G.R. No. 12133. November 12, 1918
JUAN LAYDA ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. HIGINO LEGAZPI ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
JOHNSON, J.:
Pangasinan, on the 21st day of January, 1915, and, after numerous delays, was
finally submitted to the Supreme Court for final decision on the 9th day of
July, 1918. The purpose of the action was to recover, as owners, a piece or
parcel of land 47 meters long and 46 meters wide, together with P15 as
damages.
Upon an examination of the record, it was discovered that the decision of the
lower court had become final before the appeal had been perfected. That being
true, this court acquired no jurisdiction by virtue of the appeal; and not
having jurisdiction to consider the case upon its merits, it must be
dismissed.
Appellate courts have a right to examine the record for the purpose of
determining whether they have jurisdiction or not, even though that question has
not been raised. Jurisdiction of appellate courts is not conferred by consent of
the parties. The right to appeal is statutory.
Judgments in ordinary civil actions become final and may be executed the
moment the time for perfecting an appeal has elapsed. If the appellant allows
that time to elapse, his right to an appeal is lost. A failure to perfect the
appeal within the time prescribed is jurisdiction^ and the certification of a
bill of exceptions thereafter cannot restore the jurisdiction which is lost.
Since the decision in the case of Gomez Garcia vs. Hipolito (2 Phil. Rep.,
732), hundreds of motions have been made for the purpose of dismissing bills of
exceptions. The court has been annoyed by such motions, due to the fact’ that
the time for the presentation of bills of exceptions has not been definitely
fixed.
Since the pronouncement of numerous decisions upon the question when bills of
exceptions should be presented, the Legislature adopted Act No. 2347 (sections
26 and 27), which has made more certain that period. By virtue of section 26 of
said Act, the losing party in a land registration case must present his bill of
exceptions within thirty days, counting from the date on which he received a
copy of the decision, unless that period is extended by order of the court
before its expiration. (Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of
Lands, 34 Phil. Rep., 623; Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil. Rep., 774;
Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs. Alabado, 34 Phil. Rep., 920.)
From said thirty days there may be deducted the time which the court occupied
in considering a motion for a new trial and until notice of the decision on said
motion is received.
Since the announcement of the rule in the two above-cited cases, scarcely a
motion has been presented for the dismissal of a bill of exceptions in a land
registration case. The question whether or not the bill of exceptions is
presented within time in a land registration case, now, is simply a matter of
counting the days. Uncertainty leads to confusion, annoyance and delay.
A more difficult question is presented when we consider the exact period
within which a bill of exceptions must be presented in ordinary actions. That
period is not definitely fixed, in the terms of days, by any statute. In fact,
that period is about as uncertain and indefinite as it could possibly be made.
Section 143 of Act No. 190 provides that the bill of exceptions must be
presented within ten days after “notice of an intention to present a bill of
exceptions is given.” (Lim vs. Singian and Soler, 37 Phil. Rep., 817.) But when
or within what period must the “notice of an intention to present a bill of
exceptions” be given? Said section provides that such notice may be given (a) at
the time of rendition of the judgment; or (b) as soon thereafter as may be
practicable; and (c) at least before the end of the term of the eourt at which
final judgment is rendered. Thus it is seen that under that section it is
impossible to have any uniform rule for the presentation of the bill of
exceptions, for the reason that the time when “notice of an intention to present
a bill of exceptions” must be given, is uncertain. Certainly, the aggrieved
party could not be expected to “give notice of his intention to present a bill
of exceptions at the time of the rendition of the judgment,” if he had no notice
at that time of the decision; and the time “as soon thereafter as may be
practicable” is as indefinite and uncertain as the number of cases which will
arise; and “the end of the term of the court” is equally as uncertain. It is a
fact that the terms of courts are closed when the business of the particular
province1 is finished; that is especially so when the judge is sitting in two
provinces. The law fixes the time when the terms of court begin but does not fix
the time when the terms close, while in the city of Manila there are no terms;
the law requires that the judges shall hold court on all working days during the
year while there are cases ready for trial. (Sec. 5, Act No. 2347.) The law
fixes the exact time (ten days), (sec. 143) within which the bill of exceptions
must be presented after “notice of an intention to present a bill of exceptions”
is given. (Lim vs. Singian and Soler, supra.) The period above indicated, within
which “notice of an intention to present a bill of exceptions” must be
presented, is rendered more uncertain by the fact that, after notice of the
decision, a motion for a new trial may be presented. And it has been held, in
decisions without number, that the time, from the presentation of said motion,
until notice of the decision thereon is given, must not be counted as a part of
the time within” which “notice of an intention to present a bill of exceptions”
must be given.
