G.R. No. 122181. June 26, 1998
JOSE A. LINZAG AND THE HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL A. LINZAG, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV, MATI, DAVAO ORIENTAL, PATRICIO S. C…
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
subsequently obtains an unfavorable judgment in an action to annul the
original certificate of title issued pursuant to the former, and then
loses both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court in the appeal from
the latter, be allowed to file with the Court of Appeals an action to
annul the judgment of the cadastral court? The Court of Appeals resolved
the issue in the negative on the ground of res judicata. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari.
We affirm the Court of Appeals not only because of absence of
grave abuse of discretion, but likewise because an action for annulment
of judgment was no longer available. Moreover, the instant special
action was not the proper remedy against the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals.
As gathered from the decisions of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals and the pleadings of the parties, the following are the
material facts in this case:
Petitioners Jose A. Linzag and the heirs of Cristobal A. Linzag
are members of the non-Christian tribe known as the Kalagan tribe of
Mati, Davao Oriental. Jose and Cristobal claim to have inherited from
their deceased parents, Datu Joaquin Linzag and Regina Agustino, a
parcel of land, otherwise known as Waniban Island, designated as Lot No.
1222 of the Mati Cadastre, with an area of 36,575 square meters, more
or less.[1]
At the cadastral proceeding (CAD CASE No. N-16, LRC Cad. Record
N-326) involving Lot No. 1222 before the then Court of First Instance of
Davao Oriental sitting in Mati, Davao Oriental, Cristobal Linzag filed
his claim over said Lot. Another claimant, one Patricio Cunanan,
likewise filed a claim.
On 26 July 1971, one Orlando L. Salvador filed a motion[2]
to award Lot No. 1222, as an uncontested lot, in his favor. He alleged
therein that he had acquired the rights of Patricio Cunanan for
sufficient consideration and that the other claimant, Cristobal Linzag,
had withdrawn his answer/claim in favor of Patricio Cunanan and/or his
successors-in-interest, thereby making said lot as a “non-contested
lot.” At the hearing of the motion, which was not opposed by the
Director of Lands, then represented by the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal, Salvador offered in evidence the following: (a) a “Deed of
Absolute Sale of Hereditary Rights Over an Unregistered Land” covering
Lot No. 1222 executed on 29 December 1970[3]
by Patricio S. Cunanan, Avelina C. Salazar, Elena C. Abayari, Igualdad
Cunanan, Diosdado Cunanan, Lakandula Cunanan, Josefina C. Sibala as
vendors and Orlando L. Salvador as vendee; and (b) a verified
“Withdrawal of Claim/Answer” dated 13 July 1971[4] signed by Cristobal and Jose Linzag and executed in favor of Patricio Cunanan and/or his successor’s-in-interests.
On 10 August 1971, the cadastral court, on the basis of the foregoing, issued an Order[5]
declaring that Salvador and his predecessors-in-interests had been in
peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of Lot No.
1222, in concept of an owner for a period of at least 30 years; that
Salvador was the successor-in-interest of original claimant Patricio S.
Cunanan; and that the lot was a non-contested lot. The court thus
decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby adjudicates Lot
No. 1222, together with all its improvements thereon, in favor of:ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, of legal age, Filipino, married to Jovita B. Ramos-Salvador, a resident of Parañaque, Rizal.
The Land Registration Commissioner is hereby directed to issue the
corresponding decree of registration for said Lot No. 1222, as soon as
this Order becomes final and executory.
After the Order became final, the cadastral court issued an Order[6] directing issuance of the decree of registration.
In due time, Decree No. N-137262 was issued. Then on 13 October
1971, pursuant to said Decree, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
O-2039[7] covering Lot No. 1222 was issued in the name of Orlando L. Salvador.
On 4 February 1977, petitioners herein filed an action for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages[8]
against private respondents Patricio Cunanan and Orlando Salvador
before the Court of First instance of Mati, Davao Oriental (docketed as
Civil Case No. 571).
