G.R. No. 123048. August 08, 2000
YOLANDA FLORALDE, NIDA VELASCO AND NORMELITA ALAMBRA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND PAULINO W. RESMA, RESPONDENTS.
PARDO, J.:
dismissing respondent Paulino W. Resma from the service as Division
Chief of Specialist Services Division (SSD) and Officer-In-Charge of
Agricultural Training Institute (ATI), Department of Agriculture.
On April 23, 1994, petitioners employees of the ATI charged
respondent Paulino W. Resma with grave misconduct in office (sexual
harassment) in three separate complaints filed directly with the Civil
Service Commission.
On August 30, 1994, the Commission gave due course to the
complaints and formally charged respondent with grave misconduct
requiring him to submit his answer with the affidavits of his witnesses,
and placed him under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days
effective upon notice.
On September 9, 1994, respondent filed his answer to the
complaints. He specifically denied all the accusations against him and
asked for the dismissal of the complaints.
On September 20, 1994, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation of the case.
At the hearing, petitioners affirmed the contents of their
affidavits and gave the specific dates during which the sexual
harassment took place. Petitioners categorically narrated the various
incidents of sexual harassment, and they were subjected to extensive
cross-examination. On the other hand, five witnesses testified for the
respondent including himself. In essence, they testified that the sexual
harassment could not have occurred.
On February 17, 1995, the Commission convinced that the
complainants had proven the guilt of the respondent with substantial
evidence, issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with
all its accessory penalties.[3]
On March 6, 1995, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that the Commission erred because the decision was not
supported by evidence.[4]
On April 18, 1995, the Commission denied the motion for reconsideration.[5]
On June 16, 1995, respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for review.[6]
After due hearing, on September 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision which REVERSED and SET ASIDE the resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission.
Hence, this appeal.[7]
The issue raised is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission on the ground
that the same were not supported by substantial evidence.
The sexual harassment charges against Resma were filed by three
(3) rank and file employees of the Agricultural Training Institute,
where respondent Paulino Resma is OIC. Being rank and file employees,
they were all reporting to their superior, Paulino Resma. Their time
records were signed by the latter. Sexual harassment in the workplace is
not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of sexual desire;
it is about power being exercised by a superior officer over his women
subordinates. The power emanates from the fact that the superior can
remove the subordinate from his workplace if the latter would refuse his
amorous advances.
This is the situation at bar. Yolanda Floralde, Nida Velasco and
Normelita Alambra were all rank and file employees reporting to
respondent Paulino Resma, and their Daily Time Records (DTRs) were
signed by him.
Respondent Resma alleged that the Civil Service Commission erred
in its resolutions since the petitioners were unable to prove his guilt
by the quantum of substantial evidence required in administrative
proceedings.
We do not agree. The evidence adduced before the Commission
consists of the positive testimonies of petitioners. On the other hand,
respondent claimed that it was impossible for him to be at the office on
the days that the sexual harassment occurred. In other words,
respondent presented an alibi.
Yolanda Floralde testified that it was around four in the
afternoon at the anteroom of the directors office that Paulino Resma
approached her and ask her “Ano yan, pagkatapos ako’y pinalapit sa
kanyang kinaroroonan x x x nanatili akong nakatayo ngunit maya-maya ay
bigla na lang siyang tumayo at dinakma ang puwit ko ng papisilpisil.”[8]
Floralde testified that this was not the only incident that
respondent sexually harassed her. Respondent would oftentimes tell her
that “nakakagigil ang batok mo, ” and “masuwerte ka type kita, yung iba may gusto sa akin di ko type.”[9]
Respondent would also pinch her at her side close to her bust and when
they met at the corridors respondent would make a motion as though he
would embrace her.
Nida Velasco on the other hand testified that in 1990 Paulino
Resma first made his sexual advances toward her. According to Velsaco “habang
binubuksan ko po ang pinto ng refrigerator sa Orosa Hall, bigla po niya
akong niyakap at hinawakan niya ang maselang parte ng aking dibdib at
bigla po akong hinalikan sa bibig. Binantaan po niya ako na kapag
nagsumbong ako ay hindi niya irerenew ang aking appointment dahil casual
lang po ako.” Nida further testified that respondent would often comment that “mamula-mula na ang iyong pag-aari at fresh na fresh ka pa” and that she would answer back “lolo ka na eh, gago ka pa. “[10]
At one time she was watching a volleyball game when she felt someone
touch her buttocks, when she looked back it was respondent Resma, and
the latter said “nakakagigil ka “[11]
Normelita Alhambra on her part testified that in 1990 at around
7:00 in the morning that after putting down her bag, respondent Resma
suddenly approached her and embraced her. She was able to escape from
his embrace. In other instances, Normelita testified that “tuwing
maglalagay ako ng tubig sa baso sa loob ng CR biglang sumusulpot si Mr.
Resma at dinadakma ang puwit ko at sinasabing gustong-gusto niya ang
malalaking puwit.”[12] Also at one time Normelita testified that “nakasuot
ako ng long sleeve na red at white maong pants galing ako sa CR ng
bigla akong binangga ni Mr. Resma at dinakma ang aking dibdib.[13]
Respondent’s defense is that the complaints were instigated by a
certain Atty. Ola, who was his rival for promotion. The defense alleged
that the three complaining petitioners were all convinced by Atty. Ola
to file charges against respondent Resma so that he would be out of
contention for promotion.
We are not convinced that all three women would prevaricate at
the mere urging of Atty. Ola. Filing a charge for sexual harassment is
not a trivial matter. It entails having to go public with an incident
that one is trying to forget. It means opening oneself to public
ridicule and scrutiny. We, therefore, can not believe the version of the
defense that the charges were all fabricated.
