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IN THE MATTER OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MARCELINO AGUAS FOR CONTEMPT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA.

G.R. No. 12. August 08, 1901 August 8, 1901

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Aguas versus the Court of First Instance of Pampanga

The Case

This is the matter of the proceedings against Marcelino Aguas, an attorney, for contempt of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The question is whether an attorney may be punished for contempt when, during a trial, he rises to protest what he regards as the judge's coercive handling of a witness and demands that the incident be placed on the record. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between a lawyer's duty to represent his client and the court's power to punish for contempt, and it teaches that a finding of contempt cannot rest on a bare conclusion such as a "menacing attitude" without the concrete facts from which that conclusion is drawn.

Procedural History

During a trial before the Court of First Instance at Bacolor, in the Province of Pampanga, the judge cautioned a witness, Angel Alberto, to look at the judge rather than at the defendant's attorney. When the witness did not heed the warning, the judge rose, approached him, seized him by the shoulders, and said, "Lingon ang mucha," meaning "Look at me." The defendant's attorney, Marcelino Aguas, protested and demanded that a record be made of the occurrence and that the hearing be postponed. Two days later the clerk entered a recital of the incident, together with a statement that on prior occasions the attorney had been wanting in respect to the court by using improper phrases and by interrupting opposing counsel. On this record the court adjudged the attorney in contempt and suspended him from the practice of his profession for twenty days.

The attorney appealed, but the lower court disallowed the appeal. He then asked to be heard in justification, which was granted. On that hearing evidence was taken, and the court found that the attorney had risen in a menacing attitude and, with voice and body trembling, protested that the judge's action was coercive of the witness. On this finding the court again adjudged him guilty of contempt and again suspended him for twenty days. From that judgment Señor Aguas appealed to this court.

Facts

On the twenty-ninth of August, 1900, a trial was in progress before the Court of First Instance at Bacolor, in Pampanga. The court had occasion to caution Angel Alberto, a witness, not to look at the attorney for the defendant but to fix his attention on the judge who was examining him. The witness did not give heed to the warning. The judge thereupon arose from his seat, approached the witness, seized him by the shoulders, and used the expression "Lingon ang mucha," meaning "Look at me." The accounts differ on whether he shook the witness, as the defendant's attorney insisted, or only turned him about, as the judge and others claimed.

Either way, the seizing of the witness brought the defendant's attorney to his feet. He protested against the action of the judge as coercive of the witness, demanded that a record be made of the occurrence, and asked that the further hearing of the case be postponed. Two days afterward the clerk entered in his record a recital of the incident and also a statement that on other and prior occasions the attorney, Marcelino Aguas, had been wanting in respect to the court by making use of improper phrases and by interrupting opposing counsel in their examination of witnesses.

On this record the court adjudged the attorney in contempt and suspended him from the practice of his profession for twenty days. On the later hearing in justification, the court found that during the trial the judge had seized the witness by the shoulders to turn him around, and that Señor Aguas, the attorney for the defendant, had risen from his seat in a menacing attitude and, with voice and body trembling, protested that the action of the judge was coercive of the witness. When his attention was called to the fact that he was wanting in respect to the court and that he should sit down, he waived his right to go on with the trial and moved for a postponement of the hearing. On this finding the court again adjudged him guilty of contempt and again suspended him for twenty days.

Issues

  • Whether or not the action of the judge in seizing the witness by the shoulder and turning him about was warranted.
  • Whether or not the attorney's protest against that action and his demand that the incident be recorded constituted contempt of court.
  • Whether or not the finding that the attorney's attitude was menacing, without the specific acts from which that conclusion was drawn, is sufficient to support a judgment of contempt.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision. It rests on the principle, stated by the Court itself, that every witness is entitled to freedom from unlawful personal violence while giving testimony. The Court expresses that principle in these words:

In our opinion the action of the judge in seizing the witness, Alberto Angel, by the shoulder and turning him about was unwarranted and an interference with that freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every witness is entitled while giving testimony in a court of justice.

This principle bears on the case because it establishes that the attorney had a right to protest, so that the protest itself could not be contempt unless it was disrespectfully made.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the judge's action in seizing the witness by the shoulder and turning him about was unwarranted and an interference with the freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every witness is entitled while giving testimony in a court of justice.

On the second issue, the Court held that against such conduct the appellant had the right to protest and to demand that the incident be made a matter of record. That he did so was not contempt, provided the protest and demand were respectfully made and with due regard for the dignity of the court. The Court framed the remaining question thus:

The only question, therefore in this case is, Was the appellant respectful and regardful of the court's dignity in presenting his objection and asking that it be recorded in the proceedings?

On the third issue, the Court held that the finding that his attitude was menacing, standing alone, could not support the judgment. The witnesses said, and the judge found, that his attitude was menacing at the moment of making his protest, but beyond that there was nothing in the record tending to show that he was disrespectful to the court or unmindful of its dignity. The Court reasoned that both testimony and finding stated a mere conclusion which, in the absence of the facts from which it was deduced, is wholly valueless to support a judgment of contempt. The statement that the attorney's attitude was menacing tended no more to establish the offense than if the witnesses had testified and the court had found that his conduct was contemptuous or lacking in respect. The specific act from which the inference was drawn should have been testified to by the witnesses and found by the court, and failing that, the record did not show concrete facts sufficient to justify the conclusion that he was disrespectful to the court or offensive to its dignity.

Doctrine

First, a witness in a court of justice is entitled to freedom from unlawful personal violence while giving testimony, and a judge's seizure and turning about of a witness is an unwarranted interference with that freedom.

Second, an attorney has the right to protest against such conduct and to demand that the incident be made a matter of record, and doing so is not contempt, provided the protest and demand are respectfully made and with due regard for the dignity of the court.

Third, a judgment of contempt cannot rest on a bare conclusion such as a menacing attitude, a contemptuous manner, or a lack of respect. The specific acts from which the conclusion is inferred must be testified to by the witnesses and found by the court; without those concrete facts, the conclusion is wholly valueless to support a judgment of contempt.

Disposition

The judgment appealed from was reversed, with costs de oficio, and the attorney was relieved of the contempt adjudication and the suspension from the practice of his profession.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a protest respectfully made and a demand that it be recorded are not contempt, and a finding of a menacing attitude without the specific acts behind it is wholly valueless to support a judgment of contempt. Examiners use this case on the limits of the contempt power and on the requirement that contempt findings rest on concrete facts, not on conclusions.