On 10 June 1977, petitioners filed an amended complaint[9] wherein they alleged, inter alia,
that they and their predecessors-in-interests had been in actual,
lawful, peaceful, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession and
occupation of the land since the Spanish regime up to the present; the
lot was ancestral land of the Linzags; the lot had been included in a
prior land registration case filed by Patricio Cunanan which was decided
against him, with the land registration court holding that the land was
“part of the public domain,” which decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals on 19 November 1960 in CA-G.R. No. 19594-B; that in the
cadastral proceedings, specifically on 13 July 1971 and after the
effectivity of said decision of the Court of Appeals, Patricio Cunanan,
with the aid and participation of his son-in-law, Atty. Galileo Sibala,
procured, through fraud, the signatures of Jose and Cristobal Linzag on a
document which turned out to be a withdrawal of their claim to Lot No.
1222 by representing to them that it was a deed of mortgage over the lot
in consideration of P3,000.00; and thereafter, Cunanan, together with
the heirs of his deceased wife, sold the lot to Orlando Salvador for the
sum of P25,000.00. Petitioners further alleged that both the withdrawal
of claim and deed of absolute sale were notarized by Atty. Sibala; on
the basis of the deed of sale in his favor, Salvador filed a motion with
the cadastral court to adjudicate the lot in his favor as an
uncontested lot; that the cadastral court granted the motion and as a
consequence thereof, OCT No. 0-2039 was issued in Salvador’s name; and
that it was only on 14 May 1974 that petitioners discovered the fraud.
They then prayed for judgment directing the Register of Deeds of Davao
Oriental to issue a certificate of title in petitioners’ names, and
ordering defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and transportation expenses.
In its decision[10]
dated 14 February 1984, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 571
because the “action [was] improper and that the claim of plaintiffs have
not been duly substantiated by them.” The court likewise ruled that
plaintiffs therein were not the true owners of the property; plaintiffs
failed to prove extrinsic fraud; there was no evidence that Salvador was
a buyer in bad faith; and that the action was filed beyond the
prescriptive period.
Petitioners appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals (Eighth Division) in CA-G.R. CV No. 03329. In its decision[11] of 25 July 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners thereafter appealed to this Court by way of a
petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 89441. In the
resolution[12] of 2 October
1989, this Court (First Division) denied the petition “for late filing”
and decreed that the judgment sought to be reviewed “has now become
final and executory.”
Meanwhile, on 9 November 1993, Original Certificate of Title No.
O-2039 was cancelled and the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Davao
Oriental issued a Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16604[13] in the name of Manuel P. Blanco, Jr. and Jose Manuel Serrano.
Undaunted by the foregoing adverse events, on 5 December 1994, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition[14]
for the annulment of judgment of the then Court of First Instance of
Mati, Davao Oriental in CAD. CASE No. N-16, LRC Cad. Record No. N-326
concerning Lot No. 1222 (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35877). Impleaded as
respondents were the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Mati, Davao Oriental, which succeeded the former Court of First Instance
that decided the cadastral case, herein private respondents Patricio
Cunanan, Orlando Salvador, Manuel Blanco, Jr., Jose Manuel Serrano and
the Register of Deeds of Davao Oriental.
