G.R. No. 12330. January 25, 1917
YNCHAUSTI & CO., PETITIONER, VS. JOHN S. STANLEY, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, RESPONDENT.
MORELAND, J.:
Procedure requiring, on proper representation, the interference of the
court when any person, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, was without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such
person to intervene and prohibit further action by such person.
The allegations of the complaint are to the effect that the Insular
Collector of Customs has ordered that the coast wise vessels of the
plaintiff company shall carry, as one of the officers on each vessel, a
third mate, whereas the law of the Philippine Islands requires as
officers of such vessel only one master, one first mate and one second
mate. The complaint charges that the requirement by the Insular
Collector of Customs of a third mate is in violation of law, is in
excess of his power and authority, and is an unlawful invasion of the
rights of the plaintiff.
The question to be determined arises from an alleged conflict of
statutes. Act No. 2614, passed on the 4th day of February, 1916,
amended section 19 of Act No. 2507 by substitution, substantially, in
its place of a new article which specifically determines the number of
watch and engine-room officers to be carried on Philippine vessels.
This section [10] of Act No. 2614, so far as material to this
litigation, is as follows:
“Sec. 19. Every vessel registered in the Philippine Islands shall have the following officers:
* * * * * * *
“(b) Every steam vessel of five hundred gross tons, but
less than fifteen hundred, shall have the following officers: One
master, one first mate, and one second mate.”
On the 24th of February, 1916, the Legislature passed Act No. 2657,
known as the Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands, paragraph
(e) of section 1312 of which reads as follows:
“The general duties, powers, and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs shall include:
* * * * * * *
“(e) The fixing of the number and classes of marine
officers to be carried on Philippine vessels and the licensing of such
officers; * * *”
It is contended by the defendant that the section of the
Administrative Code quoted repeals all prior laws on the subject and
gives to the Insular Collector of Customs the right to determine, in
accordance with the dictates of his judgment and discretion, the number
and class of officers which Philippine vessels shall carry.
The plaintiff contends on the other hand that the section of the
Administrative Code referred to does not repeal the provision of Act
No. 2614, amending Act No. 2507, or Act No. 2507, for the reason that,
apart from the fact that said Acts are not specifically repealed by the
Administrative Code, they are specific and go into detail with regard
to the management of Philippine vessels while engaged in Philippine
trade, whereas the section of the Administrative Code is general in its
terms and does nothing more than confer the authority the exercise of
which is controlled in detail by the Acts.
We are inclined to take the view of the plaintiff in this matter. In
the first place, there is no express repeal of Act No. 2614 or Act No.
2507. The Administrative Code contains the following provision: “The
Acts and parts of Acts enumerated in the following schedule are hereby
repealed.:” Then follows a long list of the Acts which the
Administrative Code repeals in their entirety. Following this list is
another of “Acts repealed in part.” In neither of these lists do we
find Act No. 2614 or Act No. 2507. Immediately succeeding the list of
Acts repealed in part is found a “Table of Sources and References.”
This table gives the sources from which the various sections of the
Administrative Code were derived. Among these Acts Nos. 2614 and 2507
are not found. It, therefore, appears that there was no specific intention to repeal either of those Acts.
In the second place, it is to be noted that there is no general
clause in the Administrative Code, such as is usually found in
statutes, which repeals all Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent
therewith.
In the third place, Act No. 2614, as we have seen, was passed on the
4th day of February, 1916, while the Administrative Code was passed on
the 24th of the same month—less than three weeks after the passage of
Act No. 2614. It would not seem that the Legislature, having passed an
Act of great importance, of wide extent and effect, minute in detail,
which was intended to cover and did cover to the last degree the care
and handling of the vessels navigating the waters of the Philippine
Islands, could have intended to repeal that Act within less than three
weeks after its passage and substitute in its place absolutely nothing
except the uncontrolled judgment of the Insular Collector of Customs.
It being clear that the Legislature did not expressly repeal Act No.
2614, and did not, accordingly, have a definite and fixed purpose to do
so, that Act will be considered repealed only in case there is such a
conflict between it and section 1312 (e) of the Administrative Code that they can- not stand together.
We are of the opinion that there is no necessary
conflict between them. The Administrative Code grants general authority
to the Insular Collector of Customs; while Act No. 2614 specifies in
detail the manner in which that general authority shall be exercised
and the subject-matter to which it shall be directed. There is no necessary
conflict between a statute which confers authority and another which
specifies how that authority shall be exercised and on what occasion.
But it is contended that there is a necessary conflict between a
statute authorizing a particular official to fix “the number and classes of marine officers to be carried on Philippine vessels” and one which itself
fixes the number and classes of marine officers to be carried on
Philippine vessels. The question is asked: Why give the Insular
Collector of Customs authority to fix the number if some prior statute
has already fixed it? And. it is urged that the power conferred by one
statute to fix the number is destroyed or rendered innocuous by another
statute which already fixes the number. The necessary result, it is
contended, is that there is a conflict between the two statutes. This
argument has force when the question is considered in one aspect only.
