DOMINGO FAJAEDO ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AMBOS CAMARINES, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This
is an original action in the Supreme Court whereby the petitioner seeks
to compel, by mandamus, the respondent judge to sign a bill of
exceptions.

The facts, according to the allegations in the
complaint, are these: At the general election held on June 6, 1916, the
petitioners and respondents, except the judge, were opposing candidates
for the various municipal officers of Baao, Province of Ambos
Camarines. The respondents were proclaimed elected. The petitioners
contested the election. After hearing, the motion of contest was
dismissed upon the merits. The petitioners prepared and submitted to
the judge a bill of exceptions for approval. The judge declined to sign
the bill for the reason, as he stated, that the judgment was final and
conclusive.

The respondents demurred to the petition upon the
groundthat it does not state facts sufficient to justify the issuance
of the writ, citing and relying upon the case of Arzadon vs. Chanco and Baldueza (14 Phil. Rep., 710) wherein the court held that:

“The
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance to hear and decide election
contests is exclusive and final (sec. 27 of the Election Law);
consequently, decisions rendered by them in the exercise of said
jurisdiction can not be reviewed by means of an appeal. As they are not
appealable and as against them no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy exists, it is evident that they constitute a proper subject for
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.”

Counsel for the
petitioners contends that the question whether judgments of Courts of
First Instance in municipal election contests are appealable has never
been directly raised and decided by this court and that, therefore, the
question is still an open one, citing McGirr vs. Hamilton and
Abreu (30 Phil. Rep., 563). We agree with counsel for the petitioners
upon this point and will proceed to examine the case as of first
impression.

Section 27 of Act No. 1582, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2170, provides, among other things, that:

“The
contest shall be filed with the court within two weeks after the
election and shall be decided by the same as soon as possible after the
hearing of the contest. Such court shall have exclusive and final
jurisdiction, except as hereinafter provided. * * *: Provided, however,
That an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court, within ten days, from
any final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance on contests
of elections for provincial governors, for the review, amendment,
repeal, or confirmation of such decision, and the procedure thereon
shall be the same as in a criminal cause.”

These provisions
were reenacted without change and now form a part of sections 576 and
577 of Act No. 2657, effective July 1, 1916.

It is contended
on behalf of the petitioners that both Acts, in so far as they attempt
to make the judgments of Courts of First Instance in such cases final
and conclusive, are inconsistent with and repugnant to the provisions
of section 9 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and section 26 of
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916.

The pertinent provisions of the two Acts of Congress, both being the same, read:

“That
the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine
Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided
and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by
law.”

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as thus
conferred upon it by Congress, may be added to, but not diminished, by
the Philippine Legislature. This proposition has long since been
settled and if the acts complained of do, in fact, curtail the
jurisdiction of this court, they are null and void. The inquiry now
arises whether the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands had
jurisdiction to entertain appeals from judgments of Courts of First
Instance in municipal
election contests prior to the enactment of the first Philippine Bill.

Section 18 of the Organic Act, No. 136, effective June 16, 1901, reads as follows:

“The
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of all actions and
special proceedings properly brought to it from Courts of First
Instance, and from other tribunals from whose judgment the law shall
specially provide an appeal to the Supreme Court.”

Section
496 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), effective October 1,
1901, provides that the Supreme Court may, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, affirm, reverse or modify any final judgment,
order or decree of a Court of First Instance regularly entered in the
Supreme Court by a bill of exceptions or appeal.

Section 56 of Act No. 136 provides that:

“Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:

“1. In all civil actions in which the subject of litigations is not capable of pecuniary estimation;” * * *.

Section
1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is “An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in civil actions and special proceedings in the Philippine
Islands,” defines an action to be “an ordinary suit in a court of
justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong;” and
then declares that “every other remedy furnished by law is a special
proceeding.” Under section 143 of Act No. 190, either party to an action
has the right to perfect a bill of exceptions for review by the Supreme
Court of all rules, orders, and judgments made in the action, to which
the party excepted in due time. The word “action,” as here used,
includes the special remedies of injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and con-
tempt. Part 2 of Act No. 190 contains the procedural law governing
“special proceedings.” In, such matters the orders, judgments, etc., of
Courts of First Instance are reviewed by the Supreme Court on appeal
and not by bills of exceptions. “Special proceedings” include
proceedings in habeas corpus,
the appointment of guardians, trustees and matters relating thereto,
and the settlement of estates of deceased persons, including appeals in
such matters. Every “special proceeding” is specifically defined and
dealt with under its corresponding title. Election contest cases are
nowhere mentioned or provided for in the Code. In fact, the only
references to election matters are found in the sections under the
title “Usurpation of office or franchise.” The remedies herein provided
are actions of quo warranto, which are not “special proceedings” within the meaning of the Code.

The
right of the Philippine Commission to create municipal offices, to
provide for the filling of them, and to determine the manner in which
the incumbents should derive their titles to such offices, at least
prior to the approval of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, has never
been questioned. In the exercise of this power, the Commission, after
providing for the election of municipal officials by the qualified
voters of the respective municipalities, declared that all contests in
such elections shall be heard and determined by the provincial board of
the organized province wherein the elections were held (sec. 13 of Act
No. 82, effective January 31, 1901), thus creating a special tribunal
for the determination of those questions exclusive of the Courts,
although possessing general and original jurisdiction under Act No.
136. While it is true that when an election took place under Act No. 82
and the will of the people was expressed through the ballot box, the
candidate receiving the number of votes necessary to elect him was
entitled to the possession of the office, its rights and emoluments,
and that these were his property, yet they were not of that class or
kind of property mentioned in section 56 of Act No. 136 over which
Courts of First Instance were given original jurisdiction. Neither was
the exercise of the right to hold the office and enjoy its emoluments
such a right which could be enforced in an “action” or “special
proceedings,” as these terms are used in the Code of Civil Procedure
(Act No. 190). There is a clear distinction between a proceeding to
contest an election and one to recover an office unlawfully withheld
from another. Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction in actions of quo warranto
to determine the title to an office and to oust the usurper, but this
action will not lie before the beginning of a term of office, as the
court can only give a judgment of ouster, based upon the existing
usurpation. Jurisdiction to hear and determine municipal election
contests was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance by Act No.
1582, effective January 9, 1907, but this was long after the approval
of the first Philippine Bill. The result is that neither Act No. 1582
with its amendments, nor the reenactment (sections 576 and 577 of Act
No. 2657) whereby judgments of Courts of First Instance in such cases,
when rendered upon the merits, are final and conclusive, does not
diminish the appellate jurisdiction of this court in violation of the
Acts of Congress, for the reason that this court did not have such
jurisdiction prior to the first Act of Congress.

For the
foregoing reasons, the demurrer to the petition is sustained and the
petitioners are given five days after notice within which to amend
their petition. If no amendment is filed within this time, judgment
will be entered dismissing the case, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.

Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Carson, J., concurs in the result.

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MORELAND, J., concurring:

I agree to the decision of the court on the ground that the subject of
election was left by Congress to the local legislative body and its
action in relation to appeals in contested election cases is binding on
the courts.