THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GREGORIO EUGENIO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The defendant and appellant in this case, Gregorio Eugenio, was convicted in
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija of the abduction of
Esperanza de la Cruz in the municipality of Cabanatuan. The acts giving rise to
the prosecution are alleged to have taken place on the 23d, 24th, and 25th of
March, 1916. The accused, an unmarried man, was at the time of the alleged
offense about 23 years of age and a member of the municipal police in said
municipality, while the offended girl was about 16 years of age, living with her
sister Encarnacion de la Cruz, a married woman. The mother of these women is
dead, and the complaining witness had been living with her father until about
two months prior to the date of the alleged abduction, when she had come to live
with her sister.

According to the testimony of these two witnesses (and none others were
introduced by the prosecution) Esperanza disappeared from the house of her
sister during the night of March 23 and stayed away about two days. The account
given by Esperanza of her absence is that she and the defendant had agreed to
marry and that at about midnight of the date mentioned he took her to the
municipal building where he was on duty as a member of the police and that after
staying there about an hour he carried her to the home of an uncle of his who
lived in the adjoining barrio of Bantug. Here she remained with the defendant
for two days, during which time they cohabited together.

The accused admits having had a relation of friendly intimacy with the
complaining witness and says that he had visited her from time to time. He also
states that she had become enamoured of him and wished him to marry her, but
that he did not wish to do so. He denies that he took her from the house of her
sister or detained her during the time mentioned in the home of his uncle or
elsewhere.

Proof was introduced showing that the accused was on active duty as guard
from 8 a. m. to 8 p. m. on March 23, and from 4 a. m. to 8 a. m. on the 24th;
and two of his associates testified that from 8 p. m. on the 23d until 4 a. m.
on the 24th he was sleeping in the municipal building. On this point, however,
the evidence is unconvincing; and it is clear that the accused could have
abducted the girl during the four hours which elapsed between midnight and 4 a.
m. of the 24th.

The real weakness of the proof for the prosecution is found in the
irreconcilable conflicting between the testimony of Esperanza and her sister
Encarnacion upon the very material point of the location of the house where the
detention occurred; for while Esperanza testifies that the accused carried her
to the home of his uncle Ramon Pineda, in Bantug, Encarnacion testifies that the
girl was detained in the home of another uncle of the accused, named Quirino
Pineda, who lives in the poblacion of Cabanatuan. The elder sister mentions
circumstances enough to show clearly an intention on her part to fix upon the
residence of Quirino Pineda as the place of detention; but as against this
Esperanza declares that the detention was at the house of Ramon Pineda. We find
nothing in the record that would enable us to reconcile these declarations, or
to determine which witness spoke the truth. We are accordingly compelled to
recognize in this discrepancy a vital contradiction between these witnesses on a
most important point. This has the effect of impeaching the veracity of both,
for we can not safely speculate as to whether the one or the other spoke
truly.

This court, in discussing the value of the testimony of witnesses for the
prosecution in cases of rape and analogous crimes, has said, in United States
vs. Ramos (35 Phil. Rep., 671):

“Convictions cannot and should not be sustained when it appears that these
witnesses have willfully and knowingly testified falsely as to any matter
developed at the trial; or where they are in direct conflict as to any of the
circumstances to which they testify, when the conflict arises in regard to a
matter about which there could not well be a mistake.”

The principal question in the case of course is whether the accused induced
the offended girl to go to stay with him for purposes of debauchery, and the
place of detention is of no importance in the legal elements of the crime. But
the place where the girl stayed was the most conspicuous external fact connected
with the offense; and if the offense had been committed and these two witnesses
had intended to speak the truth, the contradiction which we find in their
testimony could not have arisen.

For the reasons stated, we are of the opinion that the defendant should be
acquitted. The judgment of the lower court is therefore reversed, with costs of
both instances de officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo, and Malcolm,
JJ., concur.