THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RODOLFO ATREJENIO Y LIBANAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Atrejenio versus People

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Rodolfo Atrejenio y Libanan for the killing of Bonifacio Olino y Jose, and the accused-appellant asks the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction for murder. The case matters for the bar candidate because it gathers in one decision several doctrines tested together: the exclusion of a confession taken without the Miranda warnings, the admissibility of a dying declaration as an exception to the hearsay rule, the weight of an alibi against positive identification, and the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. It is a study in how the Court sifts the admissible from the inadmissible and still finds guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Procedural History

The accused was charged with murder in an information filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12, alleging that he shot the victim with a homemade gun, with treachery and evident premeditation. He pleaded not guilty, and trial proceeded. The prosecution presented two eyewitnesses, Lito Olino and Leonito Toltol, together with the medico-legal officer, the police investigator, and a ballistics expert from the National Bureau of Investigation. The defense presented the accused and two friends who corroborated his alibi.

On April 7, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim 50,000 pesos as damages. The accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which reviewed the records and the assigned errors and rendered the decision now before us.

Facts

At about eight in the evening of July 27, 1986, Bonifacio Olino and his first cousin Lito Olino were walking along Osmeña Street toward Panday Pira Street in Tondo, Manila. The accused, a neighbor of about two weeks, was seen standing alone behind a culvert and taking cover near a concrete fence, some eight arm lengths away. When the two cousins had come to within about five arm lengths, the accused suddenly came out and fired at the victim with a .38 caliber revolver, holding the gun in his right hand and supporting it with his left. The place was lit by an electric post and a nearby store.

The victim fell to the pavement. As Lito lifted him, the victim told him that he had been shot by his enemy, the accused. The victim was rushed to the Mary Johnston Hospital but was declared dead on arrival. The autopsy showed a gunshot wound on the left anterior thorax that lacerated the upper lobe of the left lung, with a round pellet recovered from the back, and no defensive wounds at all. A second eyewitness, Leonito Toltol, who was buying cigarettes at a store nearby, saw the shooting and identified the accused as the assailant.

Later that night, Lito accompanied the police investigator to the accused's house, where Lito identified him as he came out. At the police station the accused was investigated after being apprised of his constitutional rights, and he orally admitted the killing, saying that he and the victim had quarreled at a benefit dance a month before and that the victim had been looking for him the day before. The defense, for its part, claimed that the accused was in front of his house talking with two friends when they heard a gunshot and a commotion, and that he had no gun and no motive to kill.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in relying on the evidence of the prosecution after the accused's alleged oral confession was disregarded as violative of his Miranda rights.
• Whether or not the dying declaration of the victim is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
• Whether or not the inconsistencies between the sworn statement and the testimony of the eyewitness, and the failure to present the firearm, create reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the defense of alibi can prevail over the positive identification of the accused.
• Whether or not the killing is qualified by treachery so as to constitute murder.

Applicable Provisions

Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

This is the provision the Court invokes to exclude the accused's oral admission, since the confession was taken without the required warnings and therefore cannot be used against him.

Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, on dying declarations, is the rule the Court applies to the victim's statement identifying his assailant, and it provides:

The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

This is the exception to the hearsay rule on which the conviction chiefly rests, because the victim spoke in extremis and identified the accused as his killer.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court agreed that the oral confession was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of the accused's rights under Article III, Section 12, but held that the remaining evidence fully established his guilt. The strongest basis for conviction was the victim's dying declaration. The Court laid down the requisites: the statement must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; the declarant must have been under the consciousness of an impending death; he must have been competent as a witness had he survived; and the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the declarant was the victim. All four were present, for the victim pointed to the accused as his assailant as he was lifted from the pavement, knowing he had sustained a fatal wound, and he died shortly after.

On the second issue, the Court held that the discrepancies between the eyewitness's sworn statement and his testimony in court did not destroy his credibility. An affidavit taken ex parte is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, and is generally inferior to testimony given in open court. The discrepancy as to whether the witness and the victim were brothers or cousins was immaterial, and the correction as to the weapon, from a homemade gun to a .38 caliber revolver, was explained by the witness's state of confusion and was confirmed by the ballistics expert. The Court added that the presentation and identification of the weapon used are not indispensable to prove guilt.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the alibi. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else; it must likewise be shown that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The distance between the two streets was not so great as to preclude his presence, and his alibi could not prevail over his positive identification by the victim himself and by the two eyewitnesses.

On the fourth issue, the Court affirmed that the crime is murder. Evident premeditation could not be appreciated for want of evidence of planning and preparation, but treachery attended the killing, because the accused positioned himself behind a culvert and took cover near a concrete fence, then suddenly came out and fired at the unsuspecting victim as he walked innocently along the street.

Doctrine

A confession obtained without the Miranda warnings is inadmissible in evidence against the accused, but the prosecution may still convict on the remaining competent evidence. A dying declaration is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule when the four requisites concur, and it may be the strongest basis for conviction. An affidavit taken ex parte is inferior to testimony given in open court, and inconsistencies between them do not necessarily impair credibility. Alibi, to prosper, must strictly satisfy the requirement of time and place and cannot overcome positive identification. Finally, treachery qualifies a killing to murder where the assailant deliberately adopts a mode of attack that ensures the victim's death without risk to himself, as when he hides and suddenly fires at an unsuspecting victim.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim 50,000 pesos as damages.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a confession taken in violation of the Miranda rights is inadmissible, yet a dying declaration made under the consciousness of an impending death may stand as the strongest proof of guilt. Examiners like to use this case to test the requisites of a dying declaration, the strict requirements of alibi, and the appreciation of treachery where the assailant hides and suddenly fires at an unsuspecting victim.