DOMINGO BANATAO, DOROTEO BANATAO, FRANCISCO BANATAO, AND ARSENIO BANATAO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. SALVADOR DABBAY AND JACINTO TULIAO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

In this action the plaintiffs seek to obtain a judicial determination of the
ownership of certain land situated in the sitio of Fugu, barrio of
Malabbad, in the Province of Cagayan, and to recover possession thereof from the
defendants, with damages and costs. From a judgment rendered in the Court of
First Instance in favor of the plaintiffs the defendants have appealed.

As no motion for a new trial was made in the court below until after the
appeal had been taken and the bill of exceptions approved, the facts found in
the trial court will not be reviewed, and the case will be here considered
merely with reference to such questions of law as are presented upon the appeal.
In the lower court the defendant Tuliao practically entered a disclaimer as to
the property; and he will be ignored as a party to this appeal.

It appears that forty or fifty years ago a new island made its appearance in
the Cagayan River at or near the spot where the land in question is situated.
This island was called Fugu, a word which, in the native dialect prevailing in
the Cagayan Valley, means “island.” Soon after this island appeared, an ancestor
of the plaintiffs, named Juan Banatao, established himself upon its northern
end, while one Quienes and others respectively took possession of separate
strips extending across the island but lying further south.

As a result of the formation of this island the Cagayan River was divided
into two branches; and, in course of time, the river has abandoned the eastern
branch altogether. The old bed of this eastern branch of the river is clearly
marked by a depression in the land indicating the former course of the stream,
in which are to be seen deposits of stone and gravel. This area is called in the
local dialect “Carentan,” meaning a sandy beach; and upon it is located the
present sitio of Carentan.

The change of the river above noted has thus operated to destroy the
character of Fugu as an island; and it has thereby become connected
terrestrially with the land lying on the eastern bank of the Cagayan River; but
the old name remains and the place is now known as the sitio of
Fugu.

After the island of Fugu was formed changes of importance occurred in its
location and shape, owing to the shifting of the course of the Cagayan River.
The general character of these changes was that the upper end of the island,
that is the southern portion, was gradually eroded and carried away by the
descending waters of the stream, while as a result of accretion and the deposit
of alluvium, the northern and northwestern part of the island continually grew
in size. As a result of this action of the river the island very slowly moved
northward from the place of its first appearance in the river, and slowly
increased in size northwardly and westwardly. The process of erosion which was
going on at the southern end of the island finally carried away altogether the
strips of land which had been occupied by other settlers than Banatao and
Quienes and took away all but a very narrow strip of that which had belonged to
the latter. On the other hand, the process of accretion, which was going on at
the northern and north-western end of the island, continually added to that
portion of the island where Juan Banatao had planted himself.

The new area added in the manner above stated is of considerable extent, and
the plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the land owned by them, including
the increment added by accretion, amounts to 213 hectares, 36 ares and 82
centares. The land which is the subject of the present controversy, however,
consists of a strip extending east and west and containing an area of 12
hectares, 86 ares and 20 centares, indicated on plaintiff’s Exhibit E as
occupied by Salvador Dabbay.

The possession of the plaintiffs, by their predecessors in interest, dates
from before the year 1881 and has continued, without interruption except as to
the part now occupied by the defendant Salvador Dabbay. In the latter part of
the year 1894 Jacinto Banatao, the son of Juan Banatao, caused a possessory
information to be drawn up and inscribed in the property register, showing his
occupation of that portion of the island then in his possession. The
circumstance that this document was drawn up within a year after February 13,
1894, would indicate that the title thereby acquired, pursuant to the provisions
of the royal decree of that date, was equivalent to that which would have been
obtained by composition with the State. (See Carino vs.
Insular Government, 8 Phil. Rep., 150.) And as such it was treated by the court
below. Whether this possessory information actually combined all the requisites
essential to constitute a title equivalent to a composition title is immaterial,
since the long duration of the possession and cultivation of the property by the
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest has perfected their title,
whatever may have been the character of the document referred to.

The notable alluvial accretion, of which mention has been made began prior to
1899, and probably two or three years prior to that date. It is thus seen that
the accretion which has added so largely to the area of the northern and
northwestern portion of Fugu has occurred mostly since Jacinto Banatao procured
his possessory information.

The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that the Cagayan River is a
navigable stream. This is assigned as error by the appellant. We are of the
opinion that the court committed no error in so finding. The circumstance that
section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not especially mention the
navigability of rivers as a matter concerning which courts may take judicial
notice is of no moment, as this subject is one which in our opinion is clearly
within the general principle there stated. After mentioning numerous matters
proper to be judicially noticed by the court, among which are the territorial
extent of the several islands, forming the Philippine Archipelago and its
geographical divisions, said section states that “all similar matters of public
knowledge shall be recognized by the courts without the introduction of proof *
* *.”

In conformity with the principle thus stated the courts may take judicial
notice of the existence and location within the territory over which they
exercise jurisdiction of great rivers and lakes, and their relation to the
national or provincial boundaries, of the navigability of streams constituting
highways of commerce and other notorious facts concerning the same. The
presumption of general knowledge weakens as we pass to smaller and less known
streams; and yet, within the limits of any state the navigability of its largest
rivers ought to be generally known, and the courts may properly assume it to be
a matter of general knowledge, and take judicial notice thereof. (Wood
vs. Fowler, 26 Kan., 682, 687; 40 Am. Rep, 330.)

