she was in a non-virgin state physically, that there were no external signs of recent application of any form of violence, and that the smears were negative for spermatozoa. The accused was later arrested at his workplace in Pasig. For his part, the accused denied the charge and claimed that on the day in question he was at his workplace in Pasig until three o'clock in the afternoon, that he went home at six o'clock in the evening, ate, conversed with his son and his nephew, and slept, and that he was arrested the following day and mauled by policemen.

Issues

• Whether or not the decision of the trial court is valid, considering that it quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum.
• Whether or not the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly that of the complainant, are credible.
• Whether or not the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, including the elements of carnal knowledge and of force and intimidation.
• Whether or not the accused may still raise, on appeal, the objections of warrantless arrest and lack of preliminary investigation.

Applicable Provisions

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 7659, defines rape and fixes its penalty, and the trial court used it to hold that the use of a deadly weapon raised the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

This provision supplies the elements the Court tested against the evidence, namely carnal knowledge accomplished by force or intimidation.

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code governs the application of penalties consisting of two indivisible penalties, and the trial court applied it to impose the lesser penalty because there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: 1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. 2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

This provision explains why the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua rather than death.

Section 14, paragraph 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires that decisions state the facts and the law on which they rest, and the Court used it to test the validity of the trial court's decision:

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

This provision answers the defense argument that the decision was invalid because it quoted the prosecution's memorandum.

Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court likewise prescribes the form of a judgment, and the Court cited it together with the constitutional provision:

Section 2. Form and contents of judgment. The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

This provision confirms that a decision must be the judge's own, which the Court found the assailed decision to be.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the assailed decision sufficiently complies with the Constitution and the Rules of Court. The trial court did quote the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum, but it made its own findings, and after assessing the evidence it agreed with the prosecution's evaluation. That is sufficient compliance, and in any event the conclusions of the trial court are supported by the evidence on record.

On the second issue, the Court held that the lower court's assessment of credibility will not be disturbed on appeal unless some fact or circumstance of substance has been overlooked. The complainant's testimony was clear, consistent, and straightforward, and she broke into sobs as she narrated her ordeal. The Court reasoned that no woman in her right mind would cry rape, allow an examination of her private parts, or subject herself and her family to the humiliation of a prosecution unless her story were true, and that her credible and positive testimony prevails over the negative assertion of the accused. The defense arguments on the medical findings failed. The absence of spermatozoa does not negate rape, because the felony is consummated when the penis touches the pudendum, however slightly, and ejaculation is not an element of the crime. Neither does the absence of external marks of violence disprove the claim, because no mark of violence may be detected if the blow is delivered to the abdomen. On the place of the crime, the Court held that lust is no respecter of time and place, and that rape can be committed even inside a house where there are other occupants. The knife, the blood-stained panty, the shorts, and the blanket were not essential, because the victim's credible testimony, standing alone, is sufficient basis for conviction. On the objections of warrantless arrest and lack of preliminary investigation, the Court held that these should have been raised before the accused entered his plea, and having failed to do so at the proper time, he is deemed to have waived them.

On the third issue, the Court held that the prosecution proved carnal knowledge and the use of force and intimidation. Force and intimidation are viewed from the perception or judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the felony, and the amount of force that warrants conviction is that which is sufficient to bring about the desired result. The complainant's testimony established that the accused pointed a knife at her neck, that she fought him, that he punched her stomach causing her to lose consciousness, and that he warned her not to tell her husband on pain of killing her family.

On the damages, the Court awarded indemnity ex delicto of 50,000 pesos without need of proof other than the conviction, and moral damages of 50,000 pesos, since the prosecution proved that the victim lost weight, became sickly, and suffered sleepless nights.

Doctrine

A conviction for rape may rest solely on the credible testimony of the offended party, because eyewitnesses to rape are seldom available, and the absence of spermatozoa or of external marks of violence does not negate the crime. Rape is consummated upon the slightest penetration of the pudendum, and ejaculation is not an element. Force and intimidation under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are judged from the perception of the victim at the time of the commission of the felony, and the force required is only that sufficient to bring about the desired result. Rape may be committed even in a house where other occupants are present, because lust is no respecter of time and place. The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight on appeal absent a substantial circumstance overlooked. Objections to a warrantless arrest and to the lack of preliminary investigation must be raised before the plea, and are otherwise waived. Finally, conviction for rape carries indemnity ex delicto of 50,000 pesos and moral damages of 50,000 pesos.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Antonio Gastador y Wagas with modification, ordering him to pay the victim 50,000 pesos as indemnity ex delicto and an additional 50,000 pesos as moral damages, with costs against him.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the victim's credible testimony, standing alone, is sufficient basis for conviction, and that the absence of spermatozoa or of external marks of violence does not negate rape. Examiners like to use this case on the credibility of the offended party, on force and intimidation viewed from the victim's perception, and on the awards of indemnity and moral damages.