PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PEPITO ORBITA Y JUSAY, CEFERINO CAPISUNDA Y BALCE, AND ORLANDO SANTIAGO Y FRANCISCO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

People versus Orbita

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted three members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit for the killing of Diosdado de Guzman. The accused are Pepito Orbita, Ceferino Capisunda, and Orlando Santiago. The trial court convicted all three of murder, and they ask the Supreme Court to reverse. The case matters for two reasons. First, it is a clean illustration of how conspiracy is proved not by direct agreement but by the acts of the accused before, during, and after the crime. Second, it shows that when conspiracy is established, the accused who never fired a shot is as guilty as the one who did.

Procedural History

The third assistant provincial prosecutor of Batangas filed an information for murder with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Branch 13. The three accused were arraigned separately and each pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment on February 2, 1995, finding all three guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and abuse of superior strength as a generic aggravating circumstance. It sentenced each to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, ordered them to indemnify the heirs of the victim jointly and solidarily in the amount of 50,000 pesos, and to pay the costs. From that judgment the accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, as is proper in cases involving reclusion perpetua.

Facts

On the afternoon of August 18, 1989, four men were drinking in front of the house of Ading Ray in Barangay Tipaz, San Juan, Batangas. They were Arbel Magtibay, Gildo Areglado, Diosdado de Guzman, and Ading Ray. The three accused, all CAFGU members, passed by and were invited to drink. When Ading Ray handed Santiago a glass of lambanog, Santiago threw the glass. De Guzman remarked that if one is going to drink, one should drink, and if not, one should not throw the liquor. Irked, the three accused suddenly pointed their rifles at de Guzman. Ading Ray pacified them, and they left.

That evening, at about seven thirty, de Guzman was walking home with Ambo Comia, Lordino Mendoza, and Arbel Magtibay. In front of the store of Rosenda Bautista they met Orbita and Santiago, who poked their rifles at de Guzman. Lordino Mendoza tried to pacify them, but Orbita suddenly fired, hitting de Guzman in the chest. His companions fled, helping him along, and left him by a big stone at the side of the road to look for a jeep.

Juanito Mendoza, who lived nearby, heard the shots and came out. He saw de Guzman bloodied and being aided by his companions. Across the road stood Ceferino Capisunda with a long firearm. Juanito asked him not to fire because his mother was sick and the shot would alarm her. Capisunda did not answer. After a few steps, Juanito heard someone call him, followed by a burst of gunfire. He turned and saw Capisunda firing at de Guzman, who fell dead near the stairs at the side of the road. The post mortem examination showed five gunshot wounds with different points of entry and trajectory.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that there was conspiracy among the three accused, and in convicting all of them of murder.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving credit to the testimonies of the three accused.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in not finding that there was sufficient provocation on the part of the victim.

Applicable Provisions

The decision defines conspiracy in the language of Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

This definition is the anchor of the conviction, because it is the basis for holding all three accused liable although only two of them fired.

The decision also applies the rule on qualifying circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Treachery is what raises the killing from homicide to murder, and the Court finds it present because the victim was unarmed and was shot suddenly and without warning.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that conspiracy was established. The agreement may be deduced from the manner in which the crime was committed, or from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the crime, indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest. It may even be shown through circumstantial evidence. Here, the three accused were in each other's company at the first encounter. When they met on the road, Orbita and Santiago were together. Orbita fired the first shot, Santiago pointed his gun at the victim and his companions, and Capisunda positioned himself on the other side of the road and shot the victim as he tried to escape. Taken together, these acts reveal a well planned and orchestrated design to kill. The Court held that when conspiracy is established, it matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim. Santiago, though he did not fire, is equally guilty.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the testimonies of the accused. Their story was that they were on their way to a baptism, that de Guzman cursed and hit Orbita, and that Orbita fired only once and lost consciousness. The Court found this unbelievable and implausible, because the victim sustained five gunshot wounds with different points of entry and trajectory. Against this, three eyewitnesses positively identified the accused. The Court held that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.

On the third issue, the Court found the claim of sufficient provocation puerile and undeserving of discussion. The remarks of the deceased were not sufficient to provoke and goad the accused to kill. The Court also affirmed the finding of treachery, since the victim was unarmed and was shot suddenly and unexpectedly with an M-14 rifle.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The agreement need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the crime, when those acts point to a joint purpose, concerted action, and community of interest. Once conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as principals, and it matters not who among them actually shot and killed the victim. Positive identification by eyewitnesses, categorical and consistent and without ill motive, prevails over alibi and denial. And treachery qualifies a killing as murder when the offender employs means that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself from the defense the offended party might make, as where an unarmed victim is shot suddenly and without warning.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification, and in addition sentenced the accused jointly and severally to pay the heirs of the victim 50,000 pesos as moral damages, with costs against the appellants.

Remember This

Memorize this line: when conspiracy is established, it matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim. Examiners use this case to test conspiracy inferred from circumstantial evidence and the liability of a conspirator who only aimed his gun but never fired.