As to the issue of whether the resolution of the Civil Service
Commission is supported by substantial evidence, we find that, in fact,
preponderant evidence supported its findings.
“In determining where the preponderance or the superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the
facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts on which they are testifying, the nature of such facts, the
probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want
of interest, and also their personal credibility as far as the same may
legitimately appear at the trial. The Court may also consider the number
of witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greatest number.”[14] “By preponderance of evidence, is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.[15]
“The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence
which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.”[16]
Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission. “Well-settled is the rule
in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an administrative
agency must be respected, as long as such findings are supported by
substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or
preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to weigh once
more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in
respect of sufficiency of evidence.”[17]
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals. In lieu thereof, the Court REVIVES
and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dismissing
respondent Paulino W. Resma from office for grave misconduct. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, J., see separate opinion.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.
[1] In CA-G.R. SP No.
37480, promulgated September 22, 1995, Mabutas, Jr., J., ponente, Torres
and de la Rama, JJ., concurring, Petition, Annex “A”, Rollo, pp. 18-39.
[2] Resolution No.
95-0968, adopted on February 17, 1995, Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, Chairman,
Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr. and Thelma P. Gaminde, Commisioners, Petition,
Annex “D”, Rollo, pp. 46-51.
[3] Petition, Annex “D”, Rollo, pp. 46-51.
[4] Petition, Annex “E”, pp. 52-57.
[5] Petition, Annex “C”, pp. 41-45.
[6] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37480.
[7] Filed on January 2, 1996; Rollo, pp. 3-17. On September 28, 1999, we gave due course to the petition (Rollo, pp. 179-180)
[8] Record, Affidavit-Complaint, p. 509.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Record, Affidavit Complaint, p. 500.
[11] Record, Affidavit Complaint, p. 500.
[12] Record, Affidavit Complaint, p. 502.
[13] Record, Affidavit Complaint, pp. 501-502.
[14] Sapu-an vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 701, 706 (1992)
[15] Ibid.
[16] Jison vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 495, 532 (1998)
[17] Ynson vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 411, 423 (1996), citing Rubenecia vs. Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 640 (1995)
CONCURRING OPINION
MELO, J.:
I am compelled under the circumstances of this case to concur in
the result reached by the majority opinion. However, I would just like
to add some observations.
As gleaned from the records, on April 23, 1994, Yolanda Floralde,
Nida Velasco, and Normalita Alambre, employees of the Agricultural
Training Institute (ATI) charged private respondent Paulino Resma, who
was then the Officer-In-Charge of the ATI, with sexual harassment in
separate complaints filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In a
resolution dated February 17, 1995, the CSC found private respondent
Resma guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the
service. Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
private respondent Resma elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals,
which thereafter set aside and reversed the decision of the CSC.
Private complainants Floralde, Velasco, and Alambre then sought review
and reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals with this Court.
In Paredes v. Civil Service Commission (192 SCRA 84 [1990]),
we held that in CSC cases, the right to appeal is limited only to the
party adversely affected by the decision, that is, only the person or
the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension
for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office can appeal said decision. By inference or implication, when
the respondent is exonerated of the charge against him, there is no
occasion for appeal. In other words, in administrative disciplinary
cases, a judgment of exoneration is inappealable.
However, in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy (306 SCRA 425 [1999]) which incidentally is another ponencia of Mr. Justice Pardo, the majority, with undersigned ponente
dissenting, modified the above doctrine by allowing the CSC to appeal
in cases where the respondent is exonerated of the charges.
Nevertheless, in both cases, the Court did not deviate from the doctrine
that the complainant, being a mere witness for the government, cannot
appeal the decision rendered in the administrative case. In Paredes,
we declared that the complainant is not the party adversely affected by
the decision so that she has no legal personality to interpose an
appeal to the CSC. In an administrative case, the complainant is a mere
witness. No private interest is involved in an administrative case as
the offense is committed against the government.
In the same vein, in Dacoycoy, the Court, asking and
thereafter answering its own rhetorical question, said: “Who now may
appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court?
Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge.
Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government.”
In the instant case, when private respondent Resma was exonerated
by the Court of Appeals, it was not the CSC but the complainants who
filed an appeal. Having been filed by complainants, the petition should
therefore be denied, in line with the above-stated doctrine.
Unfortunately, the aforementioned doctrine cannot be applied in
the instant controversy because private respondent Resma failed to raise
it as an issue on appeal.
As I stated in my dissenting opinion in Dacoycoy:
Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent, the latter
failed to invoke the foregoing general rule. In a similar case, we held
that the party favored by such law who fails to interpose any objection
to an appeal may be deemed to have waive this right. The Court En
Banc, speaking through Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason in Mendoza vs. Civil Service Commission (233 SCRA 657 [1994]), held:xxx xxx xxx
When private respondent appealed the decision of the MSPB to the
CSC, petitioner never questioned the propriety of the appeal and
preferred to defend the correctness of the decision. Likewise,
petitioner failed to question before this Court the right of private
respondent to appeal from the decision of the MSPB. A law limiting the
right to appeal to the respondent in the administrative case is a rule
of procedure, not of substantive law. Failure to invoke timely a rule
of procedure in favor of a party constitutes a waiver thereof (Republic
vs. Judge Villanueva, G.R. No. 83333, February 13, 1989, En Banc, Minute
Resolution).
Having failed to question the complainants’ right to appeal, the petition may not now be dismissed on that ground.
I, therefore, join the majority opinion as stated in the dispositive portion thereof.