In its decision[15] of
28 February 1995, public respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for being barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. 571, i.e., on ground of res judicata. The appellate court’s extensive discussion[16] on this issue deserves to be quoted, thus:
On the issue of res judicata, the private respondent point
[sic] to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental
in Civil Case 571 affirmed by this Court in CA G.R. CV. 03329. It was
argued that this previous case involved the same parties, subject matter
and cause of action as this instant petition, and is, therefore, a bar
to this petition.An action is barred by a former judgment if (1) the former judgment
is final; (2) the court which rendered it has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
(4) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action.An examination of the records show [sic] that the first three
requirements for the application of the doctrine of res judicata are
present in this case.The petitioners themselves related in their petition that they had
instituted a complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance with
damages against the private respondents, Salvador and Cunanan. The
complaint was dated 10 June 1977 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 571
of the then Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental.On 14 February 1984, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment
against the petitioners dismissing their complaint and ordering them to
pay Orlando Salvador P5,000.00 and Patricio Cunanan, P2,000.00 by way of
litigation expenses and attorney’s fees (see Decision, Annex “J”,
Petition; Rollo, pp. 50-68).The judgment was affirmed by this Court in CA G.R. No. 03329 (“Jose
A. Linzag, et. [sic] al. vs. Patricio Cunan, et. [sic] al.”) in a
decision rendered on 25 July 1989 (see copy of Decision; Annex “K”,
Petition; Rollo, pp. 69-74).The petition for review with the Supreme Court was not filed within
the extension period granted to the petitioners. Thus, on 2 October
1989 the Supreme Court issued a Resolution stating that no appeal was
taken on time by the petitioners and the judgment had already become
final and executory (Annex “L”, Petition; Rollo, p. 75).The judgment in Civil Case 571 (i.e., the annulment case) having
already become final as pronounced in the Supreme Court Resolution, the
first requirement for the application of res judicata is, therefore, present.The Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental undoubtedly has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The parcel of land in
question is located within the province and as such, lies within the
territorial jurisdiction of said court. No question on the jurisdiction
of the trial court over the parties appears to have been raised.The judgment was on the merits as it was rendered after a
determination of which party is right and was not merely based on a
preliminary or technical issue (see Santos vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 145 SCRA 238, 245-246). A reading of the decision of the trial
court shows that it was based on matters of substance and not merely on
technical points.There is also an identity between the parties in this petition and
that in Civil Case 571. The petitioners in this case, Jose Linzag and
the Heirs of Cristobal Linzag are likewise the plaintiffs in Civil Case
571. The defendants in Civil Case 571 are also the private respondents
in this case. The inclusion of Manuel Serrano and Jose Manuel Blanco as
private respondents does not affect the identity of the parties as these
two are successors-in-interest of original defendant Orlando Salvador.The subject matter between the two cases are also identical. It is
the parcel of land known as Waniban Island in Mati, Davao Oriental and
the certificate of title covering such property.The issue is whether or not there is an identity in the causes of action between this petition and Civil Case No. 571.
The test generally applied in determining whether causes of action
are identical as to warrant the application of the doctrine of res judicata
is to consider whether there is an identity in the facts essential to
the maintenance of the two actions or whether the same evidence will
sustain both. This is regardless [of whether] the form or nature of the
two actions are different. If the same facts or evidence can sustain
either, the two actions are considered the same so that the judgment in
one is [a] bar to the other. If, however, the two actions rest upon two
different state [sic] of facts, or if different proofs would be required
to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is not a bar to the
maintenance of the other (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732; Aroc
vs. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, 81 SCRA 350; Pagsisihan
vs. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 540).In this petition, the petitioners claim for nullity of judgment and
their argument of lack of notice to them in the cadastral case [is]
essentially based on allegations of fraud. As narrated earlier, the
petitioners also alleged that the documents submitted by the private
respondents to support their application for registration were
fraudulent. They further alleged that the withdrawal of claim filed in
their behalf in the cadastral case was procured through fraud.It is, however, clear from the complaint and the decision in Civil
