TRANQUILINA ALMADIN, PETITIONER, VS. CELESTINO ALMADIN, RESPONDENT.
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Almadin versus Almadin
The Case
This is Almadin versus Almadin, a very early decision of the Philippine Supreme Court, rendered in February 1903, applying the new Code of Civil Procedure. Tranquilina Almadin comes before the Court against Celestino Almadin, seeking to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna that had been rendered against the defendant by default. The action is not about the merits of the original quarrel at all. It is an application to reopen a default judgment on the ground of fraud, accident, or mistake, and it matters because it fixes, with unusual clarity, the starting point of the sixty-day period within which such an application must be brought. The Court's answer is short and strict: time runs from the day the defendant first learns of the judgment, and his own motion for a new trial is proof of the day he learned of it.
Procedural History
The case began in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, which rendered judgment by default on the first day of October 1902. On the sixth day of October 1902, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, supported by an affidavit offering an excuse for his failure to attend on the day fixed for trial, the very day the judgment was rendered. After the term of court at which the judgment was rendered had adjourned, the Court of First Instance, on the thirty-first day of January, entered an order overruling the motion for a new trial. The defendant then came to the Supreme Court by application to set aside the judgment, invoking the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure governing defaults caused by fraud, accident, or mistake. That application was filed in the Supreme Court on the second day of February 1903.
Facts
The defendant failed to appear on the day fixed for the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and on that same day, the first of October 1902, judgment was rendered against him by default. Five days later, on the sixth of October 1902, he moved for a new trial, supporting the motion with an affidavit that presented an excuse for his failure to attend.
The motion did not succeed. After the term of court had adjourned, the Court of First Instance, on the thirty-first of January, entered an order overruling the motion for a new trial. The defendant then brought his application to the Supreme Court to set aside the judgment, filing it on the second of February 1903.
The defendant argued that the sixty-day period allowed by the statute should be counted, not from the judgment of default, but from the date of the order of the Court of First Instance overruling his motion for a new trial. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the merits, because the application was plainly late.
Issues
- Whether or not the sixty-day period for applying to the Supreme Court to set aside a judgment by default runs from the rendition of the judgment of the Court of First Instance overruling the motion for a new trial.
- Whether or not the defendant's knowledge of the rendition of the judgment by default may be attributed to him as of the date he filed his motion for a new trial in the Court of First Instance.
- Whether or not the application to set aside the judgment was filed within the period fixed by the statute.
Applicable Provisions
Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1901, governs the procedure in cases of defaults caused by fraud, accident, or mistake, and fixes the period for the application. It provides:
The petition to the Supreme Court shall be made within sixty days after the complainant first learns of the rendition of such judgment and not thereafter.
This is the provision on which the entire case turns, because the Court reads its words literally and counts the sixty days from the defendant's first knowledge of the judgment, not from the denial of his motion for a new trial.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the sixty days are not counted from the order overruling the motion for a new trial. The petitioner contended otherwise, but the Court answered that the language of the statute is explicit upon this point, and it quoted the governing words:
The petition to the Supreme Court shall be made within sixty days after the complainant first learns of the rendition of such judgment and not thereafter.
On the second issue, the Court held that the defendant's knowledge of the rendition of the judgment by default must be attributed to him as of the date on which he filed his motion for a new trial in the Court of First Instance, that is, the sixth day of October 1902. His own motion, in other words, is the measure of what he knew and when he knew it.
On the third issue, counting sixty days from the sixth of October 1902, the period expired on the sixth day of December 1902. The application was filed only on the second of February 1903, long after that date. The Court therefore found it unnecessary to consider the case on its merits, and held that the application to set aside the judgment came too late.
Doctrine
Three rules follow from this case, and each is tied to the quoted provision. First, the sixty-day period to petition the Supreme Court to set aside a judgment by default caused by fraud, accident, or mistake runs from the day the complainant first learns of the rendition of the judgment, and not thereafter. Second, the filing of a motion for a new trial in the Court of First Instance is treated as the point at which the defendant's knowledge of the judgment is fixed, so the period is counted from that filing. Third, the denial of the motion for a new trial does not restart or extend the period; the statute's words are explicit, and the period is jurisdictional in effect, so an application filed after it expires will be overruled without reaching the merits.
Disposition
The application to set aside the judgment was overruled as filed too late, with costs of the proceedings against the petitioner.
Remember This
Memorize the line: the sixty days run from the day the complainant first learns of the rendition of the judgment, and the filing of his motion for a new trial is the proof of that day. Examiners use this case to test the starting point of the period for relief from a default judgment, and to test whether a denied motion for a new trial can extend a period that the statute has already closed.