EUFROCINA TAMISIN, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CECILIO TAMISIN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. AMBROCIO ODEJAR AND GLICERIA GIBAS, DEFENDANTS AND APP…

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for the annulment of a sale at
public auction and for the reconveyance of the properties involved
therein.

The record shows that on February 18, 1951, the
Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
instituted Civil Case No. 9401 in the court below, praying that Cecilio
Tamisin and his children Rufino, Teresa and Eufrocina, as well as the
spouses Ambrocio Odejar and Gliceria Gibas, interplead and litigate
among themselves with respect to the sum of P500.00 belonging to Lt.
Roberto Tamisin, who died on March 12, 1942, and that the court declare
who are the legal heirs authorized by law to receive the said amount.

On being served with the summons, Ambrocio Odejar and his wife Gliceria
Gibas filed an answer containing a cross-claim against the Tamisins for
the recovery of one-half of the sum of P11,363.42 previously awarded to
the latter by the Judge Advocate General as arrears in pay due to the
estate of the deceased Lt. Roberto Tamisin, it being alleged that the
deceased was married to their daughter Paula Odejar who died without
issue.

In their answer, Cecilio Tamisin and his children
denied liability on the cross-claim and alleged that Lt. Roberto
Tamisin was never married to Paula Odejar.

Pending
litigation of the case, Cecilio Tamisin died and his children moved for
the dismissal of the cross-claim. The court, however, denied it and
suggested that proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the said
deceased be commenced so that the claim against him could be filed
therein. In view of the repeated neglect or refusal of the heirs or
next of kin of the deceased Cecilio Tamisin to act upon the suggestion
of the court, Ambrocio Odejar, on March 1, 1952, filed special
proceedings No. 4492 with the same court for the settlement of the
estate of the said deceased. In due time, one Ponciano Palis was
appointed special administrator but for reasons not stated he failed to
qualify. Meanwhile, the cross-claim as against Cecilio Tamisin was
eliminated in the interpleader suit and prosecuted only as against his
children.

On March 23, 1953, judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 9401, the dispositive part of which reads:

“Wherefore,
judgment is hereby rendered condemning Rufino Tamisin, Eufrocina
Tamisin and Teresa Tamisin jointly and severally to pay the spouses
Ambrocio Odejar and Gliceria Gibas in the amount of P5,688.71, with
legal interest thereon from March 6, 1951, the date of the filing of
the cross-claim; and that ½ of the amount of P500.00 which was
deposited at Corregidor by Lt. Tamisin are adjudged payable by the
plaintiff to the spouses Ambrocio Odejar and Gliceria Gibas, with costs
against the defendants Tamisin.”

The
Tamisins moved for new trial, alleging, among other things, that they
could prove that Roberto Tamisin and Paula Odejar were never married,
but said motion was denied. Upon motion by Adejar, who alleged that
Rufino Tamisin was disposing of his properties, the court issued an
order for the execution of the judgment.

No appeal having
been taken from the judgment, the same became final and pursuant to the
writ of execution issued therein, the provincial sheriff of Laguna
levied upon five parcels of land (described in par. 2 of the complaint
in the present action) for the satisfaction of the judgment. To enjoin
the sheriff from selling the property and to have the judgment set
aside and new trial ordered, the Tamisins filed with the Court of
Appeals a “petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.” (CA G. R. No. 14357-R.) The appellate court issued the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, but after hearing the case
on the merits, it dismissed the same for lack of merit and dissolved
the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued.

Thereafter, the sheriff proceeded with the execution and levy upon the
five parcels of land already referred to. The Tamisins, apparently
determined to block the enforcement of the judgment in the case, filed
a motion in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of their
deceased father for the issuance of an order to suspend the sale on the
ground that the properties were in custodia legis. The probate
court, however, denied the motion, and on March 28, 1956, the lands
were sold to the Odejar spouses for P7,798.01 in full-satisfaction of
the judgment rendered in their favor.

On June 15, 1956,
Eufrocina Tamisin was appointed the administratrix of the estate of her
deceased father Cecilio Tamisin. After her qualification, she asked
Odejar and his wife to reconvey to the estate under her administration
the properties acquired by them at the auction sale. As the latter
refused, Eufrocina Tamisin, in her capacity as administratrix, filed
the present action praying that the sale at public auction of the .five
parcels of land be declared null and void and that defendants be
ordered to reconvey them to her.