Even though Act No. 2614 fixed the number of marine officers to be
carried on Philippine vessels, there remained the necessity of
conferring upon some official the power to enforce compliance with the
Act. If no officer was empowered to see to the enforcement of the Act,
the initiative in complying therewith would be left entirely to the
owners of the vessels themselves. While there would have been a law on
the subject, compliance therewith would have been left, in the first
instance, to the owners of the vessels. It has always been considered
advisable, if not necessary to place the responsibility of requiring
compliance with statutes, such as Acts Nos. 2614 and 2507, upon some
governmental official whose duty it should be to make rules and
regulations adapted to securing compliance with them, to inspect and
determine whether there was compliance, and to take such steps as might
be necessary to secure compliance. It is precisely here that the
authority conferred upon the Insular Collector of Customs by the
Administrative Code operates. The authority conferred has more the
nature of administration than of creation; and was designed to be
exercised not before or in place of Acts Nos. 2507 and 2614, but after
those Acts became effective and under and in compliance with their
provisions. There would have been a real conflict if the prior statute
had conferred the authority to fix the number and class of officers to
be carried on vessels, say, on the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners,and the Administrative Code had. later conferred the same
authority on the Insular Collector of Customs. If authority is
conferred on an official to do a certain act, it is always understood
that he shall perform the act authorized in conformity with the law as
it stands when he performs it. Thus, where he is authorized to fix the
number and class of officers to be carried by one ship, he shall fix
them in accordance with law, if there is a law on the subject. If there
is no law, he shall use his judgment and discretion. If this is true,
Act No. 2614 and section 1312 (e) of the Administrative Code
can stand together, as the latter simply authorizes the Insular
Collector of Customs to fix the number and class of officers in
accordance with law. If neither one of the prior acts had ever been
passed, that necessity would, nevertheless, exist. The authority to fix
and the authority to fix in accordance with law are the same; and,
being the same, there can be no such conflict between them as would
result in the destruction of either.
Moreover, the authority to fix the number of officers to be carried
on ships is not necessarily authority to fix a given number or such
number as the official receiving the authority may consider the proper
number. It is simply authority to fix a reasonable number; and a
subsequent statute fixing the precise number would not be in conflict
with the prior statute conferring the general authority to fix the
number. The official would still have the authority to fix but he would
exercise that authority in accordance with the last statute.
Furthermore, in spite of Act No. 2614, the Insular Collector of
Customs has authority to fix the number and class of officers on
coast wise vessels in one sense at least. Under Act No. 2614 not all
vessels shall be provided with the same number and class of officers.
Under section 1312 (e) of the Administrative Code, the Insular
Collector of Customs has the authority and power to determine the number
and class of officers which a particular vessel will carry. It is his
duty to determine, in the first place, the character and tonnage of the
vessel; in the second place, the number and classes of officers which
the vessel shall carry; and, in the third place, to order the owner of
the vessel to comply with his determination. There must be some one to
determine the question of fact as to the kind and tonnage of the
vessel; and there must be some one who, after the number and classes
are determined, shall, upon the facts, fix the number and class of
officers and give notice thereof to the owner of the vessel.
Thus, in a real sense, the Insular Collector of Customs may exercise the authority conferred upon him by section 1312 (e)
of the Administrative Code without coming into conflict with the
provisions of Act No. 2614. We have no doubt that the Code Committee
knew of the existence of Act No. 2614 and of Act No. 2507 at the time
they presented the Administrative Code to the Legislature for its
consideration; and it is undoubtedly true that, if the Code Committee
had believed that there was a real repugnancy between those Acts and
any provision of the Administrative Code, the Committee would have
cured it. The same may be said of the Legislature. The fact that Act
No. 2614 was so fresh in the mind of the Legislature and was well known
to the Code Committee, is strong evidence of the belief of both that
there was no real conflict between them.
Act No. 2614 and the Administrative Code may, then, stand together
upon the theory that the Administrative Code simply appointed a given
official to carry out the provisions of Act No. 2614, the authority
conferred by the Administrative Code being simply the necessary
authorization of a particular official so to do.
And finally, subsequent Acts of the Legislature disclose
conclusively that it was not the understanding of that body that the
Administrative Code contained all of the administrative laws which were
thereafter to be considered in force in the Philippine Islands. The
Legislature on the 27th of March, a month after the enactment of the
Administrative Code, passed Act No. 2662 which expressly extends the
provision of Act No. 2614 to non-Christian territory. It seems clear,
therefore, that on the 27th of March, the Legislature was of the
opinion that Act No. 2614 was still in force in its entirety.
There are other laws which deal more or less with administrative
affairs which are considered by common consent as still in force
notwithstanding the passage of the Administrative Code. Among them are
the Act creating the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, the Sugar
Central Board, the Blue-sky laws, the Public Land Act, the Irrigation
Acts, and others.
It being admitted that the finding of the Insular Collector of
Customs as to the tonnage and other circumstances of the vessel dealt
with in this case is correct, the Collector had no authority to order
placed on the vessel more or a different class of officers than the
statute provides for.
The demurrer is overruled and the
defendant given leave to answer within five days from the service of
notice of the entry of this order. If an answer is not filed within
that time the plaintiff will, on application, be entitled to a judgment
for the relief demanded in the complaint. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Araullo, JJ., concur.