🎧 Case Brief Lecture

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995 September 18, 1995

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Romualdez-Marcos versus Commission on Elections

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari brought by Imelda Romualdez-Marcos against the Commission on Elections and Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte. Mrs. Marcos asks the Supreme Court to annul the resolutions of the Commission on Elections that cancelled her certificate of candidacy and declared her disqualified from running for the House of Representatives on the ground that she lacked the one year residency requirement. The case matters because it settles, for all election cases, that the constitutional word residence means domicile, and that the fact of domicile, not the entry in a certificate of candidacy, decides a candidate's qualification.

Procedural History

Mrs. Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte. Private respondent Montejo then filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the Commission on Elections, docketed as SPA 95-009. The Second Division of the Commission, by a vote of two to one, found the petition meritorious, struck off the amended certificate, and cancelled the original certificate. Mrs. Marcos moved for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc denied it in a resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections. The Commission then issued one resolution allowing her proclamation should she obtain the highest number of votes, and on the same day reversed itself and suspended her proclamation. Mrs. Marcos came to the Supreme Court by original petition, later supplemented, alleging that she won overwhelmingly with 70,471 votes against the 36,833 votes of Montejo.

Facts

On March 8, 1995, Mrs. Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for Representative of the First District of Leyte. In item number eight, on residence in the constituency immediately preceding the election, she wrote seven years and seven months. On March 23, 1995, Montejo filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification, alleging that she did not meet the one year residency requirement, relying on her voter registration record and on her certificate of candidacy.

On March 29, 1995, Mrs. Marcos filed an amended certificate changing the entry from seven months to since childhood. The Provincial Election Supervisor refused to receive it because the deadline of March 20, 1995 had lapsed. She then filed the amended certificate with the Commission's head office on March 31, 1995, together with her answer, claiming that the entry of seven was an honest misinterpretation and that she had always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile.

The Commission found that she had not complied with the one year residency requirement. It noted that when she returned to the Philippines in 1991 she chose San Juan, Metro Manila, that she had registered and declared herself a resident of various places in Manila, and that she had asked the election officer of San Juan to cancel her registration so she could transfer to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It concluded that she had abandoned Tacloban City as her domicile and that her claim of residence since childhood was a mere color of qualification.

Issues

  • Whether or not Mrs. Marcos was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for one year at the time of the elections.
  • Whether or not the Commission on Elections properly exercised jurisdiction in disqualifying her outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases.
  • Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of her qualifications after the elections.

Applicable Provisions

The 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 6, on the qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives, provides:

No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election.

This is the provision whose one year residency requirement Mrs. Marcos is said to have failed.

Article 50 of the Civil Code provides:

For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence.

This supplies the civil law concept of domicile that the Court carries into election law.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that residence in election law is synonymous with domicile. Domicile has two elements: the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place, and the intention of returning there permanently, which the Court calls animus manendi. The Court quoted its own settled distinction:

Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.

The Court stressed that it is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, that is decisive, and that the statement becomes material only when there appears a deliberate attempt to mislead. It found that Mrs. Marcos had always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile, that her absence from it did not amount to abandonment, and that she satisfied the one year residency requirement. On the jurisdictional issues, the Court held that the Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion, but that after the elections the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of its members.

Doctrine

For election purposes, residence means domicile, which requires bodily presence in a fixed place coupled with the intention to remain there permanently. A person may have several residences but only one domicile, and mere absence without intent to abandon does not change it. The entry in a certificate of candidacy does not control qualification; the fact of domicile does, and the entry matters only where there is a deliberate attempt to mislead. Once a candidate has been proclaimed and the election is held, the electoral tribunal, not the Commission, has exclusive jurisdiction over qualifications.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the resolutions of the Commission on Elections disqualifying Mrs. Marcos, and ordered that she be allowed to assume office upon proclamation.

Remember This

Memorize the line that residence in election law means domicile, requiring physical presence plus the intention to remain permanently. Examiners use this case to test the residence requirement for legislators and the shift of jurisdiction to the electoral tribunal after proclamation.