FERNANDO HERMOSA, JR., AS JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, FERNANDO HERMOSA, SR., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ALFONSO ZOBEL Y ROXAS, DEFENDANT AN…

Fernando Hermosa, Sr. was the owner of certain real estate
situated in San Sebastian, Spain,
which he inherited from his parents. When he died on December 19, 1944, intestate proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Samar for the settlement of his
estate and his daughter Luz Hermosa was appointed administratrix. He left as
heirs his daughter Luz and a grandson, Fernando Hermosa, Jr.

On January 14, 1947, the
administratrix requested permission from the court to sell the property located
in Spain with
the conformity of her co-heir Fernando Jr. which was to be made through public
auction. The court granted the permission in an order dated April 5, 1947. As the sale could not
be carried out through public auction for lack of bidders, the administratrix
requested permission to sell the property privately, which request was granted
in an order of October 23, 1947.
Still unable to find a buyer of the property, the administratrix approached
Alfonso Zobel to interest him in buying the property but the latter, while
willing to buy it, did not wish to have negotiations with the heirs or go
through a cumbersome judicial process, and to overcome this objection the two
heirs Luz and Fernando agreed to have the property ceded and adjudicated to one
of them who may later carry on the negotiation with the prospective buyer. In
line with their agreement, they executed on November 18, 1947 a deed of cession
and adjudication of the property in favor of Luz Hermosa, and on November 20,
1947, the two filed a joint petition with the probate court explaining the
circumstances surrounding the adjudication of the property to Luz Hermosa and
requesting that the same be approved. Acceding to their joint petition, the
court issued an order approving the deed of cession and adjudication on November 21, 1947.

After the property had been adjudicated to Luz Hermosa, the latter renewed
the negotiation concerning the sale of the property to Alfonso Zobel and after
discussing the terms and conditions thereof, both agreed that the sale price
would be P20,000, Philippine currency. However, since under the laws of Spain
the lessee of a property which is sold may repurchase the same by paying the
sale price in Spanish pesetas at the official rate of exchange, in order
to protect the investment of the buyer it was agreed to state in the deed of
sale a sale price of P80,000.

Another problem that arose was in connection with the tax that the vendor
may be made to pay if the price were fixed at P80,000 and to obviate the same
it was likewise agreed to make it appear that the difference of P60,000 had
been paid to the vendor during the Japanese occupation. After the negotiation
had been completed, Luz Hermosa executed the necessary deed of sale on December
10, 1947, together with a memorandum wherein she stated that she had received
the amount of P60,000 during the years 1942, 1943 and 1944 and that out of the
balance of P20,000 she received P15,000 on account, the remaining P5,000 to be
paid after the property had been registered in the name of the vendee. And on April 27, 1948, this remainder was in
effect paid by Zobel to Luz Hermosa thereby completing the transaction.

Meantime, Luz Hermosa died and Fernando Hermosa, Jr. was appointed in her
place as administrator of the: estate of her late father, and when he came to
know that under the deed of sale executed by Luz Hermosa in favor of Alfonso
Zobel the sale price was P80,000 and Luz only reported to the probate court the
sum of P20,000, he demanded from Zobel the payment of the balance of P60,000,
or the specific performance of the contract, and when Zobel refused to accede
to his demand, he began the present action on May 28, 1954 in the Court of
First Instance of Samar asking for specific performance or the rescission of
the sale, plus damages, in his capacity as judicial administrator. Defendant
answered the complaint setting up certain special defenses and a counter-claim.
After hearing, the court found the complaint unmeritorious and rendered
judgment dismissing it but ordering plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of
P1,000 as moral damages and P500 as attorney’s fees and costs. The case is now
before us on appeal in view of the amount involved.

It should be noted that this action was instituted by plaintiff in his
capacity as administrator of the estate of Fernando Hermosa, Sr. and that its
purpose is to demand either the specific performance or the rescission of the
deed of sale executed by Luz Hermosa in her personal capacity in favor of
defendant Alfonso Zobel on December
10, 1947. Note should also be taken of the fact that Luz Hermosa
died on December 26, 1953 for which reason plaintiff was appointed
administrator of the estate in her place. Such being the case, plaintiff has no
capacity to bring this action for the property involved has ceased to belong to
the estate of Fernando Hermosa, Sr., the only party in interest who could take
this action being either the administrator of the estate of Luz or her heirs
and none of them is a party to this case (Article 1311, new Civil Code).