Defendants, in their answer, alleged that the properties in question at the time of the levy and execution sale were not in custodia legis; that plaintiff is estopped by res judicata
to bring the suit, the issues raised having been squarely decided by
the Court of Appeals in CA G. R. No. 14357, entitled “Rufino Tamisin,
Teresa Tamisin and Eufrocina Tamisin, petitioners, vs. The Judge of Court of First Instance of Laguna et al., respondents.”

After trial, the lower court, holding that the properties in dispute at
the time of the levy and execution sale were not in custodia legis,
rendered judgment on November 29, 1956, dismissing the complaint and
sentencing plaintiff iii her personal capacity to pay defendants the
sum of P500.00 as attorney’s fees, plus costs, the action being
“clearly unfounded and obviously filed to harass the defendants.”
Reconsideration of the decision having been denied, plaintiff took the
present appeal.

Plaintiff questions the validity of the
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 9401 under which the public auction
sale in question was made in that since the case pertained to the
recovery of a sum of money and the defendant Cecilio Tamisin died, the
same should have been dismissed and prosecuted in the intestate
proceedings. It will be noted, however, that the money claim was made
not only against Cecilio Tamisin and that after his death the claim as
against him was eliminated or dismissed and prosecuted only as against
the other defendants therein. The judgment in question, moreover, has
already become final. What is more, the question as to its validity has
already been raised before the Court of Appeals when the defendants in
the case, including herein plaintiff, filed a petition for its
annulment. The appellate court, however, dismissed the petition for
lack of merit and that judgment is now binding and conclusive upon us.
It may not be amiss to state here that the probate court in the
intestate proceedings issued, on July 12, 1956, an order stating that
“there is no need of further continuing the intestate proceedings
because the heirs are all of legal age, that they are in actual
possession of their respective share, and that it appeared that the
decedent has no outstanding obligations.”

The other question raised by plaintiff is whether or not the properties in question were in custodia legis
at the time of the levy and execution sale. The question, we think, was
correctly answered by the court below in the negative. While it is true
that proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Cecilio Tamisin was commenced sometime in 1952 at the instance, of
herein appellees, the assets left by the deceased had not yet been
placed under the control of the court, no one having qualified as
administrator. The properties remained as they were until the
qualification of herein plaintiff as administratrix in 1956, several
months after the levy and execution sale. Clearly, at the time of such
levy and execution sale, said properties were not yet in the custody of
the court.

“A thing is in custodia legis
when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official
custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution
of a legal writ.” (McFarland Carriage Co. vs. Solanes, 108 F. 532.)

“So
far as concern jurisdiction over property, the actual or constructive
possession, after filing of a bankruptcy petition, * * * by someone
claiming beneficial interest as custodians and court officers * * *
constitutes custodia legis for the purpose of assumption of
jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court, and the bankruptcy court assumes
jurisdiction over the property, and the property comes into its custodia legis,
if, after the filing of the petition, it is in the custody or control
of one of such persons.” (In Re Tax Service Ass’n. of Illinois, C. C.
A. 111., 95 F. 2d 373, 375.)

Plaintiff cites the case of Saturnino vs.
Paulino et al. (97 Phil., 50; 51 Off. Gaz. [9] 2899) as authority for
her contention that the filing of special proceedings No. 4492 vested
jurisdiction upon the probate court over the properties therein
involved. The contention, however, is not borne out by the case cited.
This Court there merely held that the house and lot involved therein
were not in custodia legis because said properties were sold
almost “a month before the institution of the special proceedings.” It
does not necessarily follow that a decedent’s property takes the
character of property in custodia legis upon the mere filing or
institution of the special proceedings for its settlement. For one
thing, an inventory has yet to be made, which inventory can only be
made by an administrator or executor. (Sec. 1, Rule 84, Rules of
Court.) In the absence, therefore, of such administrator or executor,
no property sought to be the subject of administration proceedings can
be said to have been subjected to the jurisdiction of the court, the
same not being under the custody or control of a properly appointed
custodian or court officer.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Barrera, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, J., concurs in the result.

Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., did not take part.