G.R. No. 12184. September 27, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CHIU GUIMCO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
STREET, J.:
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Misamis, subjecting him to a fine
of P1,800 for a violation of section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
ordering him to be confined in the provincial jail until he should produce the
will of his deceased brother, or until the further order of the court.
It appears that the testator, Joaquin Cruz, alias Piaua, had for many years
resided in the municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, where he had lived
as a Chinese “merchant and had amassed a considerable estate, worth possibly
forty or fifty thousand pesos. On or about the year 1898, Joaquin Cruz visited
China and was there married to a Chinese woman, Uy Cuan, and by her had one
child. In the year 1902, after his return from China, he was married in Gingoog
to a Filipina woman named Maria Villafranca. In the early part of the year 1910,
Joaquin Cruz again visited China, leaving his brother, Chiu Guimco, the accused,
in charge of his property and business in Gingoog as agent or attorney in fact
(apoderado). While absent on this visit to China Joaquin Cruz died. Before his
departure from the Philippine Islands he had executed a will before Anastasio
Servillon, notary public, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were named as
executors. In August 1910, Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden appeared before Anastasio
Servillon; and at their request the latter drew up a petition for the probate of
the will. This petition was signed by Co-Iden and the accused. The will itself
was not produced before the notary public upon this occasion, and he was not
informed by them as to who then had possession of the will. Nothing further was
done in the matter of the probate of the will and Co-Iden subsequently died.
In September, 1910, the accused, as attorney in fact (apoderado) and manager
of the estate of his deceased brother, entered into an arrangement with Maria
Villafranca whereby, in consideration of the conveyance of certain property to
her, she relinquished in favor of the other persons interested in the estate of
the deceased all her claims in respect to the same property.
No further action was taken by the accused to distribute the estate to the
persons in interest. In 1914 Uy Cuan, the Chinese wife, secured a special permit
to enter the Philippine Islands for the period of six months to effect some
settlement of the estate of her deceased husband. When she arrived in Misamis,
the accused made the claim that he and his brother had been partners in the
business which had been conducted originally by Joaquin Cruz. He also asserted
that another brother living in China, named Chiu Tamco, was also a partner in
the business, though he had never been in the Philippine Islands. In a document
which was then drawn up, it was agreed that Uy Cuan and her child Chiu .Machay
were to receive 40 per centum of the estate of the deceased, that the defendant
Chiu Guimco was to receive another 40 per centum, and Chiu Tamco 20 per centum.
Later upon the same visit, Uy Cuan, on behalf of herself and child, entered into
a contract with the accused whereby he agreed to pay the sum of P350 per quarter
by way of rental on their interest in the real estate of the decedent. No
payments have, however, been made by him in compliance with this contract.
In 1915 Ramon Contreras, a Chinese merchant of Cagayan, Misamis, acting on
behalf of Uy Cuan and her child, began to make inquiries into the affairs of the
estate and on January 26, 1915, wrote a letter to the defendant Chiu Guimco,
urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of lawful
proceedings in accordance therewith. The letter called his attention to the
penalty denounced by sections 628 and 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
withholding a will, but assured him that if he would then produce the will no
penalty would be incurred.
Chiu Guimco was somewhat disturbed by this letter and called in his friend
Antonio Yacapin, then municipal president of Gingoog, for advice. Upon this
occasion he showed Yacapin the will; and the latter says he advised the Chinaman
to present the will to the court, but the latter dissented from this opinion and
stated that if he should now present the will he would suffer prejudice as a
long time had already elapsed. In deference to this determination of the accused
a letter was written for him by Yacapin to Ramon Contreras, in which the accused
asserted that the will in question had never been in his possession and that he
had never seen it.
A few months later the.complaint in this case was filed, under section 628 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, charging the defendant with the failure to produce
the will within the time required by law. The principal witness for the
prosecution was Antonio Yacapin, who meanwhile had ceased to have friendly
relation with the defendant. The court found the accused guilty. That the will
was duly executed and that the accused and his coexecutor appeared before the
notary public and procured the latter to prepare a petition for the probate of
the will are facts which are not disputed. The action of the accused in
possessing himself of the property of his deceased brother and in refusing to
take the proper steps to distribute the estate, as well as his refusal to comply
with the contract for the payment of rent to the wife and child in China, all
tend to show that he was acting in bad faith; and we have no doubt that the will
was in his possession at the time when Yacapin professes to have seen it. In
finding the defendant guilty and imposing upon him a fine of Pl,800f the Court
of First Instance therefore committed no error.
During the hearing of this cause the trial judge formed the opinion that the
accused still had possession of the will. He therefore, upon July 22, ordered
the accused to produce the will in court and addressed to him, while he was
testifying as a witness in his own behalf, the following words: “I serve notice
on you now to produce the will of your deceased brother Joaquin Cruz or make a
reasonable and satisfactory explanation as to why you cannot do so. And be back
here on the 8th of August and we will take up the case again.” The accused,
however, failed to produce the will at the time specified in the notice,
alleging that though he had searched diligently among his papers he was unable
to find it; and he reiterated his previous assertion that the will had never
been in his possession. The judge was not satisfied with this explanation, and
upon deciding the present case against the defendant he not only imposed the
fine mentioned above but also included in the judgment an order to the effect
that the accused should be committed to the provincial jail until he should
produce the will or until further order of the court.
The judge of first instance believed that he had authority to give the notice
and make the order in question under section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which provides that if a person having custody of a will after the death of the
testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court
having jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to do, he may be committed to
the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court and there kept in
close confinement until he delivers the will.
It is our opinion that this provision can only be applied when a court is
acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the
estates of deceased persons; and where administration proceedings are not
already pending, the court, before taking action under this section, should
require that there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such
character as to make action by the court under this section appropriate.
The proceedings in this case, under section 628 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, is an ordinary criminal prosecution. The act penalized in that
section (628) is a special statutory offense and is properly prosecuted upon
complaint or information as other criminal offenses created by law. The fact
that this penal provision is contained in the Code of Civil Procedure does not
make the proceeding to enforce the penalty a civil proceeding in any sense. The
remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is evidently a totally
different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section 628; and it
is in our opinion not permissible in a prosecution under the last mentioned
section to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the
additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed in section 629.
It may further be observed that one grave difficulty in applying the remedy
provided in section 629 in a prosecution under section 628 is that to enforce
the production of the will by the accused at such trial would virtually compel
him to convict himself, since the mere production of the will by him would be
conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint;
and it seems probable that this would constitute an infringement of that
provision of law which says that in a criminal action the defendant shall be
exempt from testifying against himself. (See Gen. Orders No. 58, sec.
15.)
From what has been said it follows that the order of commitment made by the
lower court remanding the accused to jail should be vacated and if subsidiary
imprisonment should be imposed for insolvency the defendant shall, under the
provisions of Act No. 2557, be credited with the time during which he was
confined in pursuance of the order of the lower court. With this modification
the judgment of the court below should be affirmed with costs against the
appellant. So j ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, and Araullo,
JJ., concur.
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
I think it well, however, to indicate that I do not understand
the comment in the concluding paragraphs of the prevailing opinion to amount to
a ruling of this court that separate proceedings may not be instituted under the
terms of section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure to compel production of a
will after judgment of conviction under section 628; or, that, when no criminal
action is pending, commitment may not be had under section 629 in a proper case.
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
I concur in the resolution of the case.