But plaintiff contends that the deed of cession executed by him jointly with
Luz Hermosa adjudicating to the latter the property in question in order to
facilitate its sale to the defendant is null and void for the reason that at
the time it was executed by him on November 18, 1947 he was still a minor and
so the cession did not have any legal effect. We fail to see how this
contention can be sustained it appearing that at the time he and his aunt Luz
executed said deed of cession, he was almost of age, or was already 20 years 11
months and 3 days old. As this Court said in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu,
37 Phil., 215: “The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real
estate, effected by minors who have already passed the ages of puberty and
adolescence and are near the adult age when they pretend to have already
reached their majority, while in fact they have not, is valid, and they cannot
be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the
obligation assumed by them or to seek their annulment.”

Moreover, after he and his aunt Luz had executed the aforesaid deed of
cession, they filed a joint petition with the probate court wherein they
explained the reason why the cession had to be made in favor of Luz Hermosa and
requested that said deed be approved. And after considering the reasons
advanced by them, the court approved the cession in the following wise:
“It having been shown that for the best interest of the estate the deed of
cession executed by Luz Hermosa Nunez and Fernando Hermosa, Jr. in favor of Luz
Hermosa Nunez on November 18, 1947 in the City of Manila and acknowledged
before a Notary Public should be approved by the court, upon motion of the
counsel for the heirs, the said cession is hereby approved” (Exhibit 10).
Plaintiff is therefore now estopped from disputing the validity of said
cession. As this Court aptly said: “The circumstance that, about one month
after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the appellants of his
minority, is of no moment, because appellee’s previous misrepresentation had
already estopped him from disavowing the contract.” (Sia Suan vs.
Alcantara, 47 Off. Gaz., p. 4561; 85 Phil., 669.)

It should be here mentioned parenthetically that plaintiff in his affidavit
Exhibit 4 stated that he was already of legal age. This is an affidavit
plaintiff executed on January 20, 1947
wherein he gave his consent to the sale of the property in question by the
administratrix Luz Hermosa the first time they decided to dispose of the
property for the benefit of the heirs. Verily, plaintiff cannot now be allowed
to repudiate such statement to the prejudice of defendant.

But even if it be granted that plaintiff has sufficient legal ground to ask
for the rescission of the sale, the fact remains that his right of action has
already prescribed, it appearing that he became of age on January 7, 1948, and
he only brought the present action on May 28, 1954, or more than four years
after he attained the age of majority. Under Article 1389 of the new Civil
Code, an action for rescission prescribes in four years from removal of one’s
incapacity, and this happened more than four years ago.

Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we need not discuss the other
questions raised by appellant in his brief.

The lower court ordered plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of P1,000 as
moral damages and P500 as attorney’s fees on the ground that in filing the
present action he was actuated by a deliberate intent to harass and molest
defendant knowing full well that he had no sufficient cause of action. We
entertain a different opinion considering that plaintiff did not take part in
the sale and so he was not aware of the circumstances under which it was
carried out. Apparently he was of the belief that the real consideration was
P80,000 as it was made to appear in the document and he brought this action in
the belief that defendant has not paid the balance of P60,000. In the
circumstances, we are of the opinion that the award of damages and attorney’s
fees is not justified.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed with the only modification
that the award of damages and attorney’s fees should be eliminated. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Montemayor, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.

Paras, C. J. Bengzon and Concepcion, JJ., concur in the
result.

CONCURRING AND
DISSENTING

PADILLA, J.,

I concur in the result, upon the ground that the alternative prayer for
rescission of the cession or assignment made by the plaintiff personally to his
aunt Luz Hermosa, now deceased, is barred, the same having been instituted not
within four (4) years after the plaintiff had become of age, and that the
plaintiff as judicial administrator of the estate of the late Fernando Hermosa,
Sr. is not entitled to bring this action but the administrator of the estate of
the late Luz Hermosa or her heirs. I disagree, however, with the majority on
the point of estoppel for the reasons stated in my dissent in the case of Sia
Suan et al vs. Alcantara, 47 Off. Gaz., 4561, 4564.