G.R. No. 11952. September 25, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. NICOLAS MACAMAY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
STREET, J.:
was a participant in a robbery committed on the night of May 5, 1915, in the
house of Juan Mar, in the municipality of Catarman, Province of Misamis. The
robbery was perpetrated by an armed band of more than three men; and assuming
the truth of the evidence which implicates the accused the band consisted of
seven. Six were brought to trial in the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Misamis and convicted; but in the present case only four were tried together,
the other two having been granted a separate trial. From a judgment of
conviction rendered in this case the defendant Macamay has appealed.
It appears that at about 10 o’clock at night, at the time and place
mentioned, armed men entered the house of Juan Mar, and with threats and menaces
ordered the inmates to give up their money. Aquilina Mar, a sister of Juan Mar,
was required to produce the keys to certain trunks in the sala. These
were opened and searched, but no valuables were found in them. Three of the
robbers then repaired to the bedroom of Juan Mar, leaving three of their
companion on guard in the sala. In the bedroom a trunk or receptacle was
discovered which, upon being opened with a key, likewise obtained from Aquilina
Mar, was found to contain P2,500 in money, which was taken by the robbers. They
also carried away a few articles of personal property, worth about P5. In these
acts one of the principal parts was taken by a man who was sufficiently
identified at the trial as Lorenzo Tinampay. At the time of the robbery his face
was blackened, probably with charcoal, but otherwise none of the participants
were disguised.
The main evidence connecting the defendant Nicolas Macamay with the crime
consists in the testimony of Nicolas Ranollo and Benigno Madria, each of whom
admitted his own complicity in the crime. Their story is substantially to the
following effect: About two days before the perpetration of the robbery Simeon
Ventusal and Lorenzo Tinampay, being in a barrio somewhat remote from the scene
of the robbery, there induced Benigno Madria and Francisco Bacleon to join them
on the pretence that they were going over into a neighboring barrio to gamble.
The party then proceeded to the home of Nicolas Macamay, the defendant, where
they arrived at about 10 o’clock on the night of May 4. Here they were
entertained until the next night. Here also they were joined by Basilio, whose
surname was not ascertained; and here Macamay and Ranollo, who had been employed
by him a few days before as a laborer, identified themselves with the
enterprise. After supper the party of seven left the house of Macamay and had
proceeded but a short way when they were halted and told by Simeon Ventusal that
the real purpose of the expedition was to rob the house of Juan Mar, who lived
some 2 kilometers away. When this revelation was made Madria and Ranollo desired
to abandon the party, so they claim, but were forced by threats to stay with the
band. Nicolas Macamay, who had come along in the rear of the party, then
produced arms which were distributed among the seven. There was one rifle, which
was given to Madria; and each of the others was supplied with a cutting weapon
of some kind, such as a barong, bolo, sword, or dagger. The band then
proceeded to the house of Juan Mar and on approaching found it necessary to wait
awhile in a coconut grove until a serenader should go away. After his departure
the band approached the house, and after Nicolas Macamay and Basilio had been
posted downstairs as a guard, the other five went upstairs with the results
already stated.
Upon leaving the place of the robbery the party returned to the home of
Macamay and obtaining a light repaired a short distance away where the money was
divided in the early hours of the morning. Only the silver coin, amounting to a
few hundred pesos, was here divided among all the members of the band; and some
P1,700 in bills was reserved by the three leaders from this division—a
circumstance which probably led to dissatisfaction among the others.
Nicolas Macamay was a man of some substance and prior to this affair his
conduct appears not to have been subject to criticism. His family was distantly
related to that of Mar, but they do not seem to have been on a footing of
intimacy. Macamay denied participation in the robbery and attempted, in an
unconvincing way, to prove an alibi. He admits that about the middle of April
four members of the band had visited him seeking for work, and that on May 6,
1915, five members of the band again appeared on the same errand. They took
dinner, and according to Macamay’s statement left in the early afternoon.
The testimony of the witnesses Ranollo and Madria is corroborated by the
testimony of Francisco Bacleon which was given in the court under the following
circumstances: Bacleon was one of the four who were tried in this case, and not
being represented by a lawyer, was asked by the court if he had any witnesses
whom he wished to call. He responded that he had not. The court then told him he
had a right to testify if he wished to do so, but that he could not be required
to give evidence against himself. The witness said he wished to testify, and
having taken the stand, told a story in all material respects the same as that
told by Ranollo and Madria. This testimony was introduced after the defense for
Macamay had rested. Macamay and his counsel were present in court and had an
opportunity to cross-examine Bacleon, but failed to do so. This testimony was
not a part of the evidence introduced by the Government; but we know of no rule
under which it could be excluded from the consideration of the court in this
case. The defendants were jointly accused, were tried together, and the
testimony lawfully given at the trial by any of them was competent evidence
against his companions.