The suggestion made in behalf of the appellants to the effect that a river in
these Islands cannot be considered navigable unless it has been declared such in
conformity with the requirements of article 175 of the Law of Waters is in our
opinion untenable.

Upon the facts above stated the plaintiffs claim the ownership of the land in
question as an accretion, supporting their contention by reference to the
following provisions of law:

Article 371 of Civil Code: “Islands which may form * * * in navigable or
floatable rivers belong to the State.”

Article 366 of Civil Code: “Any accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effect of the current belong to the owners of the
estates bordering thereon.”

Article 84, Law of Waters: “Accretions deposited gradually upon lands
contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers and lakes, by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.”

It will thus be seen that the arguments in favor of ownership in the
plaintiffs proceed upon the idea that the island of Fugu was originally property
of the State, that the plaintiffs’ ancestor acquired title from the State by
occupation and by virtue of the possessory information recorded in his name, and
that all the accretion to said property belongs, under the provisions above
cited, to him and his heirs.

The conflicting claim of the defendant Salvador Dabbay is based on the
circumstance that he owns, or claims to have owned for a long period of time, a
parcel of land on the east side of the abandoned bed of the Cagayan River, and
lying east of the place where the new land was formed in the sitio of
Fugu. In his answer to the amended complaint in this case, this defendant
alleges that the Cagayan River which originally formed the western boundary of
his property, had gradually receded toward the west, forming and uniting new and
alluvial land to his property. This allegation of fact is refuted by the finding
of the lower court, which clearly demonstrates that the Cagayan River abandoned
the old eastern bed for a new course and did not gradually shift its course in
the manner stated in the defendant’s answer.

The circumstance that the Cagayan River abandoned the old eastern bed,
instead of gradually shifting its course to the west, makes it impossible for
the defendant Salvador Dabbay to maintain his claim to any part of the land in
controversy as an accretion, in accordance with article 366 of the Civil Code,
and article 84 of the Law of Waters; but reference is made in his behalf to
article 373 of the Civil Code and article 83 of the Law of Waters. These
articles declare that an island formed in a river by the successive accumulation
of deposits belongs to the riparian owners on the respective banks of the
stream, unless the island is farther from one bank than from the other, in which
case it shall belong to the owner of the nearest bank.

We are of the opinion that the case is one which falls more properly under
article 366 of the Civil Code and article 84 of the Law of Waters than under
article 373 of the Civil Code and that the plaintiffs therefore have the better
right. As was well observed by the trial judge the plaintiffs’ predecessors were
the first to appropriate the new island; there is no evidence as to the width of
the eastern and western branch of the river at the time the island was formed;
nor as to who were the opposite riparian owners. Nor does it appear that any
person claimed Fugu or any part of it, as riparian owner. The island was
evidently treated as part of the public domain, and the plaintiffs are therefore
to be considered as having acquired their title from the government.

In this connection we quote the following passage from the opinion of the
trial court.

“The litigated property could in no sense have been an accretion to the
parcel claimed to be owned by the defendants. When the Law of Waters and the
Civil Code (articles 84 and 366, respectively) speak of accretions to the banks
of rivers, the term ‘banks of rivers’ is not necessarily confined to the banks
which confine streams, but may when circumstances require it, also include the
banks of rivers which exist on islands. Here it is shown that an island in the
river was appropriated and a grant for the part of the same obtained by the
plaintiffs from the State. This island or so much thereof as was appropriated
and granted, must be treated, therefore, as property of original acquisition and
not as accession or derivative acquisition, and, with regard to the owners on
the shores opposite to it on both sides, it must be treated as if the
intervening streams were distinct streams, and as if the island were mainland
between which, and the mainland on each side, a separate river flowed.”

The defendant Salvador Dabbay further relies upon the defense of res
adjudicata and shows that on March 2, 1909, a judgment was entered in the
Court of First Instance of Cagayan Province in his favor in an action instituted
by him against Domingo Banatao, Juan Banatao, and Manuel Magalad, wherein said
defendants were ordered to return said land to Salvador Dabbay. The latter
asserts that he was put in possession of the property in question by virtue of
said judgment and has subsequently held possession in pursuance thereof. The
lower court found that said action was originally instituted in the court of the
justice of the peace under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that it
was appealed to the Court of First Instance under section 88 of the same Code
and that in the latter court judgment was rendered as above stated. Upon these
facts the court held that the action in question involved merely the right of
possession of the property in question, and that the judgment relied upon was
not conclusive as to the ownership. We are of the opinion that this conclusion
was correct in point both of law and of fact. The prayer of the complaint filed
in the Court of First Instance was that the court should give judgment
condemning the defendants to restore the possession of said land to the
plaintiffs with damages and costs. The action was evidently one for unlawful
detention; and, although it was necessary for the court to consider the
ownership, as bearing upon the right of possession, the judgment of the Court of
First Instance was not conclusive as to the title.

From what has been said it results that there was no error in the judgment
appealed from and the same is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Carson, Malcolm, Avanceña, and Fisher,
JJ., concur.