G.R. No. 12289. May 28, 1958
LIM SIOK HUEY, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. ALFREDO LAPIZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Court of First Instance of Laguna. The plaintiffs are Lim Siok Huey, Pua Yek
Ben, Pua Chok Ben, Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go Kuan, the first being the surviving
spouse and the last four the surviving children of Chua Pua Lun, represented by
their counsel, and the defendants are Alfredo Lapiz, Victorino Sapin, Vicente
Reyes and Lazaro Limjuco. The damages are claimed by reason of the death of Chua
Pua Lun as a result of a collision suffered by the jeepney in which be was a
passenger.
Defendant Alfredo Lapiz, the driver of the Jaguar jeepney, in answer to the
complaint, alleged that the vehicle driven by him was hit by the Kapalaran bus
which was driven by defendant Vicente Reyes due to the negligence of the latter,
thereby causing the death of Chua Pua Lun who was a passenger of the jeepney.
Defendant Victorino Sapin in turn alleged that he was not the owner of the
jeepney driven by Lapiz, while defendants Vicente Reyes and Lazaro Limjuco, the
first as driver and the second as owner of the bus, alleged that the collision
between the two vehicles was due to the negligence of Alfredo Lapiz.
Plaintiffs Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go Kuan, being minors, the court, upon motion
of their counsel, appointed Chua Pua Tarn, a brother of the deceased, as
guardian ad lit.em to represent them in this case.
After trial, the court rendered decision “dismissing the complaint, defendant
Lapiz’ cross-claim against defendants Reyes and Limjuco as well as the
counterclaim of these last two named defendants against the plaintiffs and their
cross-claim against defendants Lapiz and Sapin,” Plaintiffs appealed directly to
this Court in view of the amount involved.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court made the following
pronouncement:
“Notwithstanding the above conclusion, the Court is however, of the opinion
that the present action cannot be maintained not on the ground invoked by the
defendants but on the theory that the plaintiffs have not authorized anyone to
file the complaint against the defendants. While .an attorney representing a
client in a ease pending in Court is presumed to be authorized for the purpose,
nevertheless in the case under consideration, such presumption had been
destroyed and overcome by the very evidence presented by counsel himself. The
plaintiffs are all citizens and residents of Communist China and they have not
communicated with anyone in the Philippines in connection with the filing of an
action for damages in their behalf arising from the death of Chua Pau Lun. Chua
Pua Tarn, who is the brother-in-law of the first plaintiff and uncle of the
others, testified that the plaintiffs had not written to him nor had he
communicated with them. The letters supposedly sent te Lim Ping Kok by his
sister Lim Siok Huey (Exh. J) and his mother (Exh. K) did not contain any
intimation much less of an authorization for the filing of a claim for damages
in behalf of the widow and children of the deceased, Chua Pua Lun, against the
parties responsible for his death. Under this situation, the Court has no other
alternative but to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the evidence on
record does not show that the plaintiffs have authorized much less directed the
commencement of the present action.”
Appellants now contend that the trial court erred (1) in finding that
plaintiffs, being residents of Communist China, have not authorized anyone to
file the present case against the defendants; (2) in dismissing the complaint
when the authority to prosecute the case stems from the appointment of Chua Pua
Tarn as guardian ad litem of minors Pua Sam Ben and Pua Go Kuan; (3) in
dismissing the case when the same could be considered as prosecuted by a
negotiorum gestor and (4) in finding that there was no authority to file the
case when such question was not
raised in issue nor was evidence adduced on
the point.
With regard to the first question, we find no error in the findings made by
the trial court. Indeed, the same is supported by the record and the evidence.
Thus, it appears that the plaintiffs who are the widow and children of the
deceased Chua Pua Lun are all citizens and residents of Communist China and
notwithstanding the fact that they have been informed of the death of the
deceased, they have not sent any communication to anyone in the Philippines
giving authority to take whatever action may be proper to obtain an indemnity
for his death other than two letters supposedly sent to Lim Ping Kok by his
sister Lim Siok Huey and his mother, which do not contain any intimation nor
authorization for the filing of the present action. The most that they contain
was an inquiry with regard to the progress of the case and the administration of
the duck-raising business which the deceased left in the Philippines. Such
certainly cannot be considered as an authority to the present counsel to file
and prosecute the present case in behalf of the widow and children now residing
in Communist China.
It should be noted that the present action was initiated by plaintiffs
represented merely by their counsel and the question arose as to whether the
latter had the proper authority to represent the former in view of the fact that
they are all residents of a foreign country. And the question was properly
raised in view of the rule that, while a lawyer is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, he may however be
required by the court on motion of either party to produce his authority under
which he appears (Section 20, Rule 127). Undoubtedly, the question was properly
raised by counsel for the defendants as otherwise the trial court would not have
given proper attention to the matter. Indeed, on this point, the trial court
made this important comment: “While an attorney representing a client in a case
pending in Court is presumed to be authorized for the purpose, nevertheless in
the case under consideration, such presumption had been destroyed and come by
the very evidence presented by counsel himself.” (Italics supplied)
It is true that one Chua Pua Tain was appointed as guardian ad litem of two
of plaintiffs who allegedly are minors to represent them in the prosecution of
the present case, but while this representation may only benefit the minors, and
not the other plaintiffs, yet the same would not suffice to meet the requirement
of the rule which provides that every action must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest (Section 2, Rule 3). Again, we need hereto show that
Chua Pua Tarn was authorized by the heirs abroad to act as such in behalf of the
minors for it was in this belief that he was so appointed by the trial court.
But when in the course of the trial it developed that he never had any
communication with any of the heirs and much less received any authority from
them either to prosecute this case or to act as such guardian in behalf of the
minors, the trial court lost no time in disauthorizing him and considering his
representation ineffective, Thus, on this point, the trial court said: “Chua Pua
Tarn, who is the brother-in law of the first plaintiff and uncle of the others,
testified that the plaintiffs had not written to him nor had he communicated
with them. The letters supposedly sent to Lim Ping Kok by his sister Lim Siok
Huey (Exh. J) and his mother (Exh. K) did not contain any intimation much less
an authorization for the filing of the claim for damages in behalf of the widow
and children of the deceased.”
Nor can the claim that Chua Pua Tam can be considered as negotiorum gestor be
entertained because in the present case there is need of express authority on
his part to represent the minors by virtue of an express provision of our Rules
of Court. In negotiorum gestio no such authority is required.
The
contention that the trial court considered the issue regarding the lack of
authority on the part of counsel to represent plaintiffs in this case or of Chua
Pua Tarn to act as guardian ad litem of the minors even if the same tvas not
raised by any of the opposing parties or their’ counsel, cannot be entertained,
it appearing that the same was expressly raised by defendants Reyes and Limjuco
not only in the course of the trial but in their answer. Moreover, this flaw in
the case of the plaintiffs was discovered by the court in the course of the
trial in view of the evidence presented by the very counsel of plaintiffs. In
view of such development, the trial court could not but take notice of the
matter considering the prayer in defendants’ answer that they be given “such
reliefs as this Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.”
Wherefore, the decision appealed from in so far as it dismisses the
complaint is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia,
and Felix, JJ., concur.
CONCURRING
REYES, J. B. L., J.,
I concur, but with respect to the issue of negotiorum gestio my position is
that the same can not exist where the authority of the alleged gestor is
disputed. This quasi-contract presupposes that the gestor’s authority is taken
for granted by the persons with whom he deals, although in fact he has not been
legally empowered by the one in whose behalf he presumes to act.