PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE VS. JOSEFINA A. ESPARAS AND RODRIGO O. LIBED (AT LARGE), ACCUSED.  JOSEFINA A. ESPARAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Esparas

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Josefina Esparas, with her co-accused Rodrigo Libed remaining at large. It is a criminal prosecution for the crime of illegally bringing methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, into the country, in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The case matters for two reasons. First, it marks the first imposition of the death penalty on a woman in this jurisdiction. Second, it settles two questions every reviewee must know: who decides whether an accused may be discharged as a state witness, and how conspiracy and membership in an organized or syndicated crime group are established for the purpose of the death penalty.

Procedural History

The Department of Justice conducted the preliminary investigation and charged Esparas and Libed before the Regional Trial Court. At arraignment, Esparas pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution presented its key witnesses, she escaped from confinement, and the defense presented no witness. The trial court found her guilty as charged, sentenced her to death, and ordered her to pay a fine of ten million pesos and the costs of suit. Because the penalty imposed was death, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. While the review was pending, the Court required the parties to comment on the effect of her escape on its jurisdiction. By an extended resolution, the Court upheld its power and duty to review all death penalty cases regardless of the escape of the accused. Esparas was later rearrested, making the jurisdictional question moot, and the Court proceeded to review her conviction on the merits.

Facts

On the twentieth of May, 1994, a Cathay Pacific flight from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Among the passengers were Esparas and her niece, Alma Juson. At the customs inspection lane, Rodrigo Libed approached the examiner, handed her the baggage declaration form of Esparas and Juson, and placed Esparas' black traveling bag on the inspection table. Libed wore a stick-on customs official business pass and a Citizen's Crime Watch pin. When the examiner found a wooden false bottom halfway through the bag, Libed, in a trembling voice, asked her to help and claimed the matter was known to the Collector's Office. The Collector denied clearing the bag and ordered a thorough inspection. The examiner slashed the false bottom and recovered a plastic bag of yellowish crystalline granules later confirmed to be shabu.

While Libed was explaining, Juson, followed closely by Esparas, pushed a cart loaded with a second black traveling bag toward the exit gate. The Collector noticed them and shouted for a customs police officer to intercept them. They were escorted back, and the second bag, also fitted with a false bottom, yielded another plastic bag of shabu. The total weight of the regulated drug was nearly twenty kilograms. Among the items seized from Esparas were her plane ticket, the claim tags corresponding to the two bags, her passport, and her arrival immigration card.

In her counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation, Esparas claimed that the bags belonged to a certain Robert Yu, a Chinese national introduced to her by Libed, who financed her trips and asked her to bring the bags to Manila. She asked to be made a state witness against Yu. Juson was excluded from the information for lack of complicity. Esparas escaped during trial, so her counter-affidavit was offered in place of her testimony. She was later rearrested.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the request of Esparas to act as a state witness against the alleged real culprit.
• Whether or not the evidence sufficiently established her guilt for illegally bringing shabu into the country.
• Whether or not the death penalty was properly imposed, that is, whether or not conspiracy and membership in an organized or syndicated crime group were established.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure governs the discharge of an accused to be a state witness:

Section 9. Discharge of accused. When two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.

This provision bears on the case because the prosecution never filed a motion for her discharge, and the requisites were in any event absent.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the determination of who should be criminally charged is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. The prosecutor cannot be faulted for refusing to use Esparas as a state witness. Robert Yu was neither a co-accused nor a co-conspirator, and the discharge of an accused under Section 9 is for the purpose of testifying against a co-accused in the same case. Moreover, the requisites were not met: there was no necessity for her testimony, other direct evidence was available, her testimony could not be substantially corroborated, and she appeared to be the most guilty, having checked in the luggage in Hongkong and attempted to check it out upon arrival. Since the prosecution filed no motion, the trial court could not be faulted for not appreciating a non-existent motion.

On the second issue, the Court found no doubt as to her guilt. The bags containing the shabu were in her possession: she personally accomplished the baggage declaration and declared the contents as personal effects, and she checked in the bags in her name as shown by the claim tags attached to her ticket. These circumstances gave rise to the disputable presumption that she owned the bags, which she failed to rebut. The Court held that intent to possess, or animus possidendi, is a state of mind inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. Her act of walking away toward the exit gate while the customs personnel were arguing with Libed led to the inescapable conclusion that she knew the illegal contents of her bags. Her defense that Robert Yu owned the shabu rested on her counter-affidavit, which was hearsay and had no probative value because she never took the witness stand to affirm it or be cross-examined.

On the third issue, the Court upheld the death penalty. The governing law was Republic Act Number 7659, which amended the Dangerous Drugs Act. Under Section 20 of that law, the penalty for unlawfully bringing two hundred grams or more of shabu into the country is reclusion perpetua to death, with a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos, and the crime is aggravated when committed by any person who belongs to an organized or syndicated crime group, in which case the death penalty shall be imposed. The Court defined an organized or syndicated crime group as a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating, or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. It found the collaborative efforts of Esparas and Libed well established: she coordinated her departure flight with him, he secured a customs pass by false representation, he tried to dissuade the examiner from inspecting the luggage, and she attempted to leave with the second bag. Their conduct conclusively pointed to conspiracy, one performing one part and the other a complementary part in pursuance of a common unlawful purpose.

Doctrine

First, the determination of who should be criminally charged is an executive function, and the discharge of an accused as a state witness requires a motion by the prosecution and compliance with all the requisites of Section 9, Rule 119, including that the accused does not appear to be the most guilty. Second, possession of a prohibited drug raises the disputable presumption of ownership, and intent to possess is a state of mind inferred from the acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. Third, an organized or syndicated crime group is a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating, or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime, and conspiracy may be shown by the complementary acts of the participants in pursuit of a common unlawful purpose.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the conviction of Esparas, including the death penalty, the fine of ten million pesos, and the costs of suit.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the determination of who should be criminally charged is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. Examiners use this case to test the requisites for discharge as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119, and the definition of an organized or syndicated crime group that triggers the death penalty under the Dangerous Drugs Act.