In the case of Lim vs. Singian and Soler (supra), we held that the appellant
must file his bill of exceptions within ten days from the “time of giving notice
of his intention to do so” (Article 143, Act No. 190), or within such additional
time as the trial court may, by express order, have allowed, upon petition for
enlargement filed before the expiration of said statutory period of ten days;
and that unless the appellant files his bill of exceptions within such time, the
judgment becomes final and the successful litigant is entitled to a writ of
execution. That case settled the question definitely and finally with reference
to the time within which a bill of exceptions must be presented in an ordinary
action after the losing party “gives notice of his intention to appeal.” That
decision left open the question: Within what period must “notice of an intention
to present a bill of exceptions” be given?
Section 27 of Act No. 2347 provides, in ordinary actions, that a new trial
may be granted within thirty days after rendition of judgment and notice
thereof. A decision cannot become final, therefore, until after the expiration
of thirty days; unless a motion for a rehearing is presented earlier; that is to
say, if a motion for a new trial is presented upon the very day upon which
notice of the decision is given, or any day thereafter within the thirty days,
and the judge should decide the same immediately, the aggrieved party cannot
claim the balance of the thirty days against the period fixed for the
presentation of his bill of exceptions. In other words, if the aggrieved party
should present his motion for a rehearing on the very day on which he received
notice of the decision, and the judge should, on the same day, decide the motion
and give notice thereof, the time for the presentation of his bill of exceptions
would begin to run immediately upon receipt of said notice, and that must be the
rule whether the motion was presented upon the first of the thirty days or upon
the last. While the motion for a rehearing must be presented within thirty days,
the time for “giving notice of an intention to present a bill of exceptions”
will not begin to run until after said motion is decided and notice thereof is
given.
Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by
the law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to
controversies. (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O’Brien, 38 Phil. Rep., 251.)
In view of that doctrine, we believe that we are giving a sane interpretation
of the general provisions of the law when we decide that the “notice of an
intention to present a bill of exceptions” must be given within a period of five
days from the receipt of the notice of the decision, if no motion for a new
trial is made, and, within a period of five days after notice of the decision on
a motion for a new trial.
From all of the foregoing, and taking into consideration the amendments to
Act No. 190 upon the question which we are discussing, we are confident that we
are within the spirit, if not the letter, of the law in announcing the following
periods within which bills of exceptions must be presented:
(1) That in land registration cases, the bill of exceptions must be presented
within thirty days from the date of the receipt of the decision of the court;
that that period may be extended by an order of the court before its expiration
; that whatever time is occupied by the court in considering a motion for a new
trial, from the time of its presentation up to the time of notice of the
decision thereon, shall not be counted; (Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs.
Director of Lands, 34 Phil. Rep., 623; Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil.
Rep., 774; Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs. Alabado, 34 Phil. Rep., 920.)(2) That in ordinary actions, the aggrieved party has (a) thirty days within
which to present a motion for a new trial; (b) that after notice of the ruling
upon his motion, he has five days within which to present “notice of his
intention to present a bill of exceptions;” (c) that after the presentation of
“notice of his intention to present a bill of exceptions” he has ten days within
which to present his bill of exceptions (Lim vs. Singian and Soler, supra); (d)
that failure to comply with any of the foregoing requirements, within the
various periods mentioned, will cause the judgment to become final, upon which a
writ of execution may issue, and the presentation of a bill of exceptions
thereafter will not give the appellate court jurisdiction; and (e) that each and
all of said periods may be extended, by order of the court upon application made
prior to the expiration of the original period.
