PEDRO SANTOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JULIAN SANTIAGO, GUARDIAN OF THE MINORS GASPARA AND SANTIAGO, SURNAMED SANTIAGO, AND MAXIMO ANGELES, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an action for the forcible entry into and detainer of the land
described in the complaint. It is alleged that the defendants, on December 15,
1915, by force, intimidation, and strategy, took possession of this land. From
the decision rendered by the justice of the peace court of the municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan, in which this case was originally instituted, an appeal was
taken to the Court of First Instance, and the latter, considering that it had
not been proven that the defendants had employed force and intimidation to
obtain possession of the land, dismissed the complaint. From this judgment an
appeal was taken to this court.

The land was principally devoted to the cultivation of rice and
nipa. It was proven, without contradiction, that prior to December 15,
1915, the plaintiff was in possession of this land. Several days prior to this
date, the defendant Julian Santiago, wishing to turn that part of the land
planted with nipa into a fishery sold the nipa trees growing thereon,
to his codefendant Maximo Angeles. On December 15, 1915, both defendants
proceeded to cut the nipa groves, and since then the defendant Julian
Santiago has continued in possession of the land.

The plaintiff states that, as he has heard that the defendants intended to
destroy the nipa trees, and has learned, on December 15, 1915, that the
defendants were actually on the land, he sent Pedro Santos and some other
persons to see whether the defendants were cutting the nipa trees. When
these agents returned they told the plaintiff that they had endeavored to
prevent the defendants from cutting the nipa trees, but that the latter
paid no attention to them. Then the appellant himself went to the place, and as,
on arriving there, the defendants approached him with their bolos in their
hands, he was frightened and withdrew. Pedro Santos testified that when he
ordered the defendants not to cut the nipa trees, they surrounded him,
with bolos in their hands, and threatened to give him blows if he did not leave.
This statement, however, is probably untrue. When Pedro Santos reported to the
appellant the result of his errand, he said nothing to the latter about the
defendants’ having threatened him (Santos) with their bolos, but simply said
that they refused to cease cutting the nipa trees. On the other hand,
when the appellant himself went to the land, the defendants made no use of their
bolos to intimidate him, for the mere fact of their having approached him with
their bolos in their hands does not mean that they intimidated him with this
weapon; it must be remembered that the defendants were already carrying their
bolos before they approached, and had been working with this implements.

But it is not necessary that the occurrences related by Pedro Santos in his
testimony should have taken place, in order that it may be said that Julian
Santiago’s possession was obtained by force. His insistence in cutting the trees
and his resistance or refusal to return the possession of the land to the
plaintiff, who previously held it, is enough to render his possession a
possession by force. We hold to be applicable to the present case the doctrine
laid down in the case of Mediran vs. Villanueva (37 Phil. Rep., 752),
decided by the first division of this court. In that case Justice Street, who
wrote the decision, said:

“In order to constitute the use of ‘force’ as contemplated in this provision
(see 80, Cod. of Civ. Proc), the trespasser does not have to institute a state
of war. Nor is it even necessary that he sould use violence against the person
of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the
lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the
property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the statute entering upon the
premises by strategy or stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force.
The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original
possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words ‘by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth’ include every situation or condition
under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude
another, who has had prior possession, therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon
land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with
lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants
himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of
forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no
force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from
the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.”
(37 Phil. Rep., 756.)

The plaintiff also demands an indemnity for the damages sustained. The
evidence shows that the defendants cut 3,000 clumps of nipa trees and
that the value of each clump was P2. The defendant Julian Santiago admits that
he was deriving benefit from the products of the land, the value of which
products he did not specify, but, according to the plaintiff, amount to P600 net
profit every year. We therefore agree that the value of the nipa trees
cut is P6,000 and that the annual product of the land amounts to P600. We find,
however, that the plaintiff is not entitled to be indemnified for the value of
the nipa trees, and only for the value of their annual yield. It is
only decided in this decision that the plaintiff had the material possession of
the land and was unlawfully ousted from this possession. This gives him a right
to be protected in his possession which was thus disturbed. But we do not decide
that he is the owner of the land, because its ownership is not a subject matter
of this action. He may not be the owner. Therefore the plaintiff is entitled
only to an indemnity for the damages he suffered as mere possessor. Material
possession involves only the enjoyment of the thing possessed, its use, and the
collection of its fruits, and these are the only benefits of which the possessor
is deprived in losing his possession. The value of the thing is represented by
the thing itself, not by the products which it may yield. Were the herein
plaintiff allowed, as damages, the value of the nipa trees cut, it would be
taking for granted that he is the owner of the land—a point which is not to be
decided in this case. As a necessary remedy in this case, the damages should be
limited to those derived from the facts giving rise to the case, namely, the
plaintiff’s material possession.

All the foregoing statements concern the defendant Julian Santiago. With
respect to the other defendant, Maximo Angeles, all that has been proven is that
he helped to cut the nipa trees, on account of his having bought them
of Julian Santiago; but, as the record does not show that he knew that Julian
Santiago had no right to sell the trees, he has incurred no liability toward the
plaintiff.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the defendant Julian Santiago is
ordered to restore the land in question to the plaintiff and to pay him the sum
of P600, as damages, for each year, beginning December 15, 1915, until the date
of the restitution of the land; and said judgment is affirmed in so far as it
absolves the other defendant Maximo Angeles.

No special finding is made as to costs. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Street, Malcolm, and Fisher, JJ.,
concur.