Case 571, attached to this petition, that these issues have already been
raised by the petitioners and passed upon by the trial court. This can
be shown by the following excerpts of the decision of the Court of First
Instance.In any case, even granting arguendo that plaintiffs or
their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
before 1945, it would appear that at the time of the filing of the
action, they had no more right [to] the property. The main thrust of
plaintiffs’ assault on the validity of defendant Orlando Salvador is
that the waiver of claim is null and void, did not reflect truly the
intention of the parties.An examination of the testimonies of the two (2) witnesses for
the plaintiffs, Jose Linzag and Salvacion vda. De Linzag, who were twice
presented as witnesses will show that plaintiffs were not able to
successfully substantiate their claim on the invalidity of said
withdrawal of answer or claim. Nothing was said in their testimonies as
would support the contention that the said instrument was not validly
executed.x x x
On the second requirement, that the land must be wrongfully
registered through fraud, it is clear from jurisprudence that the fraud
in securing title must be actual fraud and must be proven and that the
said fraud must be extrinsic. It is clear that as earlier discussed,
plaintiffs failed to prove any actual fraud. The alleged fraud
plaintiffs claimed is not extrinsic fraud, granting that fraud was
committed. xxx (See CFI Decision, pp. 10, 15; Rollo, pp. 59, 64)Notably also, the underlying objective or relief sought in this
petition and in the earlier case are essentially the same. It is the
nullification of the land title in the name of the private respondents
and the adjudication of the land in question to the petitioners.The only difference is the form and nature of the two actions;
while the earlier complaint is for the annulment of the land title, this
present petition is for the nullification of the judgment upon which
the title sought to nullified (sic) in the first case was issued.It is readily apparent, therefore, that were this petition to be
given due course, the same evidence or set of facts as that considered
by the Court of First Instance in the annulment case, Civil Case 571,
will be also be [sic] considered in this petition. Applying then the
test earlier discussed, this court finds that the causes of action in
Civil Case 571 and in this petition are the same as to warrant the
application of the doctrine of res judicata.In sum, we find that all the requirements for the application of res judicata
are present in this case. This petition should, therefore, be
dismissed. The difference in the form of the actions instituted is
immaterial. The petitioners may not escape the effect of the doctrine by
merely varying the form of his [sic] action (Filinvest Credit
Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 59, 63; Sangalang
vs. Caparas, 151 SCRA 53; Ibabao vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 76,
85).The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata
is that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more
than once. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial
has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
in them in law or estate. It is to the interest of the public that there
should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies
over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated (Ibabao vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at p. 85; Sangalang vs. Caparas,
supra, at p. 59).As this petition is already barred by the judgment in Civil Case
571, We see no other course of action but to resolve to dismiss this
petition.
Their motion for reconsideration[17] and supplemental motion for reconsideration[18] having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution[19]
of 3 October 1995, on the ground that there existed “no new and cogent
ground to warrant reversal or modification,” petitioners filed the
instant special action for certiorari with mandamus, raising the following issues:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CAN DENY DUE
COURSE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS
THAT THERE WAS AN EARLIER CASE FOR NULLIFICATION OF TITLE BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT;(2) WHETHER OR NOT A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TITLE
FILED AND DISMISSED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS A BAR (RES JUDICATA)
TO THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT BEFORE THE COURT
OF APPEALS OF AN LRC CASE RENDRED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SITTING AS
A CADASTRAL COURT;(3) WHETHER OF NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CAN DENY DUE
COURSE TO A VALID PETITION ORIGINALLY FILED BEFORE IT MERELY BECAUSE A
CASE FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE WAS ALREADY FILED AND DECIDED BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT;(4) WHETHER OR NOT PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF WHICH THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS THE SAME AS A
PETITION FOR NULLITY OF TITLE WHICH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION.(5) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE
EVEN BEFORE RECEIVING EVIDENCE AND WITHOUT DETERMINING THE ACTUAL MERITS
OF THE PETITION FILED FOR THE ANNULMENT OF A PATENTLY NULL AND VOID
JUDGMENT.