The statements made by these three witnesses as to the connection of Nicolas
Macamay with this robbery are credible and reasonable and in our opinion must be
accepted as true, even without any weighty corroborative proof. However, we
think that the admitted fact that this party was entertained at Macamay’s house
just before the robbery occurred is an important circumstance against him; and
the statements of the witnesses mentioned relative to what occurred in the house
of Juan Mar are fully corroborated by the testimony of the inmates of the
house.
After a careful examination of the record we reach the conclusion that
Macamay’s complicity is shown with all the certainty which the law requires; and
we think that the trial court committed no error in finding him guilty. No
motive appears why the witnesses who testified against Macamay should have
desired to implicate him, if he was innocent, and certainly there was no lack of
others on whom to put the blame. We think it is evidently a case where these
witnesses realized that lies would not serve any purpose, and animated doubtless
by the hope of leniency they decided to make a full and true statement of the
entire transaction. We here have a case where four men were tried together.
Three successively took the stand and, admitting their own guilt, testified that
the fourth was a member of the band. The proof clearly shows that this band was
composed of seven men, of whom three, namely, Ventusal, Tinampay, and Macamay
were what might be called strong characters, while these three implicating
witnesses were of weaker metal. They were evidently drawn into the robbery by
the influence which was exerted over them by the others, and were discriminated
against in the division of the spoils. At the trial they yielded to the natural
impulse to put the chief blame upon the principal authors of the crime. If
courts did not have the courage to declare an accused person guilty upon
evidence such as that which is produced against Nicolas Macamay in this case,
their judgments would reflect the mere whims and the caprices of particular
judges; and the administration of justice would become a farce.
Our examination of the record in this case was primarily made with a desire
to accede, if possible, to the recommendation of acquittal contained in the
brief from the office of the Attorney-General; but our conclusion is that this
recommendation cannot properly be followed.
In the court below the defendants were all sentenced to twelve years and one
day, cadena temporal. This sentence was based on article 508 of the
Penal Code, it being assumed by the court that the case fell under subsection 3
of that article, as the trunk from which the money was taken was opened with a
key obtained from the owner by force and intimidation. This in the opinion of
the court constituted the use of false keys (see art. 516) and brought the case
under subsection 3 of article 508. It should be noted, however, that the use of
false keys mentioned in subsection 3 has reference to the mode of entering the
house and not to the method of opening a trunk in the house. In the present case
the robbers came in through the door, and article 508 was inapplicable.
The crime committed in the present case is that of robbery en
cuadrilla, with violence or intimidation against the person, with the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and that the crime was committed in the
dwelling of the injured person; and it should be punished in conformity with
subsection 5 of article 503, in relation with articles 504 and 505. (U. S.
vs. Gutierrez, 14 Phil. Rep., 388; U. S. vs. De los Santos, 12
Phil. Rep., 622; U. S. vs. Gamboa, 11 Phil. Rep., 39; U. S.
vs. Quijano, 11 Phil. Rep., 368; U. S. vs. Sol, 9 Phil. Rep.,
265; U. S. vs. Callotes, 2 Phil. Rep., 16.)
The defendants therefore should have been sentenced to ten years,
presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties specified in article 57 of
the Penal Code. With this modification the judgment of the court below should be
affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
The main evidence connecting the appellant with the crime charged, according
to the majority decision, consists in the testimony of his two coaccused, one of
whom admitted that he had committed perjury in the preliminary examination, who
had already been tried but not sentenced and who may have testified against the
appellant for the purpose of revenge, whose statements are incredible and
confused, and whose testimony, as confederates “should be received with great
caution and doubtingly examined.” (U. S. vs. Ocampo [1905], 4 Phil.,
400.) This evidence, the decision says, is corroborated by the testimony of
another accused in his own case and under circumstances which would not legally
permit of cross-examination. On such faulty evidence, the court would convict
the appellant, forgetting that the inhabitants of the house which was
robbed, while they identified the other accused positively, stated just as
positively that the appellant whom they knew was not in their house on the night
of the robbery; forgetting also that none of the stolen property was
found in the possession of the appellant; forgetting also that he was a
man of means, intelligence, and standing in the community; and forgetting that
he should be presumed to be innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. “A reasonable doubt is not a mere guess that defendant may or may not be
guilty.” (U. S. vs. Douglass [1903], 2 Phil., 461, 474.) And finally,
the decision fails to give proper consideration to the extended presentation of
the facts and the fair recommendation based thereon of the Attorney-General to
the effect that the appellant should be acquitted.
I agree with the Attorney-General that the judgment of the lower court should
be reversed and the appellant acquitted with the costs de
officio.