In the present case, the following facts appear: (a) The decision was
rendered on the 20th day of September, 1915 (the record does not show when the
aggrieved party received notice of said decision); (b) on the 11th day of
October, 1915, the aggrieved party presented a motion for a new trial; (c) the
motion for a new trial was denied on the 15th day of October, 1915 (the record
does not show when the aggrieved party received notice of the denial of said motion) ; (d) an exception to the order denying the motion for a new trial was presented on the 25th day of October, 1915; (e) the aggrieved party gave “notice of his intention to present a bill of exceptions” on the 22nd day of October, 1915; (f) nothing further was done until the 20th day of November, 1915, when the aggrieved party presented a motion for an extension of time within which to present his bill of exceptions, which motion was granted; (g) the bill of exceptions was presented on the 2d day of December, 1915, and certified by the judge on the 11th day of December, 1915, and the same was received in the Supreme Court on the 6th day of April, 1916.
It will be seen from the above facts that at least 29 days expired from the
date of the “notice of an intention to present a bill of exceptions” before the
motion was made for an extension of time within which to present the bill of
exceptions. Said motion was therefore made after the expiration of the period
for the presentation of the bill of exceptions and could not be extended.
(Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil. Rep., 774; Credit Company
vs. Arkansas, etc., Company, 128 U. S., 258.)
In addition to the foregoing reasons-for dismissing the bill of exceptions,
the record contains the following additional reasons for declaring the appeal
abandoned; (1) The bill of exceptions was not forwarded to the clerk of the
Supreme Court within the time prescribed, by law and the Rules of the Court;
(section 143 of Act No. 190; Rule 14 of the Supreme Court; Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Abrion, 38 Phil. Rep., 679; De Leon vs.
Rodriguez and Cruz, R. G. No. 14569.[1]gt;); (2) for the reason that neither the
registration fees nor the amount necessary for the printing of the bill of
exceptions were deposited within the time prescribed by the rules (rule 15 of
the Supreme Court; Duay and Luanzon vs. Puyaoan, R. G. No. 14457[2]; Reyes and Caluag vs. Reyes, R. G. No.
14472[3]; De Leon vs. Celestra,
R. G. No. 14456[4]; Ortega vs.
Ferrer, R. G. No. 14443[5]; Rodriguez
vs. Garcia, R. G. No. 14337[6];
Enriquez vs. Mercado and Liwanag, R. G. No. 14403[7]); (3) for the reason that the brief of the
appellant was not presented within the time prescribed. (Rule 21 of the Supreme
Court; Cadapan vs. Balquiebra, R. G. No. 13686[8]; Zelser vs. Bernardo, R. G. No.
13535[9]; Javier and Acuña vs.
Ponce, R. G. No. 13879[10]; Municipality
of Paoay vs. Diaz, R. G. No. 14222[11].)
In holding, as we do, that “notice of intention to present a bill of
exceptions” in an ordinary action must be given within five days from the date
of notice of the decision, or of the order denying the motion for a new trial,
we are aware that we are expressly overruling the cases of Santillan vs. Almonte
(24 Phil. Rep., 277) and Gascon Enriquez vs. Gibbs (27 Phil. Rep., 110)
in which it was held that twenty days would be allowed for that purpose. Since
these cases were decided the Legislature has passed Act No. 2347, by which
section-145 of the Code of Civil Procedure was so amended as to allow a
dissatisfied litigant thirty days from the date of the notice of the decision in
which to move for a new trial. Having this considerable period of time in which
to reflect upon the advisability of taking an appeal, the reasons, which we gave
in the cases cited for allowing twenty days in which to give of intention to
take a bill of exceptions, no longer exist.
For the reason that the bill of exceptions was not presented in time, the
judgment of the lower court became final and the right to appeal was lost. This
court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to consider the appeal. For that reason,
the same is dismissed without any finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Street, Avanceña, Malcolm, and Fisher,
JJ., concur.
[1] Resolution of October 21, 1918.
[2] Resolution of October 21, 1918.
[3] Resolution of September 23, 1918.
[4] Resolution of September 16, 1918.
[5] Resolution of September 16, 1918.
[6] Resolution of September 16, 1918.
[7] Resolution of September 2, 1918.
[8] Resolution of July 8, 1918.
[9] Resolution of July 15, 1918.
[10] Resolution of July 16, 1918.
[11] Resolution of October 7,
1918.