Petitioners contend that the decision in Civil Case No. 571, an
action for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages, does not
constitute res judicata to bar the instant petition for
annulment of judgment. Petitioners further insist that the 10 August
1971 decision of the cadastral court is void for violation of due
process and extrinsic fraud, stressing that a void judgment never
acquires finality and is subject to collateral attack. Petitioners
underscore that in the proceedings before the cadastral court they were
not informed of the dates of hearing, and as a result, were unable to
hire the services of counsel. Thus if they had been afforded their day
in court, they could have proved possession of the land for the required
number of years that would have entitled them to ownership thereof; and
that private respondents procured spurious documents showing a waiver
of petitioners’ claim over the disputed property. Moreover, petitioners
were not furnished a copy of the trial court’s decision. Finally,
petitioners contend that the transfer of the land title to private
respondents Blanco and Serrano, who failed to verify true ownership of
the land, was part of Salvador’s “fraudulent schemes and strategies” to
deprive petitioners of an opportunity to recover the land.
Cunanan’s comment[20]
filed on 12 January 1996 does not meet squarely the substantive issues
raised by petitioners and, instead, interposes the following defenses:
(1) he is not a party-in-interest, having sold all his rights over the
subject property to Orlando Salvador; (2) Galileo Sibala has not
appeared as counsel on behalf of the other respondents; (3) there is no
new and cogent reason to disturb the 28 February 1995 decision as the
allegations in the petition are a mere rehash of the issues already
passed upon by respondent Court of Appeals; and (4) the petition fails
to show that petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was filed within
the reglementary period.
In their comment filed on 4 October 1996, respondents Manuel P.
Blanco, Jr. and Jose Manuel Serrano contend that: (1) petitioners were
not denied due process since they were afforded ample opportunity to
present their side of the controversy; (2) the trial court’s finding on
the issue of possession and extrinsic fraud must be accorded great
weight and respect, if not finality, on appeal; (3)the transfer
certificate of title evidencing their ownership over the land has become
incontrovertible and indefeasible; (4) they are purchasers in good
faith and for value and may safely rely on what appears on the face of
the title; (5) the instant petition is barred by res judicata;
and (7) there is no showing that respondent Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion when it refused to give due course to the
petition.
Petitioners filed separate replies to the comments of Cunanan and Blanco and Serrano.
In his manifestation filed on 20 September 1996, counsel for
private respondent Cunanan informed the Court that Cunanan died on 8
April 1996, and on 20 November 1996, said counsel submitted the names
and addresses of the heirs of Cunanan. Upon motion of petitioners, to
which the other parties submitted their comment, the Court granted, on 2
July 1997, petitioners’ motion to substitute the heirs of Cunanan for
the latter.
The Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their memoranda, which petitioners and
respondents Serrano and Blanco did on 4 September 1997 and 26 August
1997, respectively. The parties likewise filed reply memoranda.
This petition is devoid of merit.
Respondent Court of Appeals did not err, much less, commit grave
abuse of discretion, in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 35877 on ground of res judicata.
Paragraph (b) of Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which was likewise Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the 1964
Rules of Court, enshrines the doctrine of res judicata:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgment or final orders. – The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:xxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect
to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of
the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing under
the same title and in the same capacity…
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every
well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds
embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy
and necessity which makes it to the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation – republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa.
A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the
will and neglect of individuals and prefer gratification of the
litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the
public tranquility and happiness.[21]
The requisites of res judicata are: (1) there must be a
final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two
cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.[22]
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, to wit:
(1) the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action; and (2) preclude
relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action.[23]
As earlier shown, the Court of Appeals convincingly demonstrated that
the decision in Civil Case No. 571 of the Court of First Instance of
Mati, Davao Oriental operates to bar, on the ground of res judicata,
the case for annulment of judgment — CA-G.R. SP No. 35877. As stated
earlier, the decision in Civil Case No. 571 dismissed petitioners’
complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages; and, in
effect, affirmed the judgment of the cadastral court. The judgment in
Civil Case No. 571 was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its
decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 03329, while a petition to review the latter
was denied by this Court in G.R. No. 89441.
The claim of petitioners that the judgment in Civil Case No. 571
does not bar CA-G.R. SP No. 35877 because the former was for annulment
of title only, while the latter was for annulment of the judgment, is
palpably unmeritorious. There is here a clear case of hair-splitting. It
is settled that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case.[24]
This is as good a time as any to remind lawyers that any attempt to do
so merits the Court’s condemnation for being an abuse or misuse of the
rules of procedure.
