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MANOTOK REALTY, INC. AND MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 123346. March 31, 2009 March 31, 2009

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Manotok Realty versus CLT Realty Development

The Case

This is a consolidated petition for review arising from a long-running contest over parcels of land in the Maysilo Estate in Caloocan City. On one side are Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation, who hold a cluster of transfer certificates of title traced to Original Certificate of Title Number 994 dated 3 May 1917. On the other side is CLT Realty Development Corporation, which claims Lot 26 of the same estate through a chain running back to Jose B. Dimson and ultimately to an Original Certificate of Title Number 994 dated 19 April 1917. The case matters because the Supreme Court, after twice affirming the Dimson and CLT titles, reversed itself, declared the 19 April 1917 mother title inexistent, and remanded the dispute to a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to determine, on the evidence, whose titles can genuinely be traced to the one authentic mother title.

Procedural History

CLT filed a complaint for annulment of transfer certificates of title, recovery of possession, and damages against the Manotoks and the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court created a commission of three commissioners to resolve the conflict of titles. Two commissioners submitted a Majority Report finding technical infirmities on the face of the titles from which the Manotoks derived their own; one commissioner submitted a Minority Report. Adopting the Majority Report, the trial court ruled for CLT and ordered the cancellation of the Manotok titles. The Manotoks appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, deleting only the award of damages, and denied reconsideration. The Manotoks then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. The Court, in its 2005 Decision, affirmed the courts below and upheld the CLT and Dimson titles, relying on the factual findings of the trial courts and on the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

The Manotoks and Araneta moved for reconsideration. In its 2007 Resolution, the Court reversed and nullified its 2005 Decision, invalidated the Original Certificate of Title Number 994 dated 19 April 1917, and remanded the cases to a Special Division of the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence. The Special Division conducted hearings, received the evidence of CLT, the Manotoks, the Heirs of Dimson, and Araneta, and submitted a sealed seventy-page Report. The Manotoks moved to be furnished copies of the Report so they could comment and object under Rule 32. The Court denied that motion and proceeded to act on the Report, which is now the basis of this final disposition.

Facts

The Maysilo Estate was originally registered under Original Certificate of Title Number 994. The record shows that the mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, although it resulted from a decree of registration issued on 19 April 1917. Two dates thus came to be associated with one title, and rival claimants built their chains of title on different dates.

Jose Dimson obtained an order in 1977 from Judge Marcelino Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, which itself was sourced from a 1966 order of Judge Cecilia Muñoz-Palma of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On the strength of these orders, Dimson registered in his name several portions of the Maysilo Estate, including a fifty-hectare property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number 15169, which overlapped land held by Araneta under its own titles. Dimson's titles all reflected, as mother title, Original Certificate of Title Number 994 dated 19 April 1917. Another portion in Dimson's name was sold to Estelita Hipolito, who in turn sold it to CLT, which registered it under Transfer Certificate of Title Number T-177013, likewise tracing to the 19 April 1917 title. That property encroached on land covered by Manotok titles.

The Manotoks, for their part, traced their titles to Transfer Certificate of Title Numbers 4210 and 4211, both issued in 1918, both reflecting Original Certificate of Title Number 994 dated 3 May 1917. Their chain ran through Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio, then to Francisco Gonzales and his heirs, then through expropriation by the Republic, subdivision by the National Housing Authority into seventy-seven lots, and eventual sale of twenty of those lots to the two Manotok corporations. Araneta, meanwhile, held titles also traced to the 3 May 1917 mother title and remained in possession of the land it claimed.

Issues

  • Whether or not the contending parties were able to trace their claims of title to Original Certificate of Title Number 994 dated 3 May 1917.
  • Whether or not the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence, and if so, whether such flaws are sufficient to defeat their claims.
  • Whether or not the factual and legal bases of the 1966 Order of Judge Muñoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid, and if so, whether these orders establish a superior right in favor of the Dimsons and CLT.
  • Whether or not any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings since the issuance of Original Certificate of Title Number 994 on 3 May 1917, and whether any party can trace its title to the title acquired by the Government through expropriation.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, on referral to a commissioner, provides:

Referral to a commissioner may be made by written consent of both parties.

The Court noted that its remand to the Court of Appeals was not strictly under this Rule, since no consent of the parties was secured, yet the referral remained proper under the Court's own power to adopt suitable modes of proceeding.

Section 6 of Rule 135, on the inherent power of the court, provides:

A court may adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which appears conformable to the spirit of the Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary processes and other means necessary to carry its jurisdiction into effect.

This is the provision the Court invoked to justify the remand and the Special Division procedure despite the absence of the parties' consent required by Rule 32.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Special Division was correct in finding that the Heirs of Dimson and CLT failed to discharge their burden. Both had anchored their claims on Original Certificate of Title Number 994 dated 19 April 1917, which the Court had already declared inexistent. They were given the opportunity to prove their titles on other evidence, but they did not succeed. The Manotoks, by contrast, traced their titles to Transfer Certificate of Title Numbers 4210 and 4211 issued in 1918, both reflecting the authentic mother title dated 3 May 1917.

On the second issue, the Court sustained the Special Division's evaluation of the evidence. The flaws imputed to the Manotok and Araneta titles in the 2005 Decision were not borne out by the evidence, and in any event were not sufficient to defeat claims traced to the genuine mother title.

On the third issue, the Court held that the 1966 Order of Judge Muñoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo did not establish a superior right in favor of the Dimsons and CLT, because those orders rested on the inexistent 19 April 1917 title.

On the fourth issue, the Court found that portions of the subject properties had indeed been expropriated by the Republic, subdivided by the National Housing Authority, and sold to qualified vendees, from whom the Manotoks purchased their lots. The Manotok titles could therefore be traced to the title acquired by the Government through expropriation.

The Court also denied the Manotoks' motion for copies of the sealed Report, holding that furnishing it would serve no useful purpose and would only delay adjudication, and that the present Resolution quotes extensively from the Report and discusses its other substantive segments.

Doctrine

First, there is only one Original Certificate of Title Number 994. That mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that date is the date of registration. The decree of registration issued on 19 April 1917 may be acknowledged, but that date cannot be considered the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.

Second, any title that traces its source to Original Certificate of Title Number 994 dated 19 April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. A certificate of title that refers to an inexistent mother title is itself doubtful, and that error alone is sufficient to invalidate a claim resting singularly on the dates appearing on the title.

Third, a party claiming under an inexistent mother title bears the burden of proving, by other evidence, that there was merely an error in transcription or registration, or that other factual and legal bases validate the title. Failure to discharge that burden defeats the claim.

Fourth, the Court may, under its inherent power, adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding conformable to the spirit of the Rules, including a remand to a Special Division of the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence, even without the written consent of both parties required by Rule 32.

Disposition

The Court ruled in favor of the Manotoks, upholding their titles traced to the authentic Original Certificate of Title Number 994 dated 3 May 1917, and denied the motion for copies of the sealed Report.

Remember This

Memorize this line: there is only one Original Certificate of Title Number 994, registered on 3 May 1917, and any title tracing to the inexistent 19 April 1917 mother title is void. Examiners use this case to test the rule on inexistent mother titles, the burden of proving the validity of a derivative title, and the Court's inherent power to remand for reception of evidence even without the parties' consent.