PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RONNIE QUITLONG Y FRIAS, SALVADOR QUITLONG Y FRIAS AND EMILIO SENOTO, JR.,Y PASCUA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

People versus Quitlong

The Case

This is a criminal case for murder. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong, and Emilio Senoto, Junior, for the killing of Jonathan Calpito on the evening of 20 October 1994 along Harrison Road in Baguio City. The accused admitted being at the scene but denied any part in the stabbing, pointing instead to a certain Jesus Mendoza, who remained at large. The case matters for two reasons: it is a clean illustration of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and it holds that conspiracy must be alleged in the information, not merely inferred from the evidence. It is a favorite of examiners on criminal procedure.

Procedural History

An information for murder was filed against the three accused and several unidentified persons. On motion for reinvestigation, the trial court allowed an amended information naming Jesus Mendoza as an additional accused. The three detained accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty; Mendoza was never arrested. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, rendered judgment on 21 April 1995, finding all three guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, sentencing each to an indeterminate penalty of twenty years of reclusion temporal as minimum to forty years of reclusion perpetua as maximum, and ordering them to pay damages. The accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning as errors the trial court's finding of conspiracy despite its absence from the information, the finding of conspiracy at all, and the conviction for murder instead of homicide.

Facts

At around six o'clock in the evening of 20 October 1994, Lito Adjaro saw his neighbor and friend Jonathan Calpito, a nineteen-year-old medical technology student, playing billiards in a game parlor in Baguio City. Past eight o'clock, Calpito, Adjaro, and Jonathan Gosil walked toward Harrison Road to catch a taxicab. Calpito and Gosil bought fishballs from a vendor. Counting his change from a one hundred peso bill, Calpito found he had been short-changed, and an argument ensued.

Herbert Soriano, driving a passenger jeep, stopped nearby after Adjaro hailed him. Moments later, eight men rushed toward Calpito and Gosil. Calpito retreated but was cornered. Adjaro saw Emilio Senoto embrace Calpito from behind while Salvador Quitlong held his right hand and Ronnie Quitlong held his left hand. Ronnie then stabbed Calpito on the left side of the body below the nipple. When the three released him, Calpito fell, and his attackers continued kicking him. Police officers on foot patrol arrived, and some of the assailants fled. A bloodstained knife was recovered near an electric post, and Adjaro recognized it as the weapon used.

Calpito died that same evening at the Baguio General Hospital. The autopsy showed a single stab wound that penetrated the left thoracic cavity and lacerated the heart, causing hypovolemic shock. The defense offered no alibi, admitted the accused were at the scene, but denied participation, claiming it was Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim. The trial court rejected this and convicted all three, finding they acted in conspiracy.

Issues

• Whether or not conspiracy may be appreciated against the accused when it is not alleged in the information but merely inferred from the allegation of abuse of superior strength.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that a conspiracy existed among the accused.
• Whether or not the accused are guilty of murder rather than homicide.

Applicable Provisions

Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.

This is the constitutional anchor of the ruling: an accused cannot be held liable for the acts of another unless the information tells him so.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled for the accused. The information, as amended, alleged only that the accused, "being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength," attacked and stabbed the victim. It nowhere alleged that they conspired or confederated. The Court held that the trial court erred in inferring conspiracy from the allegation of superior strength. Conspiracy is not a mere recital of fact that may be supplied by evidence; it is indispensable because it makes one liable for the acts of others. The Court explained that the information must convey the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose, or the community of design, either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms, or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information.

On the second issue, since conspiracy was not properly alleged, the Court could not hold the accused collectively liable. Each accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone, and that criminal responsibility is individual, not collective.

On the third issue, the Court nevertheless affirmed the finding of guilt based on the credible testimony of eyewitness Lito Adjaro, who positively identified the accused and described their respective participations, corroborated by Herbert Soriano and the police officers. The Court gave the highest respect to the trial court's assessment of credibility, absent any showing of ill motive. The conviction for murder stood, but the liability of each accused was individual, not founded on conspiracy.

Doctrine

For the Bar, retain these rules. First, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation under Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution requires that the information state every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime, including conspiracy where the prosecution seeks to hold one accused liable for the acts of another. Second, conspiracy must be alleged in the information, not merely inferred from the evidence; it may be alleged by using the word "conspire" or its synonyms, or by averring the basic facts showing a community of design or unity of purpose. Third, the sufficiency of the allegation is distinct from the sufficiency of the evidence: once conspiracy is properly alleged, it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Fourth, absent a valid allegation of conspiracy, an accused is liable only for his own acts, and criminal responsibility is individual, not collective.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for murder but held that conspiracy could not be appreciated because it was not alleged in the information, so each accused was held liable only for his own individual acts.

Remember This

Memorize the line: conspiracy must be alleged in the information, not just inferred from the evidence. Examiners use this case to test the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and the distinction between the sufficiency of the allegation and the sufficiency of proof of conspiracy.