We stress in this connection that petitioners may have resorted
to the filing of Civil Case No. 571 because they had lost the right to
file a petition for review. It is settled that a party deprived of his
property in a cadastral proceeding may file within one (1) year from
entry of the decree, a petition for review. After the lapse of said
period, if the property has not yet passed on to an innocent purchaser
for value, an action for reconveyance may still be filed by the
aggrieved party.[25] An action
for reconveyance attacks not only the judgment of the cadastral court;
it likewise seeks confirmation by the court of plaintiffs’ title to the
land.
Another more telling reason why CA-G.R. SP No. 35877 should be
dismissed was that the remedy of annulment of judgment allowed in
Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 was no longer available to petitioners.
Such is available only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of petitioners.[26]
Here, petitioners had, in fact, availed of an action for reconveyance
where they litigated the grounds for annulment of judgment. There would
be no end to litigations if parties who have unsuccessfully availed of
any of the appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault would
still be heard in an action to annul the judgment.
A final word before ending.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court
of Appeals in an action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court
(or of its predecessor the Court of First Instance) is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, where only questions of law may be
raised. Petitioners, however, have availed of the special civil action
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. No special reasons exist in this case to justify resort to
Rule 65. Of course, every lawyer should be familiar with the obvious
distinctions[27]between a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 and an appeal by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. For one, that under Rule 45 is a continuation of the
judgment complained of, while that under Rule 65 is an original or
independent action.[28] It is likewise settled that, generally, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 will not be allowed as a substitute for failure to timely file a petition for review under Rule 45[29] or for the lost remedy of appeal.[30]
The wrong choice of remedy thus provides another reason to dismiss this petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35877 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, 27-28, 62.
[2] Id., 137- 138.
[3] Id., 56-60.
[4] Rollo, 332.
[5] Id., 51-54. Per Judge Vicente P. Bullecer.
[6] Id., 76.
[7] Id., 102
[8] Id., 77.
[9] Rollo, 61-67.
[10] Id., 73-91. Per Judge Jose C. Estrada.
[11] Rollo, 92-97. Per
Associate Justice Lorna S. Lombos-De la Fuente, concurred in by
Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera and Fernando A. Santiago.
[12] Id. , 98.
[13]Id., 55.
[14]Id., 25- 47.
[15] Annex “D” of
Petition; Rollo, 108-117. Per Associate Justice (now Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court) Antonio M. Martinez, concurred in by Justices
Fermin A. Martin, Jr., and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis.
[16] Id., 112-116.
[17] Rollo, 118-122.
[18] Id., 123-128.
[19] Id., 131.
[20] Rollo, 143.
[21] De Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 207, 214 [1992]; Baguioro v. Basa, 214 SCRA 437, 444 [1992].
[22] De Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 214-215 [1992]; Baguioro v. Basa, 214 SCRA 443 [1992].
[23] Filinvest Credit Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 59, 63 [1992].
[24] Gutierrez v. Court
of Appeals, 193 SCRA 437, 445-446 [1991]; Amberti v. Court of Appeals,
195 SCRA 659, 665-666 [1991]; Allied Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
229 SCRA 252, 260 [1994].
[25] Llenares v.Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 10, 22 [1993].
[26] See Section 1, Rule 47, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[27] See 1 Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 543-544 (6th Revised ed., 1997).
[28] Dando v. Fraser, 227 SCRA 126, 134 [1993].
[29] Vda. de Espina v. Abaya, 196 SCRA 312, 321 [1991].
[30] People v. Court of
Appeals, 199 SCRA 539, 547 [1991]; Sy v. Romero, 214 SCRA 187, 193
[1992]; Fajardo v. Bautista, 232 SCRA 291, 298 [1994]; Hipolito v. Court
of Appeals, 230 SCRA 